

**UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN:
CURRENT ISSUES IN RECONSTRUCTION**

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
**COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

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**UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN:
CURRENT ISSUES IN RECONSTRUCTION
(PART I)**

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:33 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde presiding.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.

Thank you for joining us today at this meeting of the Committee on International Relations for a hearing on the important subject of United States Policy in Afghanistan: Current Issues in Reconstruction.

The purpose of today's hearing is to listen to a variety of policy and academic experts, as well as those who are playing an important role in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan, in order to help us better understand the dynamics of our government's strategies in securing what is proving to be the greater battle for peace in Afghanistan.

Congress made a commitment to the government and people of Afghanistan through the passage of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, which became public law in December of that year, authorizing \$3.3 billion in economic and military assistance. The focus of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act is to ensure that Afghanistan becomes a viable and independent nation-state that is secure and free from terrorism.

It appears we still have quite a way to go before that goal is accomplished. Concerns about persistent insecurity and the slow political and economic reconstruction process are prevalent throughout Afghanistan, as well as among friends of that country.

Recent violent attacks have been directed not only at military targets, but at foreign aid workers, who are there serving the needs of the Afghan people. They are also directed, of course, at ordinary Afghans as they go about their daily business, and at Afghans in leadership positions. Those acts of banditry, violence, and intimidation are a direct challenge to joint Afghan/United States interests and national security.

We are concerned that some of those attacks represent a resurgence of support for the Taliban—not only from internal sources, but also from Pakistan.

Good governance can only come with security, and security can only be maintained through responsible institutions. Therefore, should our policy be to limit the power of those regional authorities who refuse to submit to the central authority of the Afghan Government, that is, “the warlords?” Appropriate support must be given to central institutions like the Afghan National Army to enable them to carry out their mandate to secure the national interest of the entire Afghan people. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia members, which is key to achieving security, will be difficult, as long as insufficient opportunities remain in the Afghan National Army and elsewhere in the economy.

The United States was never meant to bear the burden of rebuilding Afghanistan alone. The monies pledged at the Tokyo conference reflect the international effort by donors to reconstruct a nation shattered by nearly 30 years of conflict. If the United States wants to see donors stay continuously engaged, then we have to do a better job working with the Afghans to achieve security. Nobody will invest in Afghanistan as long as the insecurity continues.

The fall of the Taliban regime created newfound hope in the hearts of the Afghan people. For Afghan women, this meant an end to oppressive rule and the mark of a new beginning. There were dreams that their stifled intellects would soon be engaged in learning. Yet we are disturbed to hear that misogynist policies continue to be enforced all too widely, and that in many places too little has changed for these women.

If Afghanistan is to flourish politically, and guarantee the inalienable rights of its people, it needs to be able to enforce those rights in a legitimate and authoritative manner.

Today, we have several distinguished panelists, and we look forward to their observations and analyses on the current situation in Afghanistan. I warmly welcome you to the Committee. And with great pleasure I yield to ranking Member Tom Lantos so that he may make his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Thank you for joining me at today’s meeting of the Committee on International Relations for a hearing entitled “United States Policy in Afghanistan: Current Issues in Reconstruction.”

The purpose of today’s hearing is to listen to a variety of policy and academic experts, as well as those who are playing an important role in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan, in order to help us better understand the dynamics of our government’s strategies in securing what is proving to be the greater battle for peace in Afghanistan.

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Today, we have several distinguished panelists, and we look forward to their observations and analyses on the current situation in Afghanistan. I warmly welcome you all to the Committee.

I will now yield to my colleague, Ranking Democratic Member Tom Lantos, so that he may make his opening statement.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this extremely important hearing.

I think the fact that so few of our colleagues are attending this hearing is emblematic of the problem. And while I would like to submit my prepared opening statement for the record [not submitted], I would like to make some observations, because there are profound similarities between the crisis in Afghanistan and the crisis in Iraq, which we will need to tackle on a fully bipartisan basis. These are national problems.

Our victory in Afghanistan 18 months ago, like our more recent victory in Iraq, rid the world of dangerous, repressive terrorist regimes, and promises to deliver peace, prosperity, and eventually some form of democracy to the captive Afghan people. And in so doing, enhance their national security, and that of the entire civilized world.

It so happens, Mr. Chairman, that the military phase of both the Afghanistan and Iraqi operation will be taught as extraordinarily successful examples of military strategy, and the lightning speed with which victories were achieved, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, will be a subject of study for military historians for generations to come. And while the two situations are extremely different, there is one profound similarity between the Afghan situation and the Iraq situation.

We, as a nation, and our government, and specifically our Department of Defense, are congenitally opposed to the concept of peace-keeping and nation-building. When in point of fact, the concept of peace-keeping and nation-building are inextricably inter-

twined with a military victory. A military victory will be gradually eroded unless there is effective peace-keeping, unless there is effective nation-building. And while I do not have a push-button solution, I think one clearly logical avenue to explore will be to develop within NATO a major peace-keeping capability. We basically won the war by ourselves in the case of Afghanistan, with local support in the case of Iraq, with British support.

But then attention has turned away. People are preoccupied with new crises and new problems. Our Department of Defense is not enamored of peace-keeping, understandably so. And we have no established mechanism for nation-building.

Now, one of the signs of political maturity, which I hope this Administration will display because it was so strongly opposed to concepts of peace-keeping and nation-building, is to recognize that you change your mind if circumstances compel you to change your mind. And clearly the Afghan situation compels us to do so.

I would like unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to insert in the record an article I wrote for *The Washington Times* entitled "Secure Afghanistan Now."

Chairman HYDE. Without objection.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

COMMENTARY

The Washington Times

* SU

Forum

Secure Afghanistan now

As the United States and its allies attempt to restore order in Iraq, let us not forget the other country that still suffers from rampant insecurity — Afghanistan. The U.S.-led effort to liberate Afghanistan from chaos is in danger of failing. We are simply not putting enough military boots on the ground to fulfill the Afghani people's hopes for a stable society free from fear of terrorism, warlordism and repression.

The United States has declared that the "combat phase" of the Afghan war is over and will now focus upon reconstruction and stability operations. Combat persists, however, against American and Afghani forces nearly every day. Basic security is still lacking in the major cities and along key highways. Afghans remain under serious threat from terrorism, insurgency, widespread crime, banditry, intimidation, rape, suppression of minorities and women, and other grave violations of human rights, especially in areas with-

out a significant presence of U.S. or foreign troops.

Over the last two months, there have been more than 20 attacks on U.S. and Afghan military forces and civilians as well as on international relief workers. The U.S. government's own aid workers are nearly captives in their own compounds, unable to venture out into the countryside except for brief periods under heavy guard. Private aid workers, like the Red Cross, Mercy Corps and others, have no such protection. Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists are deliberately targeting civilian aid workers to drive them from the country and prevent Afghanistan's transformation into a stable and tolerant society.

Training of an Afghan National Army is seriously behind schedule and will not be at full strength for several years; police training is lagging, and disarmament of warlords' militias has not even begun. The Inter-

national Security Assistance Force, soon to be taken over by NATO, will not increase in size or capability nor operate outside of Kabul.

The administration's response to this security vacuum has been to tout its lightly armed, platoon-sized "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" to bring order to small areas in major cities, and to promise to pursue terrorists and bandits. This is a well-intentioned initiative — but completely inadequate. Unless the highways are patrolled and the Afghan-Pakistan border areas secured, all that these teams will reconstruct will be oases of relative security, surrounded by widespread lawlessness, poverty and misery. And pursuing terrorists after they have terrorized does little to encourage aid workers and investors to risk their personal and financial safety to rebuild Afghanistan.

This is why I have introduced legislation, co-sponsored by Chairman

Henry Hyde and recently approved by the House International Relations Committee, that requires the president to provide more security for reconstruction; to protect highways; to terminate and deter acts of banditry, illegal checkpoints, human rights abuses and intimidation; and

The United States has declared that the "combat phase" of the Afghan war is over and will now focus upon reconstruction and stability operations. Combat persists, however, against American and Afghani forces nearly every day.

to take immediate steps to support the disarmament of Afghan militias and irregulars. Our legislation also states that the president should significantly expand the International Security Assistance Force, as the Congress endorsed in the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, or take other steps, such as increasing the number and force levels of U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams to promote security across wider areas.

Without adequate security, reconstruction is a pipedream in Afghanistan, as well as Iraq. Unless we address these security gaps immediately, Afghanistan will slide back into chaos and again become a sanctuary and training ground for global terrorists. The administration has said it will not forget Afghanistan; let us hope the rest of the world will not remember it as a failure of American commitment.

TOM LANTOS
Mr. Lantos, a California Democrat, is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives and is the Ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee.

Mr. LANTOS. The thesis of the article is self-evident, and certainly not original. It is basically that outside of Kabul there is very little stability; even in Kabul there is very little stability. This is a huge country. This is like establishing a modicum of security in Paris, but not in the rest of France, or a modicum of stability in any capital city with the rest of the country being in the hands of warlords, gangsters, opium traffickers, and other unsavory characters.

I believe that our military victory against the Taliban has not fulfilled its post-war promise. And while I think historically it was an enormously significant achievement, since the radical Islamist yoke has now been lifted and freedom has been restored for many Afghans, peace remains elusive. And the security situation is deteriorating daily.

The new Afghan army, which we are in the process of creating, at the moment has about 5,000 members. And there is a consensus that something like 70,000 individuals need to be in this army, fully trained, fully equipped, to begin to perform their duty of providing security in this large and complex and faction-ridden society.

Earlier this month, Mr. Chairman, as you know, four German peace-keepers were killed and 29 injured in Kabul by a terrorist car bomb. This is painfully reminiscent of our losses in Iraq on a steady basis of our own soldiers. Humanitarian aid workers, as well as military personnel, are being routinely targeted by terrorists and by feuding warlords. Banditry, rape, and armed intima-

tion are becoming commonplace in the Afghan hinterlands, as warring ethnic groups, goaded by warlords and their private armies, intensify their violent power struggles.

Terrorists are exploiting this anarchy. Al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants appear to be reconstituting themselves, mounting a concerted effort to destabilize the government, impede reconstruction, and terrorize the population, in the hopes of making Afghanistan ungovernable until the United States gets tired and departs.

Mr. Chairman, we simply cannot allow this to stand. We cannot afford to squander our hard-fought victory against the Taliban. It is time for a new, more robust approach to Afghanistan security before it is too late.

First and foremost, other nations, especially NATO members, must do more. NATO has recently agreed to take over the 4500-person international security assistance force known as ISAF in Kabul. This is a necessary, but an insufficient, response to meet the security needs even in Kabul. NATO troops are needed now throughout Afghanistan in large numbers. NATO minimally must double the size of ISAF, and expand its mandate to provide greater security along major highways, and to prevent acts of banditry, human rights abuses, and intimidation.

For our part, we must press NATO to assume a bigger role in Afghan security, and guarantee the necessary logistical support for an expanded peace-keeping mission. We must decide whether we continue to support warlords—and I see some short-term practical benefits in it, but greater long-term dangers—or whether we truly support the central government led by President Karzai, whom you and I hosted here some months ago.

During the war we had no choice but to cooperate with regional military commanders and their militias to defeat our common enemy. But with the Taliban gone, our purposes and their purposes have diverged. It was inevitable that Afghanistan's regional warlords would regain power in the wake of the Taliban's defeat. But it is not inevitable that they retain and expand their power. Our continuing close military relationship with them only strengthens their hold over the local populations.

It is time, Mr. Chairman, to make the warlords realize that their continued relevance lies not with their armies, but with the new emerging democratic system in Afghanistan. We must compel the warlords to lay down their arms and recognize the power of the central government.

To prove that we are not only disarming rivals of favored warlords, the United States should begin by disbanding the private armies of both Defense Minister Fahim and Herat Governor Khan.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the international community and we must redouble our efforts to democratize Afghanistan. The current constitutional drafting process is secretive, and apparently strongly influenced by Islamist hard-liners. There is little or no public input. There are reports of intimidation of democracy advocates and political reformers. Elections are less than a year away. For democracy to take root in Afghanistan, it must be protected from warlords, exposed to the sunlight of open debate. And, Mr. Chairman, it is not too late to vindicate our victory in Afghanistan by reinforcing international peace-keeping, reigning in the warlords.

And until we take these steps, until we show the same leadership in peace that we showed in war, our victory could prove in vain. Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Thank you for a very comprehensive statement.

Since we have two panels of experts today, and I would like to get to all of them, of course, I am going to ask unanimous consent that any other opening statements by other Members may be made a part of the record at this point.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Yes, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Just reserving, but not intending, of course, to object, I would just like to suggest, if not for today but in any future hearings where the Full Committee takes up a subject not taken up by the appropriate Subcommittee of jurisdiction, that at least the Chairman and ranking Member be permitted to make opening statements.

Chairman HYDE. Well, I thank you. The Chairman and the ranking Member always do make opening statements. That will continue in that vein.

Ambassador Peter Tomsen, in the first panel, is a retired career foreign service officer who served as United States Ambassador to Armenia from 1995 to 1998. Prior to that assignment, Ambassador Tomsen was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He was President George H. W. Bush's Special Envoy to Afghanistan, with the rank of Ambassador, from 1989 to 1992. Ambassador Tomsen graduated from Whittenberg University in 1962 and holds a Master's Degree from the University of Pittsburgh. Welcome, Ambassador Tomsen.

Professor Barnett Rubin served as Special Advisor to the U.N.'s Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, during the negotiations that produced the Bonn Agreement, which Professor Rubin helped to draft. From 1994 to 2000, he was Director of the Center for Preventive Action and Director of Peace in Conflict Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. He is now a Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. He is also the author of many books and articles on Afghanistan. Welcome, Professor Rubin.

Mr. Bernard Frahi was appointed Chief of the Operations Branch at the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime in April of this year. In this capacity he oversees drug and crime-related technical assistance programs worldwide, through a network of 21 field offices. Prior to this assignment, Mr. Frahi was the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1998 to 2002. He is a French citizen, holds a Master of Arts degree in Law, and a degree in Criminology. Welcome, Mr. Frahi.

Professor Larry Goodson teaches Middle East Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College and is an Adjunct Professor at Dickinson College. Mr. Goodson served as an international monitor and technical advisor for elections at the Loya Jirga for the U.N. Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. He is also the author of *Afghanistan's Endless*

War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. He studied at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he received his B.A. in Political Science and Economics in 1984, and his Ph.D. in Political Science in 1990. Welcome, Professor Goodson.

Mr. Charles E. Santos is a specialist on Central Asian energy and politics. He is also the Director and founder of the Foundation for Central Asian Development. Mr. Santos helped establish the U.N. Special Mission to Afghanistan and served as its first political advisor. Welcome, Mr. Santos. We are honored that all of you are before our Committee.

And may I request, gently, that you confine your opening remarks to about 5 minutes as a summary? And your full statement, of course, will be made a part of the record.

And so we open with Ambassador Tomsen.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER TOMSEN,
AMBASSADOR, FORMER SPECIAL ENVOY TO AFGHANISTAN**

Mr. TOMSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.

The stunning American-led military victory in Afghanistan which ousted the Taliban and al-Qaeda regime has not been followed by an effective, adequately-funded reconstruction strategy to help Afghans rebuild their country and restore their self-governing institutions. Today there is a sense among Afghans, foreigners working in Afghanistan, and the media that the U.S.-led coalition and the moderate Hamid Karzai government have lost the initiative in Afghanistan.

If the present trends continue, 5 years from now Afghanistan is likely to look very much like it does today: Reconstruction stagnation, a weak central government starved of resources, unable to extend its influence to the regions where oppressive warlords reign, opium production soars, and guerilla warfare in Afghan/Pakistani border areas generated by Pakistan-based Muslim extremists continues to inflict casualties on coalition and Afghan forces.

A second possible scenario 5 years from now, while less likely, forecasts an even worse outcome: Backsliding to the externally-fueled, chaotic 1992 to 1996 period of warlord conflict and chaos inside Afghanistan. Influential circles in Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China, and the Persian Gulf, for their own reasons, would welcome the resulting deterioration in the U.S.-led coalition's position in Afghanistan. Muslim extremists from Southeast Asia to North Africa would gain new followers by portraying a western retreat from Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies would be compelled to prepare another costly military operation to prevent the growing hemorrhaging of international terrorism, instability, and drugs from Afghanistan.

How can the strategic initiative in Afghanistan be recaptured? I have three positive recommendations, aimed at: One, revitalization of the coalition security and economic effort in Afghanistan. Two, achieving better coordination and policy direction for U.S. Government agencies operating in Afghanistan. And three, empowering Afghan moderates through institution-building.

The first recommendation urges an expanded NATO deployment, such as recommended by Congressman Lantos, coupled with the fresh reconstruction push that restores positive momentum in Afghan reconstruction. The U.S. should seek NATO approval to augment the international peace-keeping force in Afghanistan when NATO takes over the U.N. mandate for the ISAF in early August.

In addition to the approximately 5,000 troops in Kabul, NATO should employ two additional brigades to Afghanistan. One brigade should complement the U.S. 82nd Airborne Brigade down in Kandahar. This NATO brigade should be along the Afghan/Pakistan border in the east. The second NATO brigade should be exclusively devoted to protecting infrastructure projects, like roads, dams, and large bridges, coming on line in Afghanistan.

As we proceed on expanding the international peace-keeping force, however, we need to avoid two things. One is the briar patch of internal Afghan politics. Two is taking over the incentive for the Afghans themselves to do the job.

My second recommendation proposes creation of an overall U.S. policy on Afghanistan, better coordination on the ground, and a higher priority for Afghan institution-building. All three of these points were stressed in the splendid Afghanistan Freedom Support Act initiated by this Committee and passed by Congress last year. The Administration, however, has yet to create both a long-term Afghan policy and a mechanism to ensure disciplined inter-agency implementation of that policy. Separate stovepipe operations by different U.S. agencies operating inside Afghanistan remain the norm. Occasional White House meetings produce fixes, which have been piecemeal, not strategic, such as the instruction to USAID to complete its stalled Kabul-Kandahar road project by the end of 2003. Sending out more high-level officials to join the three Ambassadors already in Kabul will not do the job. The policy drift in U.S./Afghan policy must first be resolved in Washington.

The State and Defense Departments, the CIA, and USAID are the four main U.S. Government agencies active in Afghanistan. The Central Intelligence Agency's operations are a major obstacle to a unified and effective U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration needs to remember that the CIA is a policy-implementing, not a policy-making, institution.

You may recall, Mr. Chairman, that in the International Relations Committee's Afghan hearing in November, 2001, Dr. Rubin, Dr. Nouri, Dr. Kratkowsky and myself all warned about a renewal of the CIA's dependence on Pakistan's powerful Inter-Service's Intelligence Directorate (ISI) in deciding which Afghans the United States should support. That was a problem in the past; I am afraid it continues to be a problem. Unfortunately, during the overthrow of the Taliban/al-Qaeda regime, CIA personnel operating in Pakistan poured tens of millions into financing the return of the unpopular warlords whose misrule in the nineties played a catalytic role in the seizure of power by the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Today the CIA's independent ability to secretly fund Afghan contenders is undercutting stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

The Department of Defense has demonstrated creativity in establishing the impressive Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs, which blend security and development goals. DOD is also sta-

tioning construction engineers in some key Afghan ministries. These laudable DOD initiatives, however, have not been part of an integrated American reconstruction strategy in which all U.S. Government agencies are coordinating to maximize results.

The PRTs are doing excellent development work, but are under-resourced. They have great potential to do much more. The U.S. should double the currently-planned eight PRTs.

Mr. Chairman, the State Department has so far failed to seize the inter-agency initiative on Afghan policy, as recommended by Congress in the Afghan Freedom Support Act. This could begin with the state's establishment of an overall U.S./Afghan policy and an implementing strategy supported by the White House and other U.S. Government agencies involved in Afghanistan. The able U.S. Ambassador in Kabul, although Chief of Mission, seems to manage only one of four U.S. Government policies in Afghanistan. Other agencies have pushed into the policy vacuum.

Mr. Chairman, USAID, after a wobbly start, has done some very good work in Afghanistan in education and other areas. On the downside, too often critical time-sensitive U.S. goals of creating stability, security, jobs, democracy, and revived governing institutions are sacrificed to the torturously slow USAID bureaucratic process. USAID is also moving too slowly in assigning USAID personnel with adequate funds to the PRTs, where tangible development activity is actually taking place. Unfortunately, USAID continues in practice to resist guidelines to give a higher priority to Afghan institution-building.

USAID's mixed performance in Afghanistan reflects the shortcomings of a bureaucratic system. In no way does this distract from the fine work by the talented, dedicated, hard-working U.S. staff in Washington and in the field. And in my longer written testimony, I give some recommendations to the Congress and the Executive Branch for reforming USAID.

Mr. Chairman, my time has run out. I have a section on the Bonn Agreement. Let me agree with both you and Mr. Lantos in saying that it has encountered rough waters due to rising security concerns inside Afghanistan. However, resumption of externally-stoked conflict within Afghanistan is perhaps the biggest threat to the Bonn process. One face of the Pakistani ISI, in coordination with Muslim extremist circles in Pakistan, continues to assist radical Afghan groups mounting attacks into Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan. Over half of the Taliban cabinet remains in Pakistan, and they are not just sipping tea.

Iranian military and economic assistance to warlords near the Iranian-Afghan border mirror its machinations to an eastern Iraq, and raise suspicions about Iran's rhetorical support for the Bonn process. The ruling clerics in Iran have an allergy to the Bonn Agreement goals of democracy, tolerance, and rule of law.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with just mentioning the final recommendation, which is empowering moderate Afghans. It is clear that only the Afghan moderates, symbolized by President Karzai, Foreign Minister Abdullah, and most of the Afghan cabinet have the desire and intention to implement the democratic Bonn roadmap. Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood), Afghan Islamists, such as Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, and Rabbani, may now pay lip service to de-

mocracy and elections. Ideologically and politically, they would once more embrace the anti-Western, al-Qaeda brand of Muslim totalitarianism as soon as opportunity permits.

U.S. policy should therefore become much more decisive in building up the moderate Karzai regime. The emphasis must be on gradually strengthening the central government and its reach into the regions through the center's economic, police, and military presence in the provinces.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of the Mr. Tomsen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER TOMSEN, AMBASSADOR, FORMER
SPECIAL ENVOY TO AFGHANISTAN

The stunning American-led military victory in Afghanistan which ousted the Taliban-Al Qaeda regime has not been followed up by an effective, adequately funded reconstruction strategy to help Afghans rebuild their country and restore their self-governing institutions. The initial enthusiasm genuinely felt by the Afghan people that peace was returning has clearly faded. Today, there is a sense among Afghans, foreigners working in Afghanistan, and the media that the U.S.-led coalition and the moderate Hamid Karzai government have lost the initiative in Afghanistan.

Mr. Chairman, this does not mean that the momentum is now with the ragtag bands of fanatics left over from the Taliban-Al Qaeda period presently staging sporadic attacks into Afghanistan from Pakistan. No, instead there is a sort of pall, a paralysis, obfuscating the future of Afghanistan. The overwhelming majority of Afghans oppose the Muslim extremists, the hated warlords, and continuing violence. But, increasingly fearful of the future, many are switching gears back to neutral in the event the U.S. and its allies leave and the fanatics return.

CURRENT TRENDLINES IN AFGHANISTAN

If present trends continue, five years from now Afghanistan is likely to look very much like it does today: reconstruction stagnation, a weak central government starved of resources, unable to extend its influence to the regions where oppressive warlords reign, opium production soars, and guerrilla warfare in Afghan-Pakistani border areas generated by Pakistan-based Muslim extremists continues to inflict casualties on coalition and Afghan forces.

A second possible scenario five years from now forecasts an even worse outcome: backsliding to the externally fueled, chaotic 1992-1996 period of warlord conflict and chaos inside Afghanistan. This scenario involves warlords deploying ever larger forces, heavy weapons and aircraft to fight pitched battles with each other to expand their territorial control, capture more of the lucrative drug trade and extort money from traders. As in the 1990s, Kabul itself would eventually fall victim to conflict among warlords and Muslim extremists. The Western presence in Afghanistan would dwindle due to deteriorating security. Afghanistan would once more suffer great humanitarian tragedy, massive refugee outflows, human and gender rights violations.

Influential circles in Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China, each for its own reasons, would welcome deterioration in the U.S.-led coalition's position in Afghanistan. They would resume their competition for geo-political advantage against one another in Afghanistan, each employing their favored Afghan warlords or religious extremists. Al Qaeda, Taliban and other Muslim radicals would re-establish Afghan bases for international terrorism. Muslim extremists from Southeast Asia to North Africa would gain new followers by portraying a Western retreat from Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies would plan another costly military operation to prevent the growing hemorrhaging of international terrorism, instability and drugs from Afghanistan.

NEEDED: A NATO DEPLOYMENT AND FRESH RECONSTRUCTION PUSH THAT RESTORES
POSITIVE MOMENTUM IN AFGHAN RECONSTRUCTION

The U.S. should seek NATO approval to augment the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan when NATO takes over the UN mandate for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in early August. In addition to the approximately 5,000 troops in Kabul, NATO should deploy two additional brigades to Afghanistan.

One brigade would be teamed up with Afghan national police, military and local tribal militia to protect the road, bridge and major irrigation projects under con-

struction or planned in Afghanistan. Those projects are critical to ending the isolation of Afghanistan's regions from Kabul. Such isolation from Kabul underpins warlord rule, poppy production and openings for attacks by radical Muslims from Pakistan.

The second NATO brigade would be stationed along the eastern Afghan-Pakistani border. It would complement the Kandahar-based U.S. 82nd Division brigade screen against radical Muslim incursions from Pakistan in Afghanistan's southwest. The second NATO brigade's mission should include assisting the under-equipped, underfunded, beleaguered Afghan border patrol and national police units guarding the eastern Afghan-Pakistani frontier.

These NATO deployments are not sufficient to restore positive momentum in Afghanistan. The U.S.-led coalition must parallel the NATO military initiative with a reconstruction "push." This means more resources for Afghan reconstruction from the international community, particularly for rebuilding Afghan self-governing institutions and infrastructure projects. It also entails better organization within the U.S. Government to ensure a more effective U.S. strategy on Afghanistan.

NEEDED: AN OVERALL U.S. POLICY, BETTER COORDINATION ON THE GROUND,
INSTITUTION BUILDING

The Bush Administration is yet to create both a long term Afghan policy and a mechanism to ensure disciplined interagency implementation of that policy. In the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, Congress' suggested remedy was a Coordinator within the State Department to create "an overall strategy" for Afghanistan. The bill recommended that the Coordinator also be responsible for "ensuring program and policy coordination among agencies of the United States Government" and for "resolving policy and program disputes among United States Government agencies. . . ."

These worthy goals remain unmet. There still is no overall U.S. policy for Afghanistan. Separate "stovepipe" operations by different U.S. agencies in Afghanistan remain the norm. Occasional White House "fixes" have been piecemeal, not strategic, such as the instruction to USAID to complete its stalled Kabul-Kandahar road project by the end of 2003. Sending out more high level officials to join the three ambassadors already in Kabul will not do the job. The policy drift in U.S. Afghan policy must first be resolved in Washington.

The State and Defense Departments, the CIA and USAID are the four main U.S. Government agencies active in Afghanistan. Their individual operations are frequently not coordinated. Often they are conflictive. Afghan officials in Kabul and the regions are alternately confused and amused, as well as frustrated and angered by the different signals, commitments and policies of these various U.S. agencies operating in their country. The declared U.S. policy of supporting the Karzai Government and withdrawing support for warlords is not being implemented in the case of many warlords. Ironically, a common U.S. appeal to Afghans is to unify—even while U.S. agencies in Afghanistan are not unified.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA operations are a major obstacle to a unified and effective U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The Bush administration needs to remember that the CIA is a policy implementing, not a policy making institution. Unfortunately, during the overthrow of the Taliban-Al Qaeda regime, the CIA poured tens of millions into financing the return of the unpopular warlords whose misrule in the 1990s played a catalytic role in the seizure of power by the Taliban and Al-Queda. "This is the CIA's strategy. We're just implementing that strategy", Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld complained in Bob Woodward's *Bush at War* narrative of the post 9/11 Afghan war strategy sessions in the White House.

CIA freelancing in Afghanistan is nothing new. In 1989–1992, contrary to the then American policy to support a broad-based Afghan political settlement process, such as occurred following the Taliban's ouster, the CIA worked closely with Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) to pursue a purely military policy aimed at replacing the Afghan communist regime with Afghan Muslim extremists. CIA officials in Washington parroted the false ISI line that moderates like Hamid Karzai and Abdul Haq had few followers in Afghanistan. Today, the CIA's ignorance of the complicated Afghan situation, scarce CIA human intelligence assets in Afghanistan and the Agency's independent ability to secretly fund Afghan contenders are all too reminiscent of the CIA's counterproductive tactics during that period.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense (DOD) has demonstrated creativity in establishing the impressive Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Blending security and development, the PRTs are constructing small scale reconstruction projects in Afghanistan's poverty stricken rural areas and towns where most Afghans live. DOD is also stationing construction engineers in some key Afghan ministries.

These laudable DOD initiatives, however, have not been part of an integrated American reconstruction strategy in which all U.S. Government agencies are coordinating to maximize results. DOD should also be more aggressive in exploiting the PRT reconstruction platforms. The less than \$20 million DOD set aside for PRT projects this year will not make more than a reconstruction dent in Afghanistan's thirty-two provinces.

The under-resourced PRTs are nevertheless doing excellent development work and have great potential to do much more. The U.S. should double the currently planned eight PRTs. (The Gardez PRT must cover five tough provinces in the east—Paktia, Paktika, Khowst, Logar and Ghazni!).

The PRTs are winners, an innovative, productive framework for reconstruction in Afghanistan's rural areas. There should be more of them and more project funding support for each.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The State Department has so far failed to seize the interagency initiative on Afghan policy, as recommended by Congress in the Afghan Freedom Support Act. This could begin with State's establishment of an overall U.S. Afghan policy and implementation strategy supported by the White House and other U.S. Government agencies involved in Afghanistan.

Last fall, the State Department dispatched its superb international development specialist, Ambassador William B. Taylor, to Kabul. It has staffed up its own Afghan Coordinator's office. These measures, however, have not changed the impression that State has failed to exercise policy leadership on Afghanistan. The able U.S. Ambassador in Kabul, although "Chief of Mission" seems to manage only one of four U.S. Government policies in Afghanistan. Other agencies have pushed into the policy vacuum.

Within the State Department, since 9/11, no U.S. diplomat has yet started long term (forty-four week) Afghan language and area studies—an omission which contradicts the President and Secretary Powell's assurances that the U.S. intends a long term commitment to Afghanistan. The State Department has also had a hard time placing diplomats in the Pentagon's PRTs in Afghanistan, and then the assignments are for a "come and go" six month period. Rather than increase the incentives, State has turned to its retirees, some quite elderly, to serve in such Spartan locations as Konduz and Herat.

USAID

After a wobbly start, USAID has begun to register some significant accomplishments in Afghan reconstruction. Working with other donors and the Afghan Central Bank, USAID assisted the creation and distribution of a new Afghan currency. The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is now up and running in Afghanistan, producing a growing number of small projects. USAID sponsored Non-Governmental Organizations have printed millions of textbooks, trained teachers and reconstructed schools for boys and girls. USAID is also introducing modern facilities into the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank.

USAID's general record in Afghanistan, however, contrasts with its dynamic successes decades ago in South Korea, India, Taiwan, Turkey and elsewhere. Twenty years ago, USAID did outstanding work when USAID direct hire employees with technical expertise were in the field—specialists in everything from road building engineers to PhDs in agriculture. These skilled development experts knew how to manage projects directly and get results. They could liaise with host country ministries, read the blueprints, certify results, and often speak the local language.

Times have changed. USAID has drifted away from field work and become a huge contract writing agency. This has an especially deleterious effect in managing important infrastructure projects, such as major roads, bridges and dams. It takes USAID many months to negotiate contracts for large projects, then to transfer congressionally appropriated funds to contractors, who sub-contract to smaller contractors or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which then hire the technical expertise for projects on the ground. Concrete project implementation is delayed and feeble. Contractors and host country officials become frustrated by USAID regula-

tions and bureaucracy. Too often, critical time-sensitive U.S. goals of creating stability, security, jobs, democracy, and revived governing institutions are sacrificed to the tortuously slow USAID bureaucratic process.

One noteworthy contribution USAID has made in recent years—quick, effective emergency action response using USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)—has atrophied. USAID initially stationed a large OFDA team to Islamabad and Tashkent for deployment to Afghanistan, then deactivated it.

USAID is moving too slowly in assigning USAID personnel with adequate funds to the PRTs, where tangible development activity is actually taking place.

BUILDING AFGHAN INSTITUTIONS

Unfortunately, USAID continues in practice to resist guidelines to give a high priority to Afghan institution building. Unlike the warlords, Hamid Karzai and his ministries have received minimal resources for administrative expenses. Police, military officials, teachers and other government employees regularly are not paid their salaries. Corruption, inevitably, is rising.

An aggressive international assistance program led by USAID to provide large scale direct assistance to President Hamid Karzai’s fledgling government would produce political and security benefits. The central government’s control would expand into the regions. Strengthening the central government and its administrative arms in the provinces would also improve project implementation, accelerate demobilization of the warlord militias, and employ local Afghans—thus moving money into the economy to stimulate economic growth.

REFORMING USAID

USAID’s halting performance in Afghanistan demonstrates a generic problem related to meeting the 21st century development challenges exemplified in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush Administration should set the stage for revamping USAID by appointing a high level commission to offer recommendations for reform. The next administration and Congress could utilize these recommendations to remake USAID into a U.S. Government institution better organized to carry out mandates from Executive Branch policy makers and from Congress. In the meantime, USAID regulations and protocols should be relaxed and simplified to speed up USAID’s implementation of its programs worldwide, as well as in Afghanistan.

It needs to be stressed that USAID’s mixed performance in Afghanistan reflects the shortcomings of a bureaucratic system. In no way does this distract from the fine work by the talented, dedicated, hard working USAID managers and staff in Washington and the field.

LEVERAGING OTHER DONOR ASSISTANCE

A re-invigorated American reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan would inspire other donors to fulfill their previous pledges of assistance to Afghanistan. A more effective U.S. approach would leverage additional funding from governments reticent to invest more unless Afghanistan’s reconstruction shows promise. Just as important, a better crafted and implemented American approach to Afghan reconstruction would draw the enthusiastic cooperation of Afghans still hopeful that the international community will help their country get back on its feet.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BONN AGREEMENT

The preliminary stages of the Bonn process were successfully carried out, concluding with the June, 2002, Loya Jirga election of President Hamid Karzai by secret ballot. The next major milestones in the Bonn process are a Loya Jirga this coming fall to choose a new Afghan Constitution, and countrywide elections in June, 2004. While the constitutional Loya Jirga may be held as planned, the Bonn process in general, including the 2004 elections, will face growing difficulties if security does not improve and the reconstruction process remains bogged down. As Lakhdar Brahimi, the senior United Nations official in Afghanistan warned May 7, “support for the government and the Bonn process will erode dangerously” if security does not improve in Afghanistan.

Continuing implementation of the Bonn process will thus mainly depend on enhanced security accompanied by the successful extension of the Kabul government’s authority into Afghanistan’s regions. Well organized, fair, countrywide elections, for example, could not take place if feuding warlords still dominate Afghanistan’s regions and the central government remains weak.

A second roadblock on the Bonn track is competition among Afghanistan’s larger neighbors for geo-political position inside Afghanistan. One face of the Pakistani ISI,

in coordination with Muslim extremist circles in Pakistan, continues to assist radical Afghan groups mounting attacks into Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan. Over half of the Taliban cabinet remains in Pakistan, and they are not just sipping tea.

Islamabad is quite obviously concerned about the rising involvement of India in Afghanistan, including the recent establishment of two Indian consulates near the Afghan-Pakistani border. While improving relations with India, the Afghan government should bear in mind Pakistan's long held fear of an Indian-orchestrated strategic vise pressing on Pakistan simultaneously from India in the east and Afghanistan in the west. Like Switzerland and Nepal, Afghan interests would be best served by balancing off its more powerful neighbors and by avoiding entangling alliances.

Iranian military and economic assistance to warlords near the Iranian-Afghan border mirror its machinations in eastern Iraq and raise suspicions about Tehran's rhetorical support for the Bonn process. The ruling clerics in Iran have an allergy to the Bonn agreement goals of democracy, tolerance, and rule of law. There are reports that Iranian Revolutionary Guard intelligence elements are organizing Shia opposition to the Karzai government in the central Hazarajat region.

Iran, China, Pakistan and India are all building roads into Afghanistan's periphery. The roads will stimulate trade. They can also introduce disruptive foreign influence into Afghan border regions located far from Kabul.

Return of "waiting in the wings" externally stoked conflict within Afghanistan is perhaps the biggest threat to the Bonn process. A more robust American diplomacy in and around Afghanistan could moderate regional tensions and lessen the danger that Afghanistan will again become a cockpit for struggle among neighbors seeking advantage over one another.

EMPOWERING MODERATE AFGHANS

It is clear that only the Afghan moderates symbolized by President Hamid Karzai, Foreign Minister Abdullah and most of the Afghan cabinet have the desire and intention to implement the democratic Bonn roadmap. Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood) Afghan Islamists such as Hekmatyar, Sayyaf and Rabbani may now pay lip service to democracy and elections. Ideologically and politically, they would once more embrace the anti-Western, Al Qaeda brand of Muslim totalitarianism as soon as opportunity permits. If the current status quo persists, most warlords in the regions will attempt to fix election outcomes in their areas.

U.S. policy should therefore become much more decisive in building up the moderate Karzai regime. The emphasis must be on gradually strengthening the central government, and its reach into the regions through the center's economic, police and military presence in the provinces.

Empowering the Afghan moderates at the center should take precedence over removing destructive warlords by force, although that course might be necessary in some instances. Over time, however, the expanding power of the central government will elicit warlord cooperation and eventual submission. In the end, the era of warlord rule will fade, as an ever stronger central government assigns new governors and regional military leaders to the provinces.

Two important domestic Afghan factors would increase prospects for success of this strategy. One is the widespread opposition of the great majority of the Afghan people to both the warlords and the radical "Jihadi" politicians promoted by extremist Muslims in Pakistan and the Gulf countries. The second factor is the yearning among Afghans for peace and stability. If the Karzai Government, supported by a more effective U.S. Afghan policy, an expanded NATO peacekeeping presence, and a fresh reconstruction "push" shows itself capable of extending its authority to the regions, its popular support among the Afghan people will steadily grow. And that support would be the main determinant of success for the historic Afghan reconstruction process.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Tomsen. Mr. Rubin.

STATEMENT OF BARNETT R. RUBIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF STUDIES AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Mr. RUBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After your statement and the statement by Mr. Lantos, I am not sure exactly why you need the witnesses. And I commend them.

Before I go to my statement I wanted to mention something that was the subject of three telephone calls I received today from prominent Afghans. During President Karzai's current absence from the country on a state visit abroad, retrograde elements in the regime have arrested Mr. Hussein Mactaviv, a courageous newspaper editor, who has published an article critical of a number of extremist leaders in Afghanistan. I believe that when President Karzai returns, he will try to rectify this. But I hope that the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Government will give him every assistance in this regard. And I have supplied the text of his courageous article to the Afghan Embassy here, and can do so to the Committee if it wishes.

Eighteen months after this victory, as my colleagues and as you have said, the remarkable efforts of the people and government of Afghanistan, of the U.S. Government, of the United Nations, and of many others will be headed for failure, unless the U.S. leads an initiative to bring greater security to Afghanistan outside Kabul, and assist the national government in reestablishing an administration. If you do not bring security to the provinces, the provinces will bring insecurity to Kabul. You cannot secure Afghanistan from the capital alone.

In such a case it will not be possible to implement the constitution that is to be enacted in October, or to hold the national elections, which are scheduled for June, 2004 under the Bonn Agreement.

Threats to security, as everyone thus far has said, come not only from the enemies of the government, such as Taliban, al-Qaeda, Bulbuddin Hikmatyar, but also, as we know, from those ostensibly part of the government, local commanders and those regional leaders called warlords. These commanders lead, though they do not always control, armed groups estimated at about 100,000 men. Restoring security will require both removing or integrating these leaders, and demobilizing these forces. These, in turn, require economic reconstruction to provide a tax base, and to absorb those who are demobilized.

Commanders all over Afghanistan, in interviews with me and others, say they will not disband these factional militias, essential for security, which is essential for elections and other reforms, as long as the Ministry of Defense is simply another factional army dominated by the military organization of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, based in the Panjsher Valley.

In Afghanistan, however, only the Ministry of Defense has offered to provide security to the demobilization effort. Yet only the U.S., and particularly the Department of Defense, can exert the pressure and supply the incentives to assure reform of the Ministry of Defense, and provide an international security presence for the demobilization effort.

However, when Defense Minister Fahim visited Washington earlier this year, he received no clear message about Ministry of Defense reform, and the Pentagon still refuses to authorize U.S. forces in the field to participate in the demobilization effort.

As everyone has said, equally important is the extension of an international security presence to major regional centers. This Committee, the U.S. Congress, the Afghan Government, the U.N.

have all recommended the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force outside of Kabul. The U.S. has attempted to substitute for that the provincial reconstruction teams, which could make a significant difference, but only if their mandate were shifted away from very small-scale rehabilitation efforts, and toward genuine security provision. These PRTs should also monitor and support the demobilization effort, and back up the central government in its efforts to collect taxes and extend its authority. And this is the major issue for the future of Afghanistan. Will it have a government?

Recently, President Karzai started a courageous and difficult initiative to subordinate the so-called warlords to the lawful authority of the national government as either military or civilian officials, and to transfer or remove them if they resist. As a result, the government has already collected tens of millions of dollars in customs revenue from the provinces.

But the government has been hampered by the refusal of the United States to become in what are called green-on-green conflict among so-called friendly Afghans. It is one thing, Mr. Chairman, for the U.S. to refuse to take sides in factional struggles. But the national government of Afghanistan, attempting to exercise its lawful authority under the Bonn Agreement and the legal framework in force in Afghanistan, is not just another faction. It deserves the full commitment of the U.S. Government, and its full support.

These are transitional measures we are talking about. International security assistance is to assure the transition to Afghan security forces. The two are not in contradiction. It is vital to build the Afghan National Army. But Afghanistan does not need a large and powerful army involved in domestic security; indeed, it could be harmful. The U.S. military officers who are involved in training the Afghan National Army have said to me themselves that it is more effective and cheaper to invest money in the training of police.

Now that there is a new reformist Interior Minister, Ali Ahmed Jalali, who many of you know, I am sure, it is vital to do this. He is undertaking reform of that ministry, but with totally inadequate resources. He recently sent 150 newly-trained policemen to the northern city of Mazar-i Sharif to help implement an agreement on removing heavy weapons from that city. He is unable to pay their salaries. He has only \$7 million in the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, and he estimates that the cost of Interior Ministry reform are \$100 to \$120 million.

If the government does manage to discipline its commanders or wrest power from them, it will need to provide the population with the economic revival it craves. As the Chairman said, the security deficit prevents the government from implementing reconstruction and from attracting private capital. I have distributed a chart here showing that 18 months into the so-called reconstruction effort, reconstruction projects costing only \$200 million have been completed. We hear about money disbursement. Disbursement means that money is in accounts. Reconstruction projects completed are \$200 million. Reconstruction projects begun, maybe just with setting up an office, are less than \$1 billion.

The Kabul-Kandahar highway project that President Bush announced at the White House with President Karzai last year is stalled for lack of security, and the Pentagon will not allow the 3,000 U.S. troops in Kandahar to protect the Japanese engineers who are supposed to start building the highway from Kandahar. And therefore, it has not started.

Only 16 percent of all the assistance provided to Afghanistan thus far has gone through channels that are under the control of the Afghan Government or Afghan authorities, and hence, we are not building up their legitimacy and capacity.

All of these are undermining people's hopes for and support of the government, and breeding cynicism about the U.S. On a recent visit to Kabul, Afghan intelligence officials told me that anger was so high that their previous orders not to interfere with protests had been reversed, for fear that demonstrations could easily lead to angry riots. In the southern part of the country, where the Taliban originated, the resurgence of the anarchy and deprivation that bred that movement in the first place is creating conditions hospitable to their revival. Yes, Taliban leaders enjoy sanctuary in neighboring areas of Pakistan, which must do more to end their military activities. But that is not the only reason for their revival. They breed on the failures of our effort.

Therefore, in brief, we must support extension of ISAF or expand the size and mandate of PRTs, authorize U.S. and coalition forces to support the efforts of the government to expand its authority, use all means available to support reform of the Ministry of Defense and for demobilization, support building national police through the trust fund, and follow the Congress's lead in launching an effort, and by other international donors as well, to meet the Afghan Government's goal of \$15 billion in implemented reconstruction projects by the end of 2006.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARNETT R. RUBIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF STUDIES AND
SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Through the Fog of Peace Building:
Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan:

Barnett R. Rubin
Humayun Hamidzada
Abby Stoddard

Center on International Cooperation
New York University¹

June 2003

Executive Summary

A year and a half after the defeat of the Taliban, anger is rising in Afghanistan at the slow pace of reconstruction. Success in reconstruction means meeting goals, not fulfilling pledges or being generous. The overriding goal is enabling Afghans to build a country that contributes to, rather than threatens, their own and global security. As the government of Afghanistan becomes better organized and articulates both this goal and what is needed to reach it more clearly, it has become evident that donors underestimated the amount of assistance required. Initial pledges fell short even of underestimates of the needs and were far less than in other comparable cases. Initial disbursements, which in past cases have always exceeded subsequent ones, came relatively quickly and nearly met pledges, as donors have highlighted (see figure 1). But most of these disbursements went for emergency humanitarian needs, not reconstruction. Implementation of those reconstruction projects that have been funded has been exceedingly slow, leaving little to show on the ground. As of May 2003, donors reported that in 17 months they had completed reconstruction projects with a total expenditure of only \$191 million, out of \$2.1 billion pledged to reconstruction for the first twelve months. Furthermore, according to Afghan government figures, only 16 percent of the total disbursements (including for humanitarian purposes) had passed through channels controlled by the struggling Afghan government and had thus failed to build that government's capacity or legitimacy. The pervasive insecurity outside of Kabul prevented implementation of major projects and sapped the public's confidence in the new authorities. Failure to strengthen the government and provide security will doom the reconstruction effort even if contributions increase. The government has articulated an ambitious policy framework for reconstruction and asked for both reconstruction and security assistance. Success is possible, and at a modest cost. Failure by the US and other major states to respond will doom Afghanistan, the region, and the world to a repetition of anarchy that gave birth to the Taliban and refuge to al-Qaida.

¹ We would like to thank the Open Society Institute, and the governments of Norway, the United Kingdom, and Canada for their support of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Program of the Center on International Cooperation as well as the Ford Foundation for its general support of CIC. None of these institutions bears any responsibility for the views expressed here.

Recommendations

1. Put security first. All recovery efforts will prove futile in a chronically insecure environment. At best, resources will be squandered; at worst they will be hijacked by violent power-seekers. As now planned, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams developed by the US Department of Defense are unlikely to meet the stated goal of improving the security situation. Either expanding and clarifying the mandate of the PRTs or expanding the International Security Assistance Force to key regional centers could be crucial steps. Either the coalition, ISAF, or some other international force must provide international monitors for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia forces.

2. Put more in the pipeline. It is now clear that the pledges made at the January 2002 Tokyo conference were insufficient to meet either the statebuilding goals of the Afghan government or the interim recovery goals posited by the initial needs assessment carried out by the World Bank, UN Development Program, and Asian Development Bank. Those pledges should be viewed as the initial step in a process of continuing reassessment and augmentation of international assistance. In fall 2003, a new pledging conference or some other means of securing additional donor commitments should mark the second anniversary of Afghanistan's new beginning. The bar should be set at or near the \$15-20 billion needs estimate of the Afghan government, and the US, as leader of the military coalition and wealthiest donor nation, should endeavor to lead the contributions in every sector.

3. Aim resources locally. Whenever feasible, donors should channel their contributions directly to accountable Afghan government and civil society mechanisms. The trust funds established by the Afghan government and its international partners provide a straightforward and transparent means of transferring resources, and they should be utilized more fully as they prove their worth. All international agencies should be encouraged to minimize their expatriate staff and to mentor Afghan NGOs and companies in the implementation of projects. Such partnerships should be a precondition of grant agreements.

4. Increase transparency and equitability of assistance. Unless donors and implementers more accurately and precisely report the geographic and sectoral distribution of their assistance and ensure it is being programmed according to need rather than logistical convenience or donor preference, rumors and resentments will continue to fester among Afghans who feel they are being shortchanged.

5. Monitor to stay on track. Donors should sign an agreement with the Afghan government stating the goals of reconstruction and committing them collectively to supplying the amounts estimated as necessary. The periodic meetings of the Afghanistan Development Forum should be occasions not only for listing contributions and making new ones, but also for monitoring progress toward overall goals and agreeing on course corrections to meet them.

Introduction

The US military campaign in Iraq coincided with the second spring New Year (Nawruz, on March 21), since the Interim Administration of Afghanistan replaced the defeated Taliban regime. Since Nawruz also marks the start of the Afghan fiscal year, the government presented its plans for reconstruction to donor countries about that time at meetings in Kabul and Brussels, just as many observers were wondering what the record of reconstruction in Afghanistan might augur for Iraq.²

What they find must be disheartening and confusing. Opinions differ radically about how much the internationally-funded reconstruction effort has accomplished (table 1). Commentators use different implicit definitions of reconstruction and of success. The Afghan government has thanked donors for their generosity while trying to prod them into doing more and doing it differently. Donors and official spokesmen have highlighted both their speed at honoring most of the pledges made at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, held in Tokyo on January 21-22, 2002, and their continued commitment. Critics argue that the appearance of activity hides a reality of little progress. A participant in a May 6 anti-American demonstration in Kabul complained, "The U.S. captured Afghanistan and did nothing for the people."³

This reaction is hardly surprising. International assistance to post-conflict Afghanistan over the past two years -- from initial donor pledges, to disbursements of funds, to ground-level recovery activities -- has followed an established and unfortunate pattern, documented in the Center on International Cooperation's project on Pledges of Aid.⁴ Donors have concentrated on either emergency relief or high-profile issues such as education. Hence the transition to longer-term reconstruction has been patchy and slow, and certain essential recovery activities -- especially the provision of security and reform of the administration -- have begun late or not at all.

Amid discussions of whether glasses are partly full or partly empty, those monitoring the effort should remember the goal: "Keep your eyes on the prize, hold on," as the civil rights anthem preached. The goal is to build an Afghanistan that contributes to rather than threatens global security. It is not to "reconstruct" the Afghanistan of 1978, to fulfill pledges, to prove the generosity or good intentions of donors, or any of the other subsidiary purposes that are too often confused with the ultimate goal. Afghans do not believe that the world promised them to deliver on pledges at Tokyo, to be generous, to provide aid more quickly than in comparable situations, or to establish better coordination mechanisms. They believe the world promised them security and a better life under a government that would be accountable to them.

² See reports of these meetings on the information resource webpage of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan. <http://www.atf/>

³ April Witt, "Afghans Rally in Anger Toward U.S.," *Washington Post*, May 7, 2003, p. A27.

⁴ Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000, www.nyu.edu/pages/cic/conflict/conflict_project2.html). See also Shepard Forman, Stewart Patrick, and Dirk Salomons, *Recovering from Conflict: Strategy for an International Response* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, NYU, 2000).

The US never intended to undertake the reconstruction of Afghanistan by itself, and the existing international institutions are inadequate to such purposes. The roadblocks to reconstruction are both political, namely the lack of willingness to provide the security necessary for reconstruction and stabilization, and structural, reflecting the now well-recognized but unresolved gap between the surge-spending activities of emergency relief and the business as usual of long-term development aid. As the Center on International Cooperation documented in its studies, the current sluggish multilateral processes always delay the start of recovery assistance by at least a year (and often more) after a peace agreement, squandering the period when aid would be most effective. The welter of organizations with unclear, overlapping mandates competing for the same pool of funds makes the definition of goals and the imposition of accountability almost impossible. The procedure of publishing appeals whose totals are the sum of the costs of projects submitted by agencies, followed by an appeal for voluntary contributions with no mechanism for monitoring donors or holding them collectively responsible for the outcome, might be suitable for providing charity, but it is hardly likely to accomplish goals deemed vital for international security.

In contrast to other post-conflict situations, Afghanistan's transitional administration has challenged this system. Through its National Development Framework and budgetary process it has tried to set goals and define a strategy.⁵ Only setting goals – an essentially political exercise – can enable actors to estimate costs, and hence evaluate the effort. In the absence of clear political leadership, evaluation usually uses technocratic process-based criteria such as meeting pledges, rather than meeting goals. By centralizing monitoring and coordination in its Afghan Aid Coordination Authority (AACA), the Afghan authorities have tried to make donors more accountable to goals. This novel experience has the potential not only to make Afghanistan a more successful case of post-conflict “reconstruction,” but show how to restructure the international institutional architecture for peace building. That will require a significant change in direction, in particular by providing more resources for security and channeling more resources through the government's policy mechanisms.

Evaluations of Reconstruction: Confusing Process with Goals

The divergence of claims about reconstruction is striking. As any visitor to Afghanistan who talks to Afghans can attest, the May 6 demonstration expressed the way most feel: once again, the US has used them for its own interest, this time against al-Qaida, the last time against the USSR, and is not delivering on promises to rebuild. A BBC program on February 1, 2003, also offered a chance for Afghans (at least those with access to telecommunications) to express their views. The Pashto Service broadcast a program where Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani answered questions from listeners posed by telephone message, fax, and email.⁶

⁵ The National Development Framework and Budget, assistance tracking database, and reports on the recovery process can be found on the Afghan government website at www.af.

⁶ We would like to thank Najiba Kasraee of the BBC Pashto Service for making this transcript available to us.

The questioners expressed a great deal of frustration and suspicion. A fax from one listener, Sediqullah Ahmadzai, summarized the fundamental complaint: "Sometime before you [Ashraf Ghani] said Afghanistan has received \$1.7 billion from \$ 4.8 billion promised aid in Tokyo conference which according to you has been spent for reconstruction, but so far we have not seen any basic change in the people's daily life." Gulalai, from Sangin district of Helmand province, left a telephone message saying simply, "There are some people in Sangin district who do not have enough for their children to eat and to wear. They are not able to feed them, and their children are starving. They must be helped." Perhaps popular expectations are too high, since the needs are so great that no effort could meet more than a small fraction of them, especially not in the first year after a quarter century of war.

Dr. Mukesh Kapila, however, provided a generally positive view of reconstruction in a speech on the "Role of Donors" to a Special Panel on Afghanistan of the UN General Assembly on 18 November 2002.⁷ As both former special advisor on donor relations to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and former head of the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Division of the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) under Minister Clare Short, Kapila had unique experience in both a leading donor organization and in the UN's efforts to monitor and coordinate donor contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Kapila listed concrete achievements, including the return of over two million refugees, the enrollment of over three million children in school, immunization and prevention of epidemics, a major increase in food production combined with large-scale food distribution, creation of employment and paying government salaries, the start of police training, and repair of essential public infrastructure such as schools, power, water, health facilities, and government buildings. He also characterized the experience of donor coordination as "relatively positive" – faint praise, perhaps, but a change from other experiences.

These achievements were possible, according to Kapila, because out of a total of approximately \$2.1 bn in grants pledged at Tokyo in January 2002 for the first four quarters, \$1.8 bn had been "committed" and \$1.5 bn "disbursed" by early November.⁸ Hence, he concluded, "both the level and speed of donor assistance for Afghanistan has – so far – been commendable and better than for many other countries at a comparable stage in their recovery process." He noted the large numbers of countries assisting Afghanistan, including non-traditional donors such as its neighbors.

On the other side are critics who validate Afghan perceptions by pointing to numerous deficiencies that would explain the widespread discontent as the result of something other than inflated expectations. UN Special Representative of the Secretary-

⁷ We thank Mukesh Kapila for making his text available.

⁸ Kapila used a round figure of \$2 bn pledged for the first year. The Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan's Afghan Aid Coordination Agency (AACAA) reports that donors pledged the amount given in the text in grants ("Analysis of Aid Flows to Afghanistan," Update 2-b, 30 March 2003, <http://www.af/resources/mof/cU-GioA-AidAnalysis.pdf>).

General Lakhdar Brahimi, when asked by Barry Bearak of the *New York Times* in April 2003 what the biggest accomplishments of reconstruction were, answered, “Probably not very much.”⁹ CARE International, a non-governmental organization that has been working with Afghan refugees and in Afghanistan for most of the past quarter century, has argued in a series of reports that the reconstruction effort is seriously flawed.¹⁰ At about the same time as Kapila’s speech, CARE argued:

- The needs of Afghanistan have been seriously underestimated. CARE showed that the amount per person per year pledged to Afghanistan was no more than a quarter than the amount actually spent on post-conflict recovery in Rwanda, Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo.
- Most expenditure did not advance the goal of reconstruction. Most disbursements (60 percent in the first year, according to Kapila) have gone for emergency humanitarian needs, not reconstruction, as the drought that started in 1999 continued into 2002, and over 2 mn refugees returned, rather than the 800,000 for which UNHCR had planned. The AACA estimated that, through March 2003, 54 percent of aid had gone for humanitarian aid, aid coordination, or aid to refugees outside Afghanistan.¹¹ Many of the concrete achievements listed by Kapila were humanitarian. Humanitarian aid is much needed – in fact more of it is necessary – but it does not accomplish the goal of reconstruction, regardless of how generous it shows donors to be.
- Sustainability requires both long-term commitments and building Afghan institutions.
 - Long-term commitment is necessary to build up confidence in the private sector, whose investments will provide the only basis for a sustainable recovery. A World Bank study of reconstruction efforts shows that growth spurts occur on average starting with the third post-conflict year.¹² Nearly all pledges, however, are front-loaded for the first year or shortly thereafter.
 - Sustainability also requires strengthening the capacity of Afghan government institutions to plan and administer reconstruction and development. As of October 2002, however, CARE estimated, only 18 percent of funding had gone to trust funds for the Afghan government, with the rest spent on donor-controlled relief (45 percent), donor-controlled short-term reconstruction (25 percent), internal costs of donors and aid agencies (5 percent), donor-controlled traditional reconstruction (4 percent), and refugee relief outside of

⁹Barry Bearak, “Unreconstructed,” *New York Times Magazine*, Sunday, June 1, 2003.

¹⁰ CARE International in Afghanistan, “Rebuilding Afghanistan: A Little Less Talk, a Lot More Action,” *Policy Brief*, October 1, 2002, http://care.ca/info/publ/Afghan_Policy_Brief_e.pdf.

¹¹ ITSA, “Analysis of Aid Flows to Afghanistan.”

¹² Paul Collier and Anke Hoellner, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 2902, October 2002, http://econ.worldbank.org/files/19228_wps2902.pdf.

Afghanistan (3 percent). AACA stated as of March 2003, “Of the US\$1.84 billion grant money disbursed since the Tokyo conference, only **US\$296m or 16 per cent** [emphasis in original], has been provided directly to and received by the [Interim or] Transitional Government”¹³

- CIC’s research also shows that quick creation of jobs and economic security for unemployed youth has a disproportionate impact on stability. Such employment creation will start in Afghanistan only with the implementation of the demobilization program, scheduled to begin in June 2003.
- Reconstruction will fail without security, which only the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to regions of the country other than Kabul could provide, according to CARE. International spending on Afghanistan has gone overwhelmingly to the fight against al-Qaida and the Taliban (84 percent), with 9 percent for humanitarian assistance, 4 percent for the International Security Assistance Force, and 3 percent for reconstruction. The fight against the declared enemies of the government is necessary to promote security, but so is curbing abuses by commanders (“warlords”) nominally within the government structure who control most of the country.

CARE concludes, “Despite the rhetoric, the donor community has yet to deliver the required funding for Afghan reconstruction.”

Clearly, Kapila, CARE, and the Pashto service questioners do not perceive the same reality. The difference might be as simple and irresolvable as whether a glass is half empty or half full, or, perhaps, nine tenths empty or one tenth full. The debate might also conceal disputes over who is drinking the water, whether the glass is big enough in the first place, or whether water is really what is needed right now. All claims above are accurate, or as close to accurate as one can be. But some claims constitute accurate answers to the wrong questions.

Defining Goals, Assessing Needs

While CARE did not present an estimate of needs based on field research in Afghanistan, it used expenditures on other post-conflict situations as a proxy. CARE found that “In four recent post-conflict settings, donors spent an average of \$250 per person per year in aid. In Afghanistan they have pledged \$75 per person for 2002 and \$42 per person [per year] over the next five years.” Note that these figures compare actual expenditures in other countries to pledges in Afghanistan. More recently the AACA has estimated that donors disbursed \$64 per capita in 2002 and pledged \$50 per person per year through 2006, a quarter to a fifth the expenditures in other countries.¹⁴ US Ambassador Robert Finn told Barry Bearak of the New York Times that “the discrepancies in aid were all the worse because relative costs were higher in Afghanistan

¹³ ITSA, “Analysis of Aid Flows to Afghanistan”

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

since ‘There is almost no infrastructure left. And mostly, there was never any infrastructure, electricity, water. You have to supply everything.’¹⁵ It is hardly credible that Afghanistan needs only a fifth the per capita expenditure of Kosovo, a compact territory in Europe with relatively easy transport access, and where the entire armed conflict lasted less than three months from the start of the NATO bombing.

Ultimately there is only one way to evaluate the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan: is it allocating resources in such a quantity and in such a manner as to accomplish its overriding goal? All other questions, about needs assessments, fulfillment of pledges, or comparisons with other countries, are subordinate to that one. Assessing needs means estimating what one requires to reach a goal.

What is the goal? The original benchmarks were set by needs assessment for the reconstruction of Afghanistan carried out by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and UN Development Program in autumn of 2001 and early winter 2002, prior to the Tokyo conference.¹⁶ This assessment, actually a desk study of different sectors without either a field survey or an overall strategy, argued that Afghanistan would require \$1.4-\$2.1 bn for the first year, \$8.3-\$12.2 bn over five years, and \$11.4 to \$18.1 bn over ten years. Yet this assessment nowhere states what kind of Afghanistan this \$11.4-18.1 bn should build, nor does it contain criteria for judging if the expenditures achieve their objectives.

This was only to be expected. As the executive summary of the assessment itself said, ‘Given past turmoil in Afghanistan, much of the available data on the country is out of date. In view of the time and security constraints, it was impossible to field-test the available information. All data and conclusions in this document should therefore be treated as indicative.’¹⁷ The Afghan government and the newly reconstituted civil society had hardly had a chance to define their goals. The assessment noted that its authors had tried to compensate for this: ‘Consultations were held with Afghan civil society representatives in Islamabad and Tehran and the views of members of the Interim Administration were solicited in Kabul. More detailed consultations, as well as fieldwork, will be undertaken after the Tokyo meeting to flesh out the reconstruction program and firm up the funding requirements.’¹⁸

Rather than leaving goal setting to international agencies, however, the Afghan government itself is now leading the process. At the Afghan High-Level Strategic Forum in Brussels on March 17, 2003, Finance Minister Ghani articulated the alternatives that could result from different courses of action and pressed the donor countries to take bold steps. This was one of those rare times in history when, as he put it, ‘the moment is open,’ and things can be done that will have an impact not for just a few years, but for a

¹⁵ Bearak, ‘Unreconstructed.’

¹⁶ World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan: Preliminary Needs Assessment For Recovery And Reconstruction, January 2002, <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Countries/Afghanistan/CB1C6A33FB68218485256B44004B58E5?OpenDocument>.

¹⁷ Ibid., ‘Introduction,’ [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/intr/\\$File/n-intr.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/intr/$File/n-intr.pdf).

¹⁸ Ibid., ‘Executive Summary,’ [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/ex/\\$File/n-ex.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/ex/$File/n-ex.pdf).

century. "What we do this year," he said, "Can benefit our people and the world, or it may be a missed opportunity that will never occur again." He laid out three scenarios for Afghanistan five years thence:

1. Afghanistan might be stable and relatively prosperous, Western-friendly, with an international orientation. Internal disintegration would be only a memory, as rule of law became firmer. The government would be actively working to reduce poverty, and a growing private sector would provide employment and support for the eradication of poppy cultivation. Afghanistan would fully participate in global security arrangements and the struggle against terrorism.
2. Afghanistan could become another failed development project. It would lurch from crisis to crisis with intermittent successes. There would be no reform, and people would stagnate in poverty. International donors and the government's own sources of revenue might provide enough resources to pay some salaries, but not enough to operate or maintain projects. The construction of many capital assets started during the first inflow of aid would remain unfinished. The country would accept loans that it could not repay and would have to petition for debt relief. It would become a ward of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, whose main role would not be as development partners but as auditors of conditionality.
3. Afghanistan could become a narco-mafia state. Criminal syndicates would take over the mining, oil, and gas industries, as the drug trade expanded throughout the region. Three hundred people would be extremely wealthy, and the rest would languish in poverty with no human rights. Rather than genuine security forces, Afghanistan would have militias serving mafias to guard (and fight over) mines, gas and oil fields, and drug-trading routes. Its impoverished and desperate people would provide recruits to militias of all sorts.

Elements of both scenarios two and three are already visible in Afghanistan today. Despite a bumper crop planted in many new areas of the country, opium prices are at a historic high, providing incomes for many militias. The intermittent battles between the militias of General Abdul Rashid Dostum and General Atta Muhammad in northern Afghanistan, though sometimes portrayed as either ethnic (Uzbek versus Tajik) or ideological (ex-communist versus ex-mujahid), often involve struggles for control of economic resources such as the Kud-o-Barq fertilizer factory and power plant, lucrative opium trafficking routes, and customs posts. The reconstruction program has already started providing opportunities to lure Afghanistan into the debt trap central to scenario 2. When the government singled out reconstruction of the highway from Kabul to Qandahar as one of its top priorities, the only resources the Asian Development Bank had available were soft loans for \$80 mn. Ghani rejected the offer despite hints that he could accept the loans now and default on them later.

Ghani argued that the donors and the government of Afghanistan should agree on the first scenario as the goal of reconstruction, a goal consistent with the stated efforts of the coalition war effort. According to his projection, realization of that reform agenda

would require a period of 15 to 20 percent annual growth in legal industry – not poppy or arms trading. This in turn would require an inflow of international capital, including from the Afghan diaspora, and the transformation of cash hoards into productive capital. He outlined a coherent set of reforms required to produce such a result and presented a budget based on this goal.

Previously, at the meeting of the Afghan Development Forum (the donor consultative group) in Kabul on March 13 and 14, 2003, Afghan President Hamid Karzai had presented both the amount and the modalities of aid giving required for this result. According to Karzai and Ghani, this preferred scenario would require international assistance of \$15 – 20 bn over a period of five years, or 60-80 percent above the estimates in the original needs assessment. This aid would have to be sustained and predictable, and increasingly allocated to the government's budget, the key instrument of policy making. This would enable the government to build institutions that would eventually generate domestic revenue and create conditions for private investment.

Ghani estimated that the failed development scenario would cost about \$1.5 bn per year for five years (\$7.5 bn), about the amount that Afghanistan received during 2002. Hence, if donors, contrary to the usual experience, sustained the momentum of the first year and kept giving at the same rate, Afghanistan might eventually make a transition from being an active threat to the international community to being its chronic ward. The third scenario would have the lowest direct cost to the international community, but the highest indirect cost. As the muffler ad used to say, "You can pay me now, or you can pay me later." In this case, low aid flows would eventually decrease even further, as any aid money would be wasted or stolen by warlords and mafia leaders. As the state collapsed (or relapsed), various forms of rent-seeking conflict would reemerge and spread through the region. The Taliban or another such movement might eventually offer salvation from such chaos.

Presented in this way, Ghani's argument is quite different from admitting, as Kapila did in his speech, that the World Bank-UNDP-ADB preliminary estimates were probably too small because of lack of data. It also differs from CARE's argument that donors have shortchanged Afghanistan compared to other post-conflict countries, though they have. Spending more money does not guarantee success. Some of the post-conflict countries that have received much higher contributions than Afghanistan have nonetheless failed to attain the kind of objectives the transitional government has set for itself. Many of those expenditures, too, went for humanitarian assistance – the figures for Rwanda include the sums spent on the "refugee" camps in Congo-Zaire that helped sustain those who carried out the genocide. In some cases the local authorities, whether international (UN transitional administration) or national, did not propose or implement the needed reformist policy agenda, and the international donors lavished funds on their own agencies, international organizations, consultants, and NGOs without building the state structures needed for sustainable peace and development.

What should matter to both policy makers and Afghans is not the moral question of whether donors are generous or stingy with Afghanistan, but the political question of whether they achieve their goals. Building an Afghanistan whose people can assure their

own security and therefore contribute to that of the rest of the world is the prize to keep our eyes on. Since no estimates offer certainty, the policy choices offered by Ghani boil down to a classic risk-benefit analysis. Just how much risk should the world accept? Given what September 11 showed about the cost of underestimating the risk in the past, even cool-headed strategic thinkers who do not want to confuse foreign policy with social work might choose to throw caution to the winds and blow a few extra bucks on the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Fulfilling Pledges or Meeting Needs?

Kapila opens his defense of donor performance by stating that, out of a total of approximately \$2 bn pledged at Tokyo in January 2002 for the first year, \$1.8 bn had been “committed” and \$1.5 bn “disbursed” by early November. But although this sort of statistic, about proportion of pledges met, has become the most commonly cited measure of reconstruction progress, it actually gives no information at all about the reconstruction of Afghanistan, but only about the behavior of donors. Pricing an overall goal, as Ghani tried to do, provides a more relevant, though still broad, standard for judging the reconstruction effort.

The total amount of money pledged, committed, disbursed, or actually spent, is only the roughest measure of the progress of rebuilding. Donors did not pledge just to spend money on Afghanistan: they pledged, at least, to fund the reconstruction needs identified in the assessments, which were classified by sector. Donors have nonetheless consistently counted their humanitarian assistance toward fulfillment of their reconstruction pledges, despite the explicit statement in the needs assessment that “the assessment does not cover humanitarian assistance,” which must be funded separately. To try to arrive at a better though still rough evaluation, therefore, we shall try to remove humanitarian disbursements from the total, subtract disbursements sitting in accounts for projects that have not begun, and examine the sectoral distribution of the remaining reconstruction expenditure.

We have already noted that donors spent the bulk of their funds during the first year on humanitarian assistance rather than reconstruction – 60 percent by Kapila’s estimates, 68 percent by ours – and that, according to AACA, the figure had gone down only to 54 percent by March 2003. Humanitarian disbursements are also usually spent immediately. Reconstruction disbursements, however, sit in accounts while longer-term projects are carried out, so that the proportion of visible activities doubtless shows a higher proportion of humanitarian activities.

While donors should not count humanitarian aid as reconstruction, they need to provide both. Whenever possible, the one should link or be a precursor to the other. Settling returnees in camps or urban shantytowns, for instance, harms chances for long-term recovery. Despite diverting well over half of their reconstruction pledges to humanitarian assistance, the donors have still failed to fund the latter adequately. UNHCR spent its entire yearly budget for resettling repatriated refugees by July 2002. In early 2003 it was reportedly scaling down its plans for constructing new shelters for returnees still further, to 40,000 residences for a population in the millions. The result is

visible in growing shantytowns and unregistered settlements in major cities and in “secondary displacement,” as it is called, as some returnees conclude that Afghanistan was neither as peaceful nor as awash in assistance as they had been led to believe. Evaluating how adequate funding of humanitarian assistance has been would require a separate assessment.

A genuine measure of the progress of reconstruction would include only funds actually spent on reconstruction projects. This requires subtracting from pledges not only amounts committed but not disbursed, but also funds disbursed on humanitarian projects and funds disbursed but not actually used. The term “disbursed” means only that a donor has transferred funds to an account where the implementing agency can spend them, even over a period of several years. For instance, the AACA Donor Assistance Database (DAD) shows \$38 mn disbursed on the rebuilding of the Kabul-Qandahar-Herat road, a project listed as underway, yet only a few kilometers south of Kabul have been paved. Implementing agencies typically devote their initial expenditures to consultants (the ubiquitous “needs assessments”), vehicles, offices, computers, and communication equipment.

As of mid-May 2003, the mid-point of Year 2 of the recovery, the AACA database listed 1385 projects in 13 sectors. Approximately half of these activities were not in fact taking place, but were either awaiting funds to be disbursed, or had received funds but not yet gotten underway and hence were listed as “planned.” Of the remaining half, a total of 77 projects were completed, and 621 were underway (with funds disbursed). Of these 698 completed or ongoing projects, 244 were for emergency humanitarian relief and coordination of international agencies as opposed to longer-term reconstruction.¹⁹ Thus, from the \$5.2 billion pledged by the international donor community in the early months of the recovery, to date only \$947 million has been activated toward reconstruction activities on the ground in Afghanistan. Much of this has not been spent, and what has been spent has gone disproportionately to startup and overhead expenses. Figure 1, which summarizes these figures, goes a long way toward accounting for the apparent discrepancy between the claims by donors that they have disbursed funds in fulfillment of their pledges and the perception by Afghans like Sediqullah Ahmadzai that there are few changes in their lives.

Table 2 uses these data to provide upper estimates of what proportion of the sectoral reconstruction needs identified (inadequately) by the assessments has been met. These are upper estimates since they count all disbursements on projects that are “underway,” though many are far from completion, and the needs are underestimated. We have categorized the estimates by the sectors identified in the Afghan government’s National Development Framework, which are also used in the Afghan transitional authority’s budget and for aid tracking by AACA. The table compares the disbursements with estimated needs from the World Bank-UNDP-ADB 2002 assessment, which were reorganized to match the sector categories.

¹⁹ We defined humanitarian projects as those focused solely on refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs), distributions of food commodities and non-food relief items, and coordination costs of the international humanitarian community. The distinction of humanitarian and reconstruction projects is often unclear, and we erred on the side of inclusion.

The data show that, overall, nearly eighteen months after the installation of the interim administration, assistance funding has fallen short of even the underestimated baseline of Afghanistan's first-year reconstruction needs and is only 30 percent of requirements for the 2.5 year mark.²⁰ The high level of expenditure on health and nutrition (236 percent of first-year needs) probably reflects the inclusion of significant humanitarian expenditures, as does the figure for livelihoods and social protection, which includes targeted aid for vulnerable groups. The disbursements for natural resources management include large-scale agricultural programs, mostly involving distribution of inputs, such as seeds and implements, or rehabilitation of irrigation systems. The education expenditures show the work done on the back-to-school program rightly highlighted by Kapila and others. The transport and civil aviation category shows a deceptively high disbursement rate compared to actual progress made on the ground.

The omissions and shortfalls show a low level of activity on precisely those sectors most needed to make reconstruction sustainable. The experience of previous post-conflict states has demonstrated that the path from emergency relief to long-term development assistance cannot be treated as a linear progression. Rather a range of recovery activities needs to take place simultaneously across all sectors of society to reinforce the overall peacebuilding process.

CIC's Pledges of Aid study found that, in recent post-conflict recovery cases, certain essential needs received belated and inadequate attention in the international aid response. Notable among these were public safety measures such as police reform and demobilization of former combatants, and governance, including rule of law, recurrent costs, and civil society institutions. Also neglected in previous cases were macroeconomic assistance, debt relief, financial institution building, and job creation. In comparison, the Afghan reconstruction effort can boast some notable accomplishments. At the initiative of the Afghan government, which insisted on a quicker currency reform than international advisors thought possible, international donors helped the country introduce a new currency in November 2002. This bold measure stabilized prices after decades of hyperinflation. In February 2003, Afghanistan cleared the last of its international arrears, thanks to coordinated donor contributions to settle all of Afghanistan's overdue financial obligations to the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and International Monetary Fund.

Drawing upon the CIC study and some 50 other case evaluations, a group of foreign assistance experts in late 2001 attempted to distill the crucial lessons from previous recovery scenarios to inform the incipient recovery effort for Afghanistan. In the resulting consensus document entitled "Aid Responses to Afghanistan: Lessons from Previous Evaluations,"²¹ the group stressed the importance of, among other things:

- Definition of common, locally owned goals;

²⁰ We estimate that donors have disbursed \$947 mm to reconstruction projects that are underway or completed. The UNDP-WB-ADB base line estimate for reconstruction needs for 2.5 years was 3.1 bn (out of \$4.9 bn total cumulative funding needs for 2.5 years).

²¹ Paper submitted by the Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee Working Party on Aid Evaluation to the DAC Senior Level Meeting, 12-13th December 2001.

- Long term and inclusive international engagement;
- Concentration of efforts by external military forces on providing security and protection rather than delivering aid;
- Early support for rule of law (judiciary, security, policing) and land tenure institutions;
- Rapid disbursement of funds for prioritized recovery needs, preferably through a common fund;
- Debt relief and underwriting of recurrent costs for civil administration.

Of course, urgent human needs like food and shelter require priority attention, and a concentration of funds in relief activities in the very early stages of a recovery effort is not inappropriate. But slow and incomplete follow-through with other sectors that lay the basis for recovery risks continued suffering, dashed expectations, loss of credibility of the new government, opportunistic grabs for power and profit, and, in the worst case, renewed anarchy and violence.

The unexpected rapidity of the Taliban's fall compressed the periods between the acute crisis and the reconstruction phases. Given that donor bureaucracies take time to translate verbal pledges into received grants, and implementing agencies take time to translate received grants into projects on the ground, reconstruction activities were unavoidably late out of the starting gate.²² Complicating matters further, U.S. military operations against the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Hizb-i Islami holdouts continued throughout the recovery process, while the ISAF peacekeeping force was restricted to Kabul, perpetuating insecurity across most of the country. This hindered reconstruction activities in some cases and brought them under the control of provincial warlords in others.

If one accepts that recovery from conflict and future progress depend upon broad security, adequate funding, and timely implementation of projects that form a strategy to meet goals articulated by a legitimate government, the future of Afghanistan seems on perilous footing. The implications of an expenditure pattern characterized by unclear goals and leadership, inadequate funding, and massive delays in implementation, if continued, are clear. Afghanistan is on track to becoming what Ashraf Ghani called a "development failure," where the recurrence of armed conflict could lead it to regress to a mafia-run narco-state.

²² The Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority has divided the recovery effort into three time periods, reflecting the protracted humanitarian relief effort required and the late onset of reconstruction activities: Immediate Humanitarian Support Phase (Before 21 January 2002); Reconstruction & Humanitarian Support Phase (21 January 2002 to 20 March 2003); and Support to National Development Budget (After 21 March 2003), (ACA website: http://www.afghanistangov.org/dad/dad_report.html).

Sustainability and State Building

Afghanistan can avoid that future only if it develops a state with a basic capacity to govern and police the society, regulate the economy, and resolve disputes peacefully. Over the past twenty-five years, the Afghan state has lost the weak capacity that it had, creating the conditions that allowed the country to be hijacked by terrorist and extremist groups and making criminal activity a rational economic choice for many. The breakdown of the state resulted from the fragility and failure of the state constructed by the old regime; the attempt by Afghan communists and their Soviet backers to use that weak apparatus for an ill-thought out program of social change imposed by violence; the massive arms supplies poured into uncoordinated guerrilla groups by the US and its partners in support of the Afghan mujahidin; the abandonment of international political and assistance efforts after the collapse of the USSR; and, finally, the support of competing armed groups by Afghanistan's neighbors and transnational extremist groups.

Such a situation can be changed, but not without investing in state institutions and the people to staff them. It was probably inevitable that donors, agencies, and NGOs would continue their habits of privileging humanitarian assistance, giving primarily through international agencies into the start of the reconstruction period. As Kapila rightly states, donors committed or disbursed much of the expenditure – in particular the humanitarian expenditure misleadingly tabulated as fulfillment of reconstruction pledges – before the new Afghan government had in place structures to handle such funds. The government has now established trust funds and engaged international firms to handle procurement and audit its accounts, though no doubt it still has a long way to go, as BBC listener Mohammad Yaseen Wardak said in a fax, “to stop corruption and encourage more aid from the world.”

As the statements of other BBC listeners showed, however, the failure to support Afghan institutions has proven to be a major source of discontent. Afghans commonly claim that the UN and NGOs spent too much on high salaries for foreigners and overhead without accomplishing concrete work:

- Anonymous telephone message to BBC: There are a lot of NGOs in Qandahar, so-called reconstruction NGOs, but so far they have not done any reconstruction job well. They neither construct a road, nor respond to the community's needs. All their budgets are spent on luxury vehicles, high salary for their staff, and meetings.
- Syed Qutbudeen Roydad (email to BBC): Why the Afghan government employs the foreign experts for reconstruction while there are many Afghan specialists proper for such posts in Afghanistan?

The press often rehearses the same issues. To choose a few random examples from a long file of quotations, Anis, a state-owned weekly, charged in its edition of December 29, 2002, “NGOs and individuals search for opportunities to earn and benefit themselves by exploiting reconstruction and propagandizing it. There are people who have earned and hoarded through this name but have not done the least thing.”

The weekly *Iqtidar-i Milli*, in its edition of March 5, 2003, was even harsher, but rather typical of Afghan comments:

According to some authorities in the ministries of planning, reconstruction, and education, the NGOs are not paying attention to the issues of planning, budgeting, recruitment, priorities of the ministries etc. They do whatever they think is good. In other words, they are an imposed state on oppressed Afghan people, a state that is placed inside the transitional state. . . . From the way they spend the money, it seems that the NGOs want the donated money to be returned to the donor countries in Europe. In fact it is new kind of oppression and plundering under the mask of humanitarian assistance....

Luxury, extravagancy and waste of money are another problem with NGOs. They spend the budget on things unnecessary. Till now, no NGO has published its work record clearly. Luxury in using very expensive cars and paying expensive travel allowance are the very common things experienced by many people. Unfortunately, embezzlement, more or less, has been seen in NGOs recently. If we imagine the amount of 1800 million dollars spent on reconstruction and the works 1300 NGOs have done in our country, many questions arise: an educated Afghan employed by an NGO receives 200-300 dollars [per month], whereas a non-Afghan person doing the same job for the same NGO receives 100 dollars per hour. That is, a non-Afghan receives 700 dollars per day! NGOs and individuals search for opportunities to earn and benefit themselves by exploiting reconstruction and propagandizing it. There are people who have earned and hoarded through this name but have not done the least thing.²³

These charges are exaggerated and unfair, especially regarding those NGOs that have been present in Afghanistan for many years under very difficult conditions, when Afghanistan was in neither the headlines nor even the back pages. Organizations such as the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, CARE, Save the Children, Oxfam, Médecins sans Frontières, and the International Rescue Committee (no slight intended to others) have stuck by the people of Afghanistan through the most difficult times. Most of these organizations have very few expatriate non-Afghans supervising a large Afghan staff. But these quotations are nonetheless representative of much Afghan sentiment and should remind us that not all expenditures on “reconstruction” actually (re)construct anything. One of the few areas where expenditure consistently exceeds estimated need has been organizational overhead. CARE found that five percent of all disbursements had gone to internal costs of international organizations, nearly a third of AACA’s estimate of how much aid has been channeled through the Afghan government.²⁴ And this is only overhead listed as such: much such expenditure is attributed to programs rather than explicitly to overhead.

Some Afghans consequently demand a greater role for the Afghan government:

²³ Thanks to Manoel de Almeida e Silva and Ghulam Haider of UNAMA for supplying these press excerpts. Naturally they bear no responsibility for their content.

²⁴ CARE International in Afghanistan, “Rebuilding Afghanistan,” p. 5.

- Wali Shah Mandozai, Miranshah, Pakistan (telephone message to BBC): Those countries, organizations, World Bank, and so on who want to help Afghanistan in reconstruction should submit their donations to the government to spend on the proper and required fields.
- Kamal Sadat, Mazar-i Sharif: (telephone message to BBC): The Afghan government must bring all the NGOs in a central office where they are to be employed and sent to the required province and fields according to needs.

Others, however, recognize the shortcomings of the administration in its current state:

- Anonymous telephone message to BBC: All the reconstruction affairs must be done through the NGOs under UN supervision unless an organized administration appears in Afghanistan.

That “organized administration,” which would provide an alternative to the proliferation of uncontrolled and expensive international agencies and NGOs, has started to develop. Only four months after assuming office, the Interim Administration of Afghanistan presented its first budget to donors. A month later followed the publication of the National Development Framework (NDF), a strategy for the recovery and development of Afghanistan that defined overall goals and the sectoral strategies needed to meet them. In October 2002 the Islamic Transitional State elected at the Emergency Loya Jirga in June presented its first development budget, keyed to the sectors defined in the NDF. In March 2003 it presented its second operational budget, following serious budgetary consultations in the cabinet.

Supporting the government is central to building a state, the core task of the international effort in Afghanistan. It is also vital for donor coordination. Multilateral efforts are often inadequate, because no one is in charge. Each donor can pride itself on its generosity, but no one calls the participants to account if they fail to accomplish the goal. The UN is too much of a members’ club to play that role effectively. Despite the difficulties such a role entails for an aid-dependent state, the Afghan government is trying to do so. The government recognizes that it does not yet have the capacity to implement many programs it wishes to establish and plans to use NGOs and international agencies, including the for-profit private sector, as implementation partners. It asks, however, that an increasing amount of aid go through the government budget, even if the government decides to use others to implement its program. As Ghani said:

There is a big difference between a donor directly funding an implementing partner, such as an NGO, private organization, or a UN agency, to deliver a service, and a donor funding the ARTF [Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which provides support to government expenditures], through which the government contracts the same implementing partner. In the latter case, the government structures and processes are strengthened, and the government gets the credit for service delivery, because it is the government who assures that

services are provided to the community. This is a critical element in building a sustainable state, which is key for lasting peace in Afghanistan.²⁵

Thus funding to the government through the ARTF or other mechanisms will support governance, conform to a coherent plan, and provide the government with the leverage to provide leadership to the multilateral effort.

CARE's statistics showed, however, that only 18 percent of the total assistance had been disbursed through funds under the control of the Afghan government. By the time of the Afghanistan Development Forum in March 2003, AACA's figures put that figure at 16 percent. The UK, Norway, and a number of smaller donors have expressed support for funding programs through the government's trust funds, but the two largest donors, the US and Japan, still resist it in favor of funding their own far more expensive organizations. According to the AACA, the US contributed \$7 million to the initial government trust fund, the Afghan Interim Administration Fund (AIAF), making it the fourth largest contributor, behind the EU, the Netherlands, and Germany. Japan was sixth largest contributor to the AIAF with a disbursement of \$3.7 million. By May 2003 the US and Japan had only disbursed \$5 million each to the ARTF, placing them at the number-eight spot, together with Denmark. Neither Japan nor the US has committed to contribute anything to the Army or LOTFA (Law and Order) trust funds.

The ultimate goal must be a strong and capable government in firm control of the course of reconstruction, supported by a healthy civil society sector of Afghan NGOs and community-based organizations to do the work of rebuilding the country. Even if a certain amount of aid to the Afghan government is lost to inefficiency and corruption, one must ask, is it worse to lose the money to Afghan corruption, while building the capacity to overcome it, or to lose it to expensive though well-documented contracts with US-based organizations, while failing to build institutional capacity in Afghanistan?

Reconstruction and Equity

When Afghans speak about reconstruction, one of the hottest debates is over distribution: who gets what? The distributional questions about aid raise a number of linked questions about equity and the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan and the international effort to support it:

- Afghans often say that the largest beneficiaries of reconstruction expenditures are UN agencies, international NGOs, and foreign consultants, not Afghans. The "international community" is in Afghanistan to serve its own interests. As Iqtidar-i Milli said, "From the way they spend the money, it seems that the (international agencies) want the donated money to be returned to the donor countries in Europe."

²⁵ World Bank, "Donors Renew Support for Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund," Press Release, Brussels, March 18, 2003.

- Among Afghans, many believe that a small, Westernized elite linked to international institutions and donor countries, and living only in Kabul, monopolizes the benefits. Some of these people lived in the US or other Western countries for most of the past quarter century and have recently returned to take over ministries and reclaim their large houses in the wealthier areas of Kabul. One of the most popular slogans at the May 6, 2003, demonstration in Kabul protesting the slow pace of reconstruction was “death to dog and cat washers,” a reference to Afghans returning from the West who exaggerated their menial employment abroad into impressive resumes.²⁶ All over the country, people echo the sentiment of the BBC caller who asked “Is the reconstruction program only for Kabul or for all Afghanistan?”
- Many believe that their regions or ethnic groups are being discriminated against for political reasons. People from different regions and ethnic groups suspect that their rivals have unfairly captured the benefits. A BBC caller from Khost, a Pashtun tribal area of southeast Afghanistan, asked why the areas of the United Front (commonly called Northern Alliance) were being rebuilt. An interlocutor of Rubin’s from Panjshir, where the core of the UF originated, however, claimed that roads were being built only in the Pashtun areas, not in the north, because Ashraf Ghani, a Pashtun from the southeast, was controlling the reconstruction process. Another caller, asking about the road from Shibirghan to Herat, accused the government and international agencies of ignoring northwest Afghanistan.

Such arguments draw strength from the severity of the needs and the lack of visible improvement nearly everywhere, and information alone will not resolve them, but a high degree of transparency about where money is being spent might help either defuse such conflicts or show what changes the government and donors need to make.

The issue of inter-regional distribution might be easier to resolve or at least evaluate in principle, but the existing data are insufficient to see through the fog of peace building. The AACA database asks donors to report where their projects are located. When we tried to use this database to evaluate the regional distribution of reconstruction assistance, however, we found that donors had classified projects accounting for 70 percent of disbursements as “nationwide.” The distribution of the remaining 30 percent represents too small a share of the total for us to publish an analysis of it, but it does tend to validate the complaint of the caller from Khost that the southeast is receiving virtually no assistance – the database reports assistance of approximately \$1 per capita to date in that region. Donors and agencies need to provide a much better accounting of where they are spending their money if the government is to be able to take this sensitive and potentially explosive political issue into account. If more expenditure is channeled through the government budget, more such information should also become available and subject to political negotiation.

²⁶ The phrase “dog and cat washers” apparently comes from stories written by Tanveer, an Afghan who represented the mujahidin movement in the Netherlands in the 1980s and who wrote satirical stories about Afghan refugees in the West. Some of these stories feature Afghans who get menial jobs washing pets for rich Europeans but send letters home describing their successes in business.

The other two issues, the self-interest of international actors and the concentration of activities and benefits in a Kabul-based elite, are more complex, and they are linked. Shifting funding to Afghan institutions, and in particular the government, so long as the latter is engaged in a reform effort, will show the international donors actually are helping Afghanistan rather than waving their flags and helping themselves. Projects should report the proportion of their funds spent on expatriate salaries and office and administrative expenses, including supplies and equipment. The government, rather than international donors, will ultimately be in a better position to deliver services in the provinces, especially if it succeeds in its current plans, undertaken together with the World Bank, to reform and restructure the provincial administration. Current efforts are focusing on the capacity of provincial and district administrations to deliver services in health and education.²⁷

Reconstruction, Security, and Political Stability

Success in reconstruction – or, more accurately, state building – will thus require funding at an adequate level, estimated by the Afghan government at \$15-20 billion through 2006, or 60-80 percent more than the estimate in the needs assessment prepared for the January 2002 Tokyo donors conference. This amount is in addition to the government's own revenue, which it is now taking difficult and even dangerous steps to generate. Success will require that increasing amounts of funding go to the government itself, either directly or through trust funds, and that the government adopt and adhere to an appropriate policy framework. It will require monitoring mechanisms to hold both donors and recipients accountable and to provide a factual basis to assess the inevitable protests against perceived intergroup inequities.

Above all, however, it will require a context in which it is possible to carry out reconstruction activities and plan for the future. It will require security: security of the personal safety of Afghan and international personnel working on reconstruction, security of the funds that will have to be transferred, security for officials so that they cannot be intimidated into making corrupt decisions, and security for lives and property of the traders and investors whose capital and future-oriented activities provide the only hope for reviving the Afghan economy and creating a sustainable tax base for the state. Without security the government cannot proceed with a meaningful constitutional process and certainly will not be able to hold elections. Yet, as every observer of Afghanistan has noted, modest and extremely limited international efforts have failed to bring security to most of Afghanistan outside Kabul.

Reconstruction and security potentially reinforce each other in a virtuous circle; thus far, however, the lack of each has hindered the other in Afghanistan. The overthrow of the Taliban by a combination of intensive bombing and funding numerous commanders all over Afghanistan both destroyed the effective if brutal security system of

²⁷ Assessing Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Early Observations and Recommendations for Action: A Guide to Government Functioning Outside of Kabul: Early Observations Based on Missions to Herat and Faryab (<http://inweb18.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/91e66bec154b73d5852567e6007090ae/6ca845f4fdbaa5de85256b9d005b009f?OpenDocument>).

the Taliban and created units of armed men only loosely accountable to any political structure. These militias have captured control of various areas and assets, including roads, customs posts, mineral resources, and markets in opium and other smuggled goods. Key leaders in the central government have formed alliances with networks of these traffickers, creating a political base out of a criminalized war economy. Demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating armed men into either civilian life or law-bound security forces and dismantling the stranglehold of the criminal economy on power relations are the key tasks of political stabilization and a condition for economic takeoff of the legitimate economy.

Demobilization evidently requires investment in reconstruction, not only in the establishment of reformed security forces for which some of the former fighters can be trained, but also because of the need to provide legitimate livelihoods to the majority who will be permanently demobilized. In the case of road building the reciprocal relation is clear. The Japanese project of rebuilding the road from Qandahar toward Kabul has not even begun because of concerns for the security of the Japanese staff who would have to work in the area north of Qandahar. The US has refused to deploy any of the 3,000 troops it maintains in the Qandahar area to protect them. The Afghan government can barely deploy its forces in the region without better roads.

The conundrum of road building illustrates the chicken-egg like quality of the relation of security to reconstruction. So does the problem of demobilization: even fighters willing to take up offers of civilian employment might be reluctant to hand over their weapons without guarantees of their security from attack by rivals. In both of these cases, and in many more, the difficulties of making the transition to autonomous provision of security require an external security assistance force.

The International Security Assistance Force in Kabul has performed the major task of providing a baseline of security in the capital and preventing the population from seeing the capital as totally under the military control of one faction. ISAF's limitation to Kabul and environs by both the Security Council resolution and the status of forces agreement with the Afghan government has limited its effect on reconstruction. Both President Hamid Karzai and UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi have advocated the expansion of ISAF to other major urban centers, as foreseen in the Bonn Agreement, but neither the US nor other potential ISAF troop contributors have been eager to do so.

In the course of its first year on the ground in Afghanistan, however, the US forces commander saw the close interrelationship of reconstruction with his military mission. Saying that he was tired of endless debates about whether security was needed for reconstruction or vice versa, Lt.-Gen. Daniel McNeil began looking for a way to "jumpstart" both. Other US officials also spoke of the need to achieve what they called an "ISAF effect" without ISAF. Initially they proposed embedding small units of Special Forces and CIA operatives with major regional commanders ("warlords") at least to inhibit them from fighting each other.

It is unclear if these teams prevented any such clashes, but they certainly did not provide security to either the population of Afghanistan or reconstruction or humanitarian workers. In response to these challenges, as well as an estimate that security challenges from al-Qaida and the Taliban were diminishing and confined to six provinces, the US military decided to shift more of its forces from war fighting to “stability operations.” The proposal eventually took the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These teams include both military and civilian components and, eventually, participants from the US and other coalition or troop contributing forces as well as from Afghanistan itself.

PRTs are units established in key regional centers including US military, military civil affairs teams, USAID, diplomats, and, eventually, military and civilian components from other states as well. The military component both provides some security for the team and carries out some of the work directly, but most of the emphasis is supposed to be on identifying projects together with the local administration, obtaining the needed funding, and overseeing the completion of the project by others in coordination with the local and national authorities. The military deployment in a PRT is considerably smaller than an ISAF contingent, at least in Kabul (fewer than a hundred rather than thousands), and the military seems to be counting on the reconstruction activity as a kind of security multiplier that will bring in intelligence and increase loyalty to the government. The increased security will then act as a reconstruction multiplier.

NGOs have criticized the PRTs for confusing the role of the military and assistance providers and hence failing both to provide security and to promote reconstruction.²⁸ PRTs appear to duplicate existing arrangements in some cases, and, though the idea was developed without consultations outside the US government, the military has been eager to consult others since and has modified the plan several times. Establishing PRTs does have one advantage over other proposals for improving security in Afghanistan: someone is actually willing to do it.

Nonetheless, like many other proposals for reconstruction, security, and other goals in Afghanistan, the proposal for PRTs seems largely dictated by what donor countries are willing to do, for reasons other than what it would require to achieve their alleged goals in Afghanistan. Thus far, for instance, the military personnel in PRTs are not authorized to participate in the demobilization of fighters, though that process is supposed to start over the summer of 2003 and would greatly benefit from international military observers and monitors, such as the military component of PRTs.

Yet without demobilization and security sector reform, starting with reform of the Ministry of Defense, not only physical and economic reconstruction, but political reform and every other part of the international assistance program for Afghanistan will fail, and the goal of making Afghanistan and the surrounding region permanently inhospitable to terrorist organizations will once again recede out of reach. The US, the UN, and virtually every major nation and potentially relevant multilateral organization have promised to do

²⁸ “ACBAR Policy Brief: NGO position paper concerning the Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” January 15, 2003, http://www.careusa.org/newroom/specialreports/afghanistan/01152003_ngorec.pdf.

better in Afghanistan, and, in view of the consequences of past inaction, with good reason. In addition, the people of Iraq, the Middle East, and the world will view the results – not the alleged intentions – in Afghanistan as an indication of what to expect in that high stakes venture. We can do it, but will we?

Table 1

Different evaluations of the reconstruction of Afghanistan

Mukesh Kapila, November 2002	“Both the level and speed of donor assistance for Afghanistan has – so far - - been commendable and better than for many other countries at a comparable stage in their recovery process.”
CARE, October 2002	“Despite the rhetoric, the donor community has yet to deliver the required funding for Afghan reconstruction.”
BBC Pashto service listener, Sediqullah Ahmadzai, to Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani	“Sometime before you said Afghanistan has received \$1.7 billion from \$ 4.8 billion promised aid in Tokyo conference which according to you has been spent for reconstruction, but so far we have not seen any basic change in the people’s daily life.”


Table 2: Assistance funding data by sector (Figures from AACA/DAD, May 2003)

National Development Framework Program Sectors	Estimated Requirements over 1 Year (USD Millions)	Estimated requirements over 2.5 years (USD millions)	Total Project Disbursements* to date (1.5 yrs) (USD Millions)	Percentage First Year Needs Met	Percentage Needs (2.5 yrs) Met to Date
	(World Bank/ADB/UNDP)**		(DAD)		
Pillar One (Humanitarian, Human and Social Capital)***					
Education and Vocational Training	80	210	83	104%	40%
Health and Nutrition	50	210	118	236%	56%
Livelihoods and Social Protection	130	350	152	117%	43%
Culture, Heritage and Media	10	20	6.9	69%	35%
Pillar Two (Physical Reconstruction and Natural Resources)					
Natural resources (Agriculture/Rural Recovery)	110	400	79	72%	20%
Urban Management, Services, Housing	30	130	29	97%	22%
Transport and Civil Aviation	60	210	162	270%	77%
Energy	40	240	5	13%	2%
Telecommunications	10	40	0.09	1%	0%
Pillar Three (Private Sector Development)					
Private sector development (trade and investment)	20	110	0	0	0%
Public Administration (incl. Local governance and community-driven development)	210	630	61	29%	10%
Security and the Rule of Law (includes Drug Control and Mine Action)	270	580	74.5	28%	13%
Unclassified aid****	10				
Unbudgeted: Human rights/civil society	(women's rights)	10	176.6		
Total	1030	3140	947	92%	30%

* Projects underway or completed with funds disbursed; ** Figures from World Bank/ADB/UNDP needs assessment (2002) "Table 1 Base Case - Cumulative Estimates of Funding Requirements on Commitment Basis."

Does not include non-reconstruction expenditures such as refugee and IDP assistance, food and non-food relief item distribution, emergency services, humanitarian logistics and coordination costs, and international agency capacity funding. * Includes first tranche of ADB loan.

Figure 1: Status of Afghan Recovery Assistance as of May 2003



- A. Government of Afghanistan estimate of needs over five years (\$15 billion). Source: "Afghanistan High Level Strategic Forum, Brussels, 17 March 2004, Chairman's Summary," <http://www.afghanistangov.org/aaca/index.html>.
- B. Baseline World Bank/Asian Development Bank/UN Development Program preliminary estimate of needs over five years from (\$10.2 billion). Source: World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/af/afrecon/afrecon.html>.
- C. Total pledged at the International Conference for Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo, January 2002, for first five years of reconstruction (\$5.2 billion). Source: Transitional Government of Afghanistan, Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA), (30 March 2003) "Analysis of Aid Flows to Afghanistan" <www.afghanistangov.org/aaca/index.html>
- D. Total committed as of 15 May 2003 (\$2.6 billion). Source: AACA, "Project Overview by NDP-SubNDP" (Update version: first half of May 2003).
- E. Total disbursed as of 15 May 2003 (\$2.1 billion). Source: AACA.
- F. Total disbursed for reconstruction projects as of 15 May 2003 (\$1.6 billion), excluding humanitarian assistance, defined as refugee/IDP aid, food, and relief commodity distribution, and coordination costs of international agencies. Source: AACA.
- G. Total disbursed for reconstruction projects that have begun as of 15 May 2003 (\$ 947 billion). Source: AACA.
- H. Total expenditure on reconstruction projects that have been completed as of 15 May 2003 (\$ 192 billion). Source: AACA.



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Afghanistan Reconstruction Project “Through the Fog of Peacebuilding: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan”

Barnett R. Rubin
Hamayun Hamidzadeh
Abbas Stockford

Chart Legend

A. Government of Afghanistan estimate of needs over five years (\$15 billion). Source: “Afghanistan High Level Strategic Forum, Brussels, 17 March 2004, Chairman’s Summary.”

B. Baseline World Bank/Asian Development Bank/UN Development Program preliminary estimate of needs over five years from (\$10.2 billion). Source: World Bank.

C. Total pledged at the International Conference for Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo, January 2002, for first five years of reconstruction (\$3.2 billion). Source: Transitional Government of Afghanistan, Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA).

D. Total committed as of 15 May 2003 (\$2.6 billion). Source: AACA, “Project Overview by NDF/Sub-NDF” (Update version, first half of May 2003).


E. Total disbursed as of 15 May 2003 (\$2.1 billion). Source: AACA.

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H. Total expenditure on reconstruction projects that have been completed as of 15 May 2003 (\$192 million). Source: AACA.

Afghan Reconstruction as of Mid-Year 2003: Goals vs. Results



A year and a half after the defeat of the Taliban, anger is rising in Afghanistan at the slow pace of reconstruction. Success in reconstruction means meeting goals, not fulfilling pledges or being generous. The overriding goal is enabling Afghans to build a country that contributes to, rather than threatens, their own and global security. As the government of Afghanistan becomes better organized and articulates both this goal and what is needed to reach it more clearly, it has become evident that donors underestimated the amount of assistance required.

Initial pledges fell short even of underestimates of the needs and were far less than in other comparable cases. Initial disbursements, which in past cases have always exceeded subsequent ones, came relatively quickly and nearly met pledges, as donors have highlighted (see figure 1). But most of these disbursements went for emergency humanitarian needs, not reconstruction. Implementation of those reconstruction projects that have been funded has been exceedingly slow, leaving little to show on the ground. As of May 2003, donors reported that in 17 months they had completed reconstruction projects with an expenditure of only \$191 million, out of \$2.1 billion pledged to reconstruction for the first twelve months.

Furthermore, according to Afghan government figures, only 16 percent of the total disbursements (including for humanitarian purposes) had passed through channels controlled by the struggling Afghan government and had thus failed to build that government's capacity or legitimacy.

The pervasive insecurity outside of Kabul prevented implementation of major projects and sapped the public's confidence in the new authorities. Failure to strengthen the government and provide security will doom the reconstruction effort even if contributions increase. The government has articulated an ambitious policy framework for reconstruction and asked for both reconstruction and security assistance. Success is possible, and at a modest cost. Failure by the US and other major states to respond will doom Afghanistan, the region, and the world to a repetition of anarchy that gave birth to the Taliban and refuge to al-Qaida.

Recommendations

1. ***Put security first.*** All recovery efforts will prove futile in a chronically insecure environment. At best, resources will be squandered; at worst they will be hijacked by violent power-seekers. As now planned, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams developed by the US Department of Defense are unlikely to meet the stated goal of improving the security situation. Either expanding and clarifying the mandate of the PRTs or expanding the International Security Assistance Force to key regional centers could be crucial steps. Either the coalition, ISAF, or some other international force must provide international monitors for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia forces.
2. ***Put more in the pipeline.*** It is now clear that the pledges made at the January 2002 Tokyo conference were insufficient to meet either the statebuilding goals of the Afghan government or the interim recovery goals posited by the initial needs assessment carried out by the World Bank, UN Development Program, and Asian Development Bank. Those pledges should be viewed as the initial step in a process of continuing reassessment and augmentation of international assistance. In fall 2003, a new pledging conference or some other means of securing additional donor commitments should mark the second anniversary of Afghanistan's new beginning. The bar should be set at or near the \$15-20 billion needs estimate of the Afghan government, and the US, as leader of the military coalition and wealthiest donor nation, should endeavor to lead the contributions in every sector.
3. ***Aim resources locally.*** Whenever feasible, donors should channel their contributions directly to accountable Afghan government and civil society mechanisms. The trust funds established by the Afghan government and its international partners provide a straightforward and transparent means of transferring resources, and they should be utilized more fully as they prove their worth. All international agencies should be encouraged to minimize their expatriate staff and to mentor Afghan NGOs and companies in the implementation of projects. Such partnerships should be a precondition of grant agreements.
4. ***Increase transparency and equitability of assistance.*** Unless donors and implementers more accurately and precisely report the geographic and sectoral distribution of their assistance and ensure it is being programmed according to need rather than logistical convenience or donor preference, rumors and resentments will continue to fester among Afghans who feel they are being shortchanged.
5. ***Monitor to stay on track.*** Donors should sign an agreement with the Afghan government stating the goals of reconstruction and committing them collectively to supplying the amounts estimated as necessary. The periodic meetings of the Afghanistan Development Forum should be occasions not only for listing contributions and making new ones, but also for monitoring progress toward overall goals and agreeing on course corrections to meet them.

Further information and the complete report on reconstruction in Afghanistan can be found at:
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict/conflict_project4.html

Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 418 Lafayette Street, Suite 543, New York NY 10003.
 Tel/212-998-3680. Fax/212-995-4706. Email/cic.info@nyu.edu

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for this hearing and for the commitment and leadership you have shown on this issue, which I recall from the last time Ambassador Tomsen and I appeared before you, on November 7, 2001.

Eighteen months later, the remarkable efforts of the people and government of Afghanistan, of the US government, of the UN, and many others, will all be headed for failure unless the US quickly leads an initiative to bring greater security to Afghanistan outside Kabul and assist the national government in re-establishing an administration. As the UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi told the Security Council in May, "The issue of security casts a long shadow over the whole peace process and indeed, over the whole future of Afghanistan." Without major improvements in security, combined with accelerated reconstruction efforts, it will not be possible to implement the constitution that is to be enacted by a Loya Jirga in October, or to hold national elections scheduled for June 2004. Both are key benchmarks of the Bonn Agreement, which forms the basis for the entire post-Taliban settlement in Afghanistan.

Reasonable people may differ as to how to meet this challenge. What is most disturbing in the present administration, however, is its denial that the challenge exists. Secretary Rumsfeld announced during his visit to Kabul on May 1 that security was improving in Afghanistan, making it possible to contemplate the start of troop reductions in the coming year. Mr. Chairman, in a memorandum you shared with the witnesses here today, you succinctly and accurately stated, "The goals of the United States in Afghanistan are to rebuild a viable and independent nation-state that is secure and free from terrorism." US personnel in Afghanistan, military and civilian, are working day and night to achieve these goals. But the administration is not backing them up with the resources and commitment they need to succeed.

Threats to security come not only from the enemies of the government, the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but also from those ostensibly part of the government, local commanders, including the major leaders called warlords. These commanders lead, though they do not always control, armed groups estimated at about 100,000 men, who often abuse the population, prey upon trade and travelers, and engage in various forms of trafficking. Restoring security will require either removing these leaders or integrating them into an accountable government structure and disbanding these armed groups in favor of accountable security forces. Both processes require the start of economic reconstruction in order to absorb the demobilized and provide the foundation of a tax base.

Commanders all over Afghanistan are tired, and many are ready to try another way of life, but nearly all say they will not disband their factional militias as long as the Ministry of Defense constitutes simply another factional army, dominated by the military organization of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, based in the Panjshir Valley. Furthermore, demobilization requires security measures. No such program has ever succeeded without international military observers. In Afghanistan, however, only the factionally dominated Ministry of Defense has offered to provide security to the DDR effort. Only the US, and in particular the Department of Defense, can exert the pressure, and provide the incentives, to assure reform of the Ministry of Defense and to provide an international security presence for the demobilization effort. Yet when Defense Minister Fahim visited Washington earlier in the year, he received no clear message about MoD reform, and the Pentagon still refuses to authorize US forces in the field to participate in the DDR effort.

Equally key is the extension of an international security presence to major regional centers. The Afghan government, the UN, and the US Congress, among others, have expressed a preference for doing so by expanding the presence of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul. Having opposed this effort, the US responded with an initiative from the field, the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams could make a significant difference, but only if their mandate were shifted away from small-scale rehabilitation projects and toward genuine security provision. The UK plans to establish a PRT in Mazar-i Sharif along these lines, and we should watch closely how it fares. PRTs should monitor and support DDR and back up the central government in its efforts to collect taxes and extend its authority.

This is the major issue for the future of Afghanistan: will it have a government that can assure the security of the Afghans and therefore, as we have learned, of ourselves? Recently President Karzai launched a difficult initiative to subordinate so-called warlords to the lawful authority of the national government as either military or civilian officials, and to dismiss or transfer them if they resist. As a result, Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani has already collected tens of millions of dollars in missing customs revenue. The government has been hampered in part by its own at times irresolute decision making. It has also confronted the refusal of the US to

become involved in so-called “green on green” conflict, among friendly Afghans. It is one thing, Mr. Chairman, for the US to refuse to take sides in factional struggles. It is another matter to treat the national government of Afghanistan attempting to exercise its lawful authority under the Bonn Agreement, as if it were just another faction. It deserves the full commitment of US support in that effort.

These, of course, are transitional measures. International security assistance assures the transition to Afghan security forces. It is vital to build the Afghan National Army, as the US is doing with the help of France, but Afghanistan does not need a large and powerful army, and it certainly does not need such an army involved in domestic political issues. The US military officers involved in training the ANA say themselves that it is more effective and much cheaper to invest money in the training of police, especially now that the Ministry of the Interior is being reformed with German aid under the leadership of the new minister, Ali Ahmed Jalali. Yet the minister is undertaking this vital task with totally inadequate resources. He recently sent 150 newly trained police officers to the north to take over security in Mazar-i Sharif after militias removed heavy weapons, but he cannot pay them. He has only \$7 million in the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, though he estimates his needs as over \$100 million.

If the government does manage to discipline its commanders or wrest power from them, it will need to provide the population with the economic revival it desperately awaits. This means building an effective, though small administration to create conditions for private investment. The security deficit has a direct effect on the ability of the Afghan government to implement reconstruction projects and attract private capital. Estimates of Afghanistan’s reconstruction needs range from 10 to 20 billion dollars over five years, through 2006. As shown in the chart I have distributed to this hearing, Afghan government statistics show that, eighteen months into the effort, less than \$200 million worth of reconstruction projects have been completed. Not a single major project has been completed, and few have begun. The Kabul-Qandahar highway project that President Bush announced at the White House with President Karzai last October is stalled for lack of security, and the administration still refuses to use any of the 3,000 US troops based in Qandahar to protect the Japanese engineers who would build the road. Furthermore, only 16 percent of all assistance has gone through channels controlled by the Afghan authorities rather than international agencies, NGOs, or companies. I do not underestimate the obstacles to strengthening and funding the Afghan administration, but we cannot do so by bypassing and substituting for it with expensive consultants.

Factional dominance of the central government, deteriorating security conditions, and near total failure to deliver the hoped-for benefits of reconstruction are undermining people’s hopes for and support of the government and breeding cynicism about the US. Afghan intelligence officials told me that anger was so high their orders not to interfere with protest had been reversed, for fear that demonstrations could lead to riots. Most important, especially in the southern part of the country, where the Taliban originated, the resurgence of the anarchy and deprivation that bred that movement is creating conditions hospitable to their revival. Taliban leaders enjoy sanctuary in border areas of Pakistan, which must do much more to end their military activities, but we would be deluding ourselves to think that the source of their revival is only foreign support. They breed on the failures of our effort. In brief, US policy should be modified as follows:

- Support expansion of ISAF to major regional centers, or expand the size and mandate of PRTs for provision of security, including for DDR.
- Authorize US and coalition forces in Afghanistan to provide support to efforts by the government to implement its legal authority including naming personnel, collecting taxes, and demobilizing militias.
- Use all means available to support genuine reform of the Ministry of Defense, a precondition for both building the ANA and demobilization.
- Increase support for building a national police force through contributions to LOTFA.
- Follow the lead of the US Congress by launching an effort by international donors to meet the Afghan government’s goal of \$15 billion in implemented reconstruction projects by the end of 2006, with emphasis on building Afghan capacity and a gradual but significant increase in funding through Afghan government channels.

Mr. Chairman, I know that much of the US efforts have been devoted to building democratic institutions, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including women’s rights in Afghanistan. These goals are essential, and most Afghans support them. But these goals cannot be realized without provisions for security and basic

livelihoods. And as we learned on September 11, when Afghanistan is insecure, so is the United States of America. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

S.O.S. FROM AFGHANISTAN
BY AHMED RASHID AND BARNETT R. RUBIN

America's strategy for stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan was heading for failure last week, when a bold new move by the Afghan government gave the U.S. what may be its last chance for success. It is a crucial moment: A failure to provide Afghans with security will push that country back to the state of anarchy that gave rise to the Taliban and allowed al Qaeda to base itself there.

As the U.S. seemed unable or unwilling to deal with a deteriorating security situation, last week President Hamid Karzai took the initiative. He acted to bring regional commanders under his control and has promised to resign if he fails. He summoned them to Kabul, where they agreed to remit taxes to the government and act as officials, not warlords. Now, Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani is sending commissions to the provinces to enforce the agreement. He says he will plant himself in the western city of Herat until the most powerful regional figure, Ismail Khan, submits to these rules.

This initiative answers demands for a legal government voiced by thousands of Afghans, who are drafting a constitution, preparing for elections, training for a new army and police force, teaching, rebuilding homes, tilling fields, clearing mines and sacrificing their lives in the fight against extremists. Yet in recent angry demonstrations many of these same Afghans poured out their bitterness at how few concrete results these efforts have produced.

This is not the assessment only of the "armchair columnists" to whom Donald Rumsfeld referred while on his May 1 visit to Afghanistan. It is a consensus that emerges from officials of the U.N., the EU, other U.S. allies, aid agencies, U.S. officials in the field, and Afghans loyal to Mr. Karzai. The differences between Washington's depiction and that of others is stark. On his way to Afghanistan, Mr. Rumsfeld announced, "The bulk of Afghanistan is permissive and secure." On May 6, however, U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi told the Security Council that "the issue of security casts a long shadow over the whole peace process and indeed, over the whole future of Afghanistan." Appealing for the deployment of international troops outside Kabul, he added, "the rest of the country must experience increased security lest support for the government and the Bonn process erode dangerously." The 5,000-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has no mandate to deploy outside the capital.

The enemies of the government are active—not mere "remnants." Daily, the regrouped Taliban rocket or ambush U.S. and Afghan forces in the south and east, where reconstruction (barely begun) is grinding to a halt. The Taliban are not the only source of disruption. The depredations of those within the government—the "warlords"—block assistance and alienate the public. More than 2,000 people have died in factional fighting since the defeat of the Taliban in December 2001. Kabul itself is factionalized. Two ministers were murdered in 2002, one by known—but untouchable—assassins from the dominant Northern Alliance faction. The Afghan forces in the city are mostly recruited from that group, based in the Panjshir Valley. Defense Minister Muhammad Fahim, their commander, continues to defy the Bonn Agreement, which requires him to withdraw forces from Kabul.

If the U.S. is serious about stabilization it will have to take on spoilers within the government, including some of those the U.S. armed to fight the Taliban/al Qaeda. A rebuilding of the army and police has to start with breaking the monopoly of Mr. Fahim's faction on the ministry of defense. Next, only an augmented international security presence in regional centers, plus targeted reconstruction aid that provides incentives for demobilization will bridge the security gap.

The U.S. continues to resist ISAF expansion, and others will not offer troops without U.S. leadership. Without security, reconstruction and political progress languish. Afghans complain they see almost no results of the billions pledged. Even when money trickles in, there is inadequate security to carry out tasks. During a September 2002 summit with Mr. Karzai, President Bush announced a showcase project—the rebuilding of the highway between Kabul and Kandahar. Though the U.S. heavily lobbied Tokyo to contribute and start work from Kandahar, Japanese officials claim that the Pentagon refused to deploy any of the 3,000 U.S. troops there to protect Japanese engineers. Hence after eight months, work has not begun in Kandahar.

Critical political projects are to start in June: a \$50-million campaign to demobilize 100,000 militia fighters; and a countrywide consultation on a new constitution. Yet without demobilization, writing the constitution is likely to prove a meaningless exercise in drawing up a document that cannot be implemented. As long as commanders can threaten people, Afghans will not be free to debate and institutions will not be able to function. Elections, required in June 2004 by the Bonn agreement, would turn into an exercise in competitive intimidation.

Fighters will not hand over weapons to the current ministry of defense. As one commander from eastern Afghanistan said, "Only when there is a demobilization process implemented by international forces in collaboration with the Afghan National Army will Afghans support it. We hate war, we hate guns, but only then will we surrender our weapons." While U.S. commanders in the field have helped negotiate the demobilization plan, the Pentagon has declined to help implement it. Mr. Brahimi told the Security Council that demobilization could not start without full reform of the ministry of defense. Yet President Karzai's aides were dismayed that during a visit to Washington earlier this year, U.S. officials failed to pressure Mr. Fahim over the continued control of the military and the intelligence service by his small faction.

People in Iraq and elsewhere are watching to see if the U.S. is committed not only to defeating regimes it sees as threats, but to providing security and governance to the long-suffering peoples of those countries. They will draw their conclusions according to the results.

Mr. Rashid, a correspondent of the Far Eastern Economic Review, is the author of "Jihad" (Yale, 2002). Mr. Rubin, the author of "The Fragmentation of Afghanistan" (Yale, 2002), is director of studies at the Center on International Cooperation, at NYU.

Updated May 29, 2003

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Bernard Frahi.

**STATEMENT OF BERNARD FRAHI, CHIEF, OPERATIONS
BRANCH, DIVISION FOR OPERATIONS AND ANALYSIS,
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME
PREVENTION**

Mr. FRAHI. Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for providing the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, and the opportunity to speak about general issues surrounding opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.

We have been witness, over the last 18 months following the swearing-in of the new Afghan administration, of the very deep nature of opium poppy cultivation, particularly rooted in the Afghan society and in the rural behavior of farmers in traditional poppy-growing areas.

I submitted with my recent testimony the executive summary of a study carried out by UNODC on the opium economy in Afghanistan. I would be pleased to leave for your records a full book of this study.

Let's begin from the facts. As you are aware, in 2002 poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 74,000 hectares, resulting in the production of 3,400 metric tons of opium. In 2003 the picture sounds rather bleak.

According to our pre-assessment survey carried out in February, opium cultivation appears to have spread to new areas, while a decrease seems to have taken place in traditional provinces of Helmand, Nangarhar, and Qandahar. Therefore, on balance, neither the area under cultivation nor the volume of output are likely to change significantly this year.

To understand the complexity to rid Afghanistan of its dependence on illegal activities, starting from opium, two factors needs to

be underlined. First, an economic factor. Opium prices, which used to be at \$50 a kilo, have recently shot up to \$550.

Chairman HYDE. We have two votes pending. I am reluctant to interrupt your statement. If you will indulge us while we scurry over to the Floor and do our duty, we will hurry back. And then we can pick it up where I interrupted you. All right? Fine.

We will stand in recess for 15 minutes.

[Recess.]

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. When last we met, Mr. Frahi was giving us an opening statement. And if you can pick up where we rudely interrupted you, that would be fine. Mr. Frahi.

Mr. FRAHI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I depicted earlier the rather stern forecast this year for poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. And I was saying that to understand the complexity to rid Afghanistan of its dependence on illegal activities, starting from opium, two factors need to be underlined.

One is the economic factor. Opium prices, which used to be at \$50 a kilo, have recently shot up to \$550 a kilo. At farm price, the income generated from this production reached, in 2002, \$1.2 billion, an amount that matches the total assistance provided last year by the international community. You may be interested to know that compared to the price of wheat, opium is more profitable. One hectare of opium, which provides about 50 kilos, will generate an income today of \$27,000, whereas one hectare of wheat will offer only \$800, about 30 times less.

Second, security and political factors. The task to rid Afghanistan of the drug economy requires much greater security than presently available. Reestablishing the rule of law and the judiciary in particular is a most important area for long-term stability.

The elimination of poppy cultivation requires enabling environment to establish the institutions needed for formal governance in civilized society, as well as to promote on-farm and off-farm income opportunities. And experience with successful elimination of opium poppy cultivation in other countries such as Pakistan demonstrate that eliminating poppy cultivation requires substantial commitment to long-term development in poverty-reduction strategies. Pakistan was declared poppy-free in 2000, after 15 years of assistance.

Given the scale of the problem, there can be no quick fix to eliminating opium production in Afghanistan. In this context, the national drug control strategy adopted last month by the transitional government of Afghanistan is extremely realistic. It forces the elimination of opium within 10 years through law enforcement and rural development. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime current program is amounting to about \$25 million, and has been developed and is being implemented to complement with national strategy. I will not elaborate. An annex has been forwarded, attached to my recent testimony.

However, in conclusion, I would like, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, to introduce suggestions for an effective opium poppy elimination strategy. Three leading points.

One, there must be more leadership. The commitment from the President of the transitional government is crucial and necessary,

particularly at the time of setting up central institutions. But it is not sufficient in the present Afghanistan state triggered by a strong tribal culture.

Poppy cultivation takes place for 90 percent of its extent in Pashtun areas, where prevails the Pashtun tribal courts. Experience proves that we need to engage with tribal communities, meet their elders at village or district level, and secure a surer commitment for poppy elimination with support of the religious leaders. The tribal and religious factor is of extreme importance, and cannot be ignored, particularly in this phase of political transition.

Second point. There must be alternatives to assist the farmers and accompany our decision for poppy eradication or long-term elimination. Assistance is to be provided in poppy areas, as well as in non-poppy areas. We need to reward those doing the right things voluntarily, if we don't want to see further poppy displacement to new areas, as it is the case this year. But we need to accompany law enforcement with rural rehabilitation programs. This can only be achieved if the Ministry of Finance agrees to devote resources to large-scale rural rehabilitation programs, and if international financial institutions balance rural donors' general resources accordingly.

Speaking about alternatives, I would like to inject a word of caution in poppy areas. Development agencies should move away from project activities that can have a direct facilitative effect on poppy cultivation, such as irrigation systems and fertilizers, in the absence of conditional agreement with Shiraz for poppy elimination.

Three, there must be effective law enforcement within a context of good governance and security. We need to break the trafficking chain existing between poppy areas and borders. This would include two points, and then we conclude.

One, more vigorous action against traffickers who buy opium in poppy areas, and transport this opium to processing laboratories or to border points. It is astonishing to observe that only 450 kilos of opium were seized in Afghanistan since January, 2003, when 3,400 tons were produced last year. In the same vein, only 97 kilos of heroin were seized in the beginning of the year in Afghanistan, while in 2002 Pakistan alone seized more than 9,000 kilos of heroin.

There is, second, a need to stimulate real operational interventions in Afghanistan against stockpiles and processing laboratories. Often there is the patronage of former commanders and warlords. Some are identified in Helmand provinces, and drug law enforcement could take place.

Finally, drug law enforcement requires international cooperation. One could further explore joint operations between drug law enforcement agencies from Afghanistan and Pakistan along their common borders, Afghanistan and Iran, Afghanistan, Takministan, and Tajikistan, with a view to dismantle all criminal organizations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Frahi follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BERNARD FRAHI, CHIEF, OPERATIONS BRANCH, DIVISION
FOR OPERATIONS AND ANALYSIS, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND
CRIME PREVENTION

DRUG THREAT ORIGINATING IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for providing the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) an opportunity to speak about general issues surrounding opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.

The problem of Afghan narcotics (opium, heroin and morphine) is serious. As a premise, I would like to stress three points:

1. During the past quarter century Afghanistan has found itself at the crossroad of violence and, as a consequence, of illegal activity. War and lawlessness have been the forces that have driven opium production to present levels, and not the other way around.
2. Afghanistan now faces a historic challenge: the establishment of an effective rule of law. The Government's commitment to controlling cultivation, trade and abuse of narcotics can be turned into real progress only if stability and security spread throughout the country.
3. Reference is frequently made to Afghanistan's drug problem. This needs a qualification: it is not true that the whole country is involved in illegal activity. Less than 1% of its land is cultivated for opium poppies, and no more than 6% of families derive the resulting illicit livelihood. Also note that only 5 of the country's 31 provinces produce opium on a large scale.

The Afghan Transitional Administration is gradually rebuilding the country's government. National policies, consistent with the emerging democracy, are being developed. The generous support by the international community, particularly by the nations that have taken the lead in different sectors of the government administration is indispensable for further consolidation. The generous support extended by the US Administration to the counter-narcotics work in Afghanistan is worth mentioning at this early stage.

While the opium economy undermines current institution-building efforts, the argument could be turned around: namely, the slow progress in the re-establishment of the rule of law is hurting the authority's ability to reduce the drug economy. It is a vicious circle of sorts.

Let's begin from the facts: the Crop Survey 2002-03

In 2002, poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 74,000 hectares, resulting in 3,400 tons of output from 5 provinces in the northern, eastern and southern parts of the country.

What about 2003? According to our pre-assessment survey carried out in February in 134 districts in 22 provinces, current opium cultivation appears to have spread to new areas, while a decrease has taken place in the traditional provinces of Helmand, Qandahar, Nangarhar and Oruzgan. Therefore, on balance, neither the area under cultivation nor the volume of output are likely to change significantly. Our 2003 opium poppy survey, which combines ground level and remote sensing activities, is underway and should be finished in August. It provides quantitative estimates as well as detailed mapping of the geographical distribution and intensity of opium poppy cultivation and opium production during the year. The report is published in September.

The Afghan Economy: the way out of illegality

Despite current efforts by the Transitional Administration, in the coming years Afghanistan will continue to be the world largest opium producer (at a time when in the Golden Triangle such cultivation is declining).

This projection is based on a simple consideration: over the past 20 years the Afghan agriculture, actually the country's entire infrastructure was destructed, resulting in a war economy in which arms, drugs, smuggling and opium provided livelihood, saving, credit, and the means of exchange for almost 20% of GDP.

In order to rid Afghanistan of its dependence on illegal activities, starting from opium, it is necessary to create ample and easily accessible opportunities for alternative, licit sources of income. This task, however, is rendered complicated by economic and political (security) factors—interrelated as they are. Let's look at them.

First, *the economic factors*. On the surface of it, the country seems to defy a basic law of economics, according to which price and risk trends are correlated. Opium prices, which used to be at about \$35-50/kg, have recently shot up to about \$550-600/kg. In macro-economic terms, while the value of the opium harvest in 1990s was

about \$150 million a year, in 2002 such revenue reached \$1.2 billion. (an amount that matches the total assistance provided last year by the international community).

In order to understand how important it is to redress the risk/reward balance in the Afghan country-side, another point needs to be stressed—this one regarding *the security and the political factors*. The task to rid Afghanistan of the drug economy requires much greater political, security and financial capital than presently available, to assist the rural areas affected by opium production and, above all, to improve the central government's ability to implement the opium production ban.

The threat to stability

Drugs originating in Afghanistan provide resources to crime and terrorism, and pose a major health threat. They ruin the life of entire communities. They corrupt. Let's take these points one at a time.

The drug dealers, among them the remnants of the Taliban, have a vested interest in ensuring that the state remains weak in Afghanistan. They ensure further flourishing of the drug economy with huge profits, recycled in *violence and death*. In pursuing this goal, they influence politics, foment regional strife, nourish separatist ambitions and armed conflicts to destabilize the government and challenge the national unity.

Corruption is both a cause and a consequence of narco-traffic. The UNODC Office has extensively studied drug trafficking routes in the region: a common element among them is the presence of corrupted government officials, corrupted port and airport staff, and corrupted customs employees. The old Silk Road, now turned into an opium-paved road, is riddled with such evidence.

Perhaps the most serious threat has come from the spreading of *HIV/AIDS* because of drug injections. In some of the countries neighbouring Afghanistan, 4 out of 5 new cases of the blood infection have been determined by drug addiction. Unless the problem is brought under control, the risk of a pandemic in the region cannot be excluded.

Finally, the massive drug traffic from Afghanistan endangers the *economic and social stability* in the countries located along the trafficking routes, fuelling crime, money laundering and terrorist activities. Unless we reinforce our efforts to strengthen the criminal justice system in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries the crime threat to stability will persist.

Sustainable rural livelihood for poverty reduction and opium poppy elimination

There is a need to recognise that social and political stability, as well as wider economic growth, are essential preconditions for eliminating opium poppy cultivation on a sustainable basis in Afghanistan. The elimination of poppy cultivation requires an "enabling environment" to establish the institutions needed for formal governance and civil society, as well as promote licit on-farm and off-farm income opportunities.

Poppy growing is the symptom not the cause of poverty. Indeed it should not be seen just as an agricultural problem requiring agricultural solutions but as a multi-faceted economic and social problem requiring a wide-ranging approach. Opium production in Afghanistan is different from other large-scale producing areas around the world. In most places, opium is a low-yielding crop produced on marginal land. However in the major growing areas of Afghanistan, poppy production has become a mainstream crop produced on good land as an integral part of the major production system.

Experience with successful elimination of opium poppy cultivation in other countries demonstrate that eliminating poppy cultivation requires substantial commitment to long-term development and poverty reduction strategies. Given the scale of the problem, the number of people involved, and the intense economic pressure that drives the whole system, there can be no quick fix to eliminating opium production in Afghanistan. It is essential that efforts to improve rural livelihoods are part of broad-based economic and social development. Furthermore, poppy growing areas (Helmand, Nangarhar, Qandahar, Oruzgan and Badakshan provinces) should be given priority for domestic budgetary allocation and for international assistance.

A New Partnership

The Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan adopted its first National Drug Control Strategy last month. It foresees the elimination of opium within 10 years through law enforcement and rural development. It also aims to counter domestic processing and trafficking, to fight money laundering, reduce abuse and enhance international cooperation in drug control.

The Afghan drug economy can be reconverted to peace and growth if the government is assisted to address the roots of the matter. A report, entitled *The Opium*

Economy in Afghanistan, recently prepared by our *Office* (see Annex 1: executive summary) has exposed these roots. *First*, the report has de-constructed Afghanistan's drug economy into its main components: production, financing, trafficking, refining and abuse. *Second*, the report has re-constructed the country's development processes piece by piece, showing that it is essential (i) to help poor farmers decide in favour of licit crops; (ii) to replace local narco-usurers with micro-lending; (iii) to provide jobs and education to women and their children; (iv) to turn bazaars into modern trading places; and (v) to neutralize warlords' efforts to keep the drug trade alive.

As said earlier, national efforts are not enough. Afghanistan's opium cultivation, trafficking and abuse have ramifications that reach *deeply* into the country's (and Central Asia's) recent history, and *widely* into contemporary geo-politics of terrorism and violence. Hence convergent efforts by neighbouring countries (through which narcotics are exported), and by Europe and Russia (where heroin abuse helps nourish opium cultivation in Afghanistan), are needed.

Since the beginning of 2002 UNODC has been delivering its assistance in Afghanistan in five strategic sectors:

1. Policy support, legislation and advocacy;
2. Drug law enforcement;
3. Mainstreaming drug control in development assistance;
4. Drug demand reduction;
5. Monitoring and assessment.

The programme breakdown is reflected in Annex 2.

Furthermore, this programme doesn't preclude the assistance provided bilaterally by international development agencies with the aim to improve rural rehabilitation in particular in opium poppy areas. All efforts are therefore made to ensure that through consistent coordination stand alone development projects will also have an impact on poppy elimination.

In the current context, the fight against opium production and trafficking originating in Afghanistan should be sustained. The international community should remain committed to develop, under the UN auspices, a comprehensive approach aimed at:

- (i) assisting Afghanistan to implement its Drug Control Strategy;
- (ii) promoting in Afghanistan as well as in neighbouring countries concerted measures against drug trafficking, stock-piles, clandestine laboratories and supply of precursors;
- (iii) mainstreaming the drug issue into the overall reconstruction programmes for Afghanistan, inviting International Financial Institutions, and bilateral donors to channel resources accordingly;
- (iv) promoting alternative development in the opium growing areas, through partnership with the specialized United Nations agencies;
- (v) assisting Afghanistan in their criminal justice reform efforts.

UNODC will contribute to the largest possible extent, stretching our work beyond Afghanistan's own borders. While the demand for opiates is rising inside Afghanistan and in the neighbouring countries, the main lucrative market for Afghan heroin remains Europe, where demand reduction efforts should be intensified. It would make a significant impact on the Afghan drug threat.


Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Annex 1

THE OPIUM ECONOMY IN AFGHANISTAN

An International Problem

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



PREFACE

For more than two millennia, Afghanistan has been at the crossroads of civilization and a major contributor to world culture. In the past quarter century, the country has also found itself at the crossroads of international terrorist violence and has become a major contributor to world narcotics production.

As a consequence, Afghanistan now faces a historic challenge. Although counter-terrorism is the key battleground, the enemy has to be confronted on other fronts, as well. First and foremost must be the struggle against illicit drugs. This challenge can be faced; Thailand, Pakistan and Turkey (on the opium front) and Bolivia and Peru (on the cocaine front) have shown that legal and commercially viable crops can replace illicit cultivation.

The establishment of democracy in Afghanistan and the Government's measures against cultivation, trade and abuse of opium have been crucial steps towards solving the drug problem. Yet, other news has not been good. For example, last year's opium poppy harvest was among the highest in the country's history.

Not surprisingly, public opinion, both in Afghanistan and abroad, is perplexed. Nagging questions are raised. Why is the international presence in Afghanistan not able to bring under control a phenomenon connected to international terrorism and organized crime? Why is the central Government in Kabul not able to enforce the ban on opium cultivation as effectively as the Taliban regime did in 2000-01?

There are no simple answers to these questions. The opium economy of Afghanistan is an intensely complex phenomenon. In the past, it reached deeply into the political structure, civil society and economy of the country. Spawned after decades of civil and military strife, it has chained a poor rural population – farmers, landless labour, small traders, women and children – to the mercy of domestic warlords and international crime syndicates that continue to dominate several areas in the south, north and east of the country. Dismantling the opium economy will be a long and complex process. It cannot simply be done by military or authoritarian means. That has been tried in the past and was unsustainable. It must be done with the instruments of democracy, the rule of law and development.

Does Afghanistan face an insoluble problem? No, if we all play our parts in the solution.

Afghanistan's drug economy can be dismantled if the Government, with the assistance of the international community, addresses the roots of the matter and not only its symptoms. This report exposes such roots as a contribution to the common effort against illicit drugs. *First*, the report deconstructs the opium economy of Afghanistan into its basic components: cultivation, production, finance, trade and consumption. *Secondly*, the report reconstructs the country's development processes piece by piece, showing that it is essential: (i) to help poor farmers decide in favour of licit crops; (ii) to replace narco-usury with micro-lending; (iii) to provide jobs to women and itinerant workers; (iv) to provide education to children, particularly girls; (v) to turn bazaars into modern commodity markets; and (vi) to neutralize warlords' efforts to keep the evil trade alive.

National efforts will not be enough. The problem is international. Afghanistan's cultivation, trafficking and drug abuse have ramifications that reach deeply into the region's post-colonial history and widely into the contemporary geopolitics of terrorism and violence. Hence, convergent efforts are needed by countries through which Afghan opiates are trafficked and where heroin abuse nourishes the opium economy. In other words, all countries that are part of the Afghan drug problem should be part of its solution.

The United Nations *Office on Drugs and Crime*, which is the foremost setting for multilateral policy against drugs and a major provider of technical assistance on counter-narcotic affairs, hopes that this informal report will raise public awareness about an issue that deserves world attention.



Antonio Maria Costa
Executive Director
United Nations *Office on Drugs and Crime*
January 2003

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

The United Nations *Office on Drugs and Crime* has conducted annual opium poppy surveys in Afghanistan since 1994. The most recent one was issued in October 2002. The surveys collect information on the location and extent of opium cultivation, production and prices. Since Afghanistan was the world's largest source of illicit opium in 2002, the surveys are crucial in defining a problem which is manifestly global and international in dimension.

The present study goes beyond reporting on a single year's production and value. It examines Afghanistan's opium economy in order to understand its dynamics, the reasons for its success, its beneficiaries and victims, and the problems it has caused domestically and abroad. The purpose of the study is to assist the country and the international community in fulfilling the objectives of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (1998) to eliminate illicit drugs.

This report is not about Afghanistan's dependence on illegal drug activity. On the contrary, it shows that the opium economy is limited to a few provinces that have defied the opium ban issued by President Karzai on 17 January 2002. The decree asserted that the opium problem was a matter of national security and called for international support to solve it. The findings of this report render that call imperative.

PART 1: DIMENSIONS

Chapter 1. Afghanistan's illicit opium economy: size and shape

Production and Trafficking

- *Afghanistan's opium production (3400 tons in 2002) has increased more than 15-fold since 1979;*
- *From 1996 to 1999 under the Taliban, production doubled and peaked at over 4600 tons;*
- *In 2000 the Taliban banned opium cultivation but not trade;*
- *In 2002 opium was cultivated by several ethnic groups in the south (Helmand), east (Nangarhar) and north (Badakshan);*
- *Cross-border ethnic and tribal links facilitate trafficking by several ethnic groups;*
- *Over three-quarters of the heroin sold in Europe and virtually all of the heroin in Russia originates in Afghanistan.*

Afghanistan's opium production has increased more than 15-fold since 1979, the year of the Soviet intervention in the country. By 2000 Afghanistan was the source of 70% of all of the illicit opium produced in the world. Following a decline in 2001, production resumed at high levels in 2002, again making Afghanistan the world's largest producer (followed by Myanmar and Laos), accounting for almost three-quarters of global opium production.




Figure 1
Source: UNDCP, *Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001 and 2002* and UNDCP/ICMP, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002*.

Traditionally, the bulk of opium poppy cultivation was in the south (Helmand province, 52% of total cultivation in 2000) and the east (Nangarhar, 24%). In 2001 the Taliban ban pushed the output to the north (Badakshan, 83%, though of a far lower total). In 2002 the largest areas under cultivation were again Helmand (40%), Nangarhar (27%) and Badakshan (11%), followed by Uruzgan (7%), Kandahar (5%) and Ghor (3%). Thus, 93% of the area under poppy cultivation is restricted to six provinces that have not yet complied with the ban issued by the Government in January 2002.




Figure 2
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, *Afghanistan Opium Poppy Survey 2002*.




Figure 3
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002*.

The area under poppy cultivation is a tiny fraction of the arable land in Afghanistan (0.9% in 2002). Even in the poppy growing villages, only 8% of the arable land was used for opium cultivation in 2000, though in Helmand and Nangarhar the rates were significantly higher (about one-third of the arable land). Today the bulk of poppy cultivation again takes place on irrigated land in the south, where productivity can be 3-4 times higher than in the rain-fed provinces of the north.

Most ethnic groups are involved in opium production, though there seems to be a concentration among Pashtun and Tajik villages located in the main opium producing regions of southern, eastern and northern Afghanistan. Opium cultivation spread throughout the country in the 1990s, following the ethnic distribution of itinerant workers who disseminated the know-how for opium production. Trafficking then spread to neighbouring countries, facilitated by ethnic links across borders: Pashtuns in Pakistan; Baluchis in Pakistan and Iran; Tajiks in Tajikistan; Uzbeks in Uzbekistan; and Turkmens in Turkmenistan.

Trade and Incomes

- *The opium trade was de-facto legal in Afghanistan before and throughout the Taliban period;*
- *In January 2002, the Karzai Administration banned it;*
- *Opium markets in southern Afghanistan were fragmented and competitive, while in the east and north they were oligopolistic. Price levels and structures varied accordingly, but they are now converging;*
- *Opium farmgate prices increased almost 10-fold (\$300 per kg) at harvest time in 2001 compared to a year earlier as a consequence of the Taliban opium ban and increased some 20-fold (\$700/kg) prior to 11 September. Despite a good harvest in 2002, opium prices still amounted to around \$350 at harvest time and were about \$540 at the end of the year;*
- *Over the 1994-2000 period, gross income from opium was about \$150 million/year (\$750/family). In 2001 following the Taliban ban, prices increased 10-fold. In 2002 gross income rose to \$1.2 billion (\$6,500/family). Part of the income is shared with traders and/or taxed by warlords;*
- *Income from opium and heroin trafficking into neighbouring countries amounted to at least \$720 million in 2000. It may have doubled in 2002;*
- *These are extraordinary revenues in a country where the average wage does not exceed \$2 per day.*

Given their quasi-legal status until the beginning of 2002, opium markets in Afghanistan operated like any other commodity market. Farmers sold opium directly in local bazaars or to local traders and shopkeepers who, in turn, provided them credit.

Over the last 20 years (1980-2000), Afghanistan's opium markets were somewhat fragmented. The weakness of the central administration, the country's segmentation into clans and tribes, and the poor transport infrastructure splintered the trade. Domestic markets were also affected by cross-border trafficking: conditions in neighbouring countries (prices, routes and risks) shaped Afghanistan's own terms of trade and trading structures.

In eastern markets (Nangarhar province), prices tended to be higher than in the south due to an oligopolistic market structure. Southern markets were decentralized, atomistic and highly competitive, with lower prices. In the north, opium prices were typically high because of better quality and strongly rising demand in Central Asia and Russia. In recent years (2000-2002), price differentials have, however, declined. Afghanistan's fragmented opium trade, now increasingly influenced by international syndicates and criminal groups, may be on the way to becoming a single integrated market.




Figure 4
Sources: UNODC/ICMP, UNODC field offices

Gross income from opium production, derived from farmgate prices at harvest time, amounted to an annual average of \$95 million over the 1994-2000 period. However, not all farmers sold their opium at harvest time when prices were low. Taking the average annual opium prices as reported at the main opium bazaars over the same period, annual income could have been twice as high, almost \$180 million. This figure includes, however, profits made by local traders. If this is excluded, the gross opium income of farmers was estimated at about \$150 million/year between 1994 and 2000. Following the Taliban ban in summer 2000, which reduced the 2001 harvest to one-tenth of earlier levels, prices increased 10-fold to \$350-400/kg. Farmers' income levels were, therefore, significantly higher in 2002. Taking into account the large output in that year (3400 tons), the gross opium revenue of farmers may have reached \$1.2 billion and possibly even higher, since prices continued rising till the end of 2002. The long-term sustainability of these prices, however, is an open question.

Gross income from opium, morphine and heroin trafficking to neighbouring countries has been substantial and increasing. A conservative estimate placed it at \$720 million in 2000. Less conservative assumptions would bring the figure closer to \$1 billion, equivalent to 15% of Afghanistan's GDP or seven times the country's 1990-99 average annual exports (\$136 million/year). In 2002 the income derived from trafficking was significantly more (about \$1.3 billion) due to higher prices in neighbouring countries.




Figure 6

Sources: UNDCP/ICMP, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002* and previous years, and UNODC field offices.

Abuse

- *Drug abuse in Afghanistan has increased strongly in the last few years due to prolonged human deprivation and suffering, the breakdown of traditional social controls, the return of refugees who developed a drug problem in refugee camps and the almost unlimited availability of opiates within Afghanistan;*
- *The war wounded also became addicted as a consequence of primitive first aid and large-scale use of opium, morphine and heroin as painkillers;*
- *Drug abuse in Afghanistan is still low compared to neighbouring countries (Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia).*

Before the Soviet occupation there was not much of a drug culture in Afghanistan and abuse was very limited. In the 1990s drug abuse emerged as a problem in both urban and rural areas. It was caused by the prolonged human deprivation and suffering of the population, the breakdown of social and cultural values, the vulnerability of people in refugee camps, and the virtually unlimited availability of inexpensive narcotics. The medical use of opiates as analgesics and sedatives in the treatment of wounded combatants and other war victims also contributed to rising levels of addiction.

No national survey of drug abuse has been conducted in Afghanistan. On the basis of surveys in some districts of eastern Afghanistan, it can be estimated that opium is abused by 0.5% and heroin by 0.1% of the adult population. These levels exceed opiate abuse levels in western Europe (0.3%), though they are lower than in Pakistan (0.9%), Central Asia (0.9%) or Iran (1.7% to 2.8%). The abuse of hashish (9.1%) and of psychotropic substances (1.8%) is also widespread.

PART 2: ORIGINS**Chapter 2. Historical roots of the opium economy**

- *The opium economy developed in Afghanistan because of:*
 - *A lack of effective government administration until the recent past;*
 - *The degradation of agriculture and most economic infrastructure due to 20 years of war;*
 - *A war economy and related black marketeering.*
- *Through the 1980s and 1990s, several competing factions financed their war efforts with opium revenue. Since most of the opium producing provinces came under Taliban control after 1996, the Taliban reaped the largest gains from the opium economy.*
- *The Taliban cultivation ban increased prices in 2001 and revalued stocks by a factor of 10; more liquidity in the hands of traders thus created further incentives for the opium economy.*

Several factors played a role in the development of Afghanistan's opium economy. The most important one was weak government control over the country in the 1980s and the 1990s. As elsewhere in the world, the lack, or collapse, of a central administration gave drug traffickers, criminal syndicates and terrorist groups the opportunity to develop an illegal economy for drugs, arms, contraband and the provision of acolyte financing for further criminal activity.

The economic system also collapsed. After more than 20 years of war and conflict, the degradation of agricultural and other economic infrastructure was total. Irrigation channels, cultivation terraces, roads and warehouses, were all destroyed. Agricultural production of legitimate crops cannot be sustained without some basic storage, marketing and transportation facilities, but opium does not face these limitations. It is durable and easy to store and carry to the market. Opium markets, in any case, operated like spot and futures markets, with traders providing credit for future production, buying the opium in local bazaars or even at the farmgate, and traffickers taking over the marketing. As poppy cultivation became a lucrative agricultural activity, it is no surprise that it took over the best available land. The amount of land available for food production declined and the country's food deficit became acute.

Much criminal and black market activity was pushed out of Afghanistan's neighbouring countries (Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia) by strong enforcement actions in the 1980s and 1990s. Within Afghanistan, conditions of war and anarchy provided fertile ground for these criminal networks to establish themselves. There is anecdotal evidence of Taliban involvement in, and encouragement of, the opium trade as a way to expand their exchequer at a time when the regime was hurting because of growing isolation and funding difficulties.

A nexus was consequently established between war, crime and opium cultivation. For almost a quarter of a century, weak central government and civil war have, in fact, been two sides of the same coin. The civil war created a lawless climate in which an opium economy flourished. Opium production and trade increasingly fuelled the civil war and weakened the Kabul Government even more, thus perpetuating a vicious circle. Later in the cycle, international terrorism added an even more pernicious dimension.

Chapter 3. Poverty, devastation and farmers' motivations

Afghan farmers grew opium poppy because:

- *The opium trade was de-facto legal until President Karzai's ban in January 2002;*
- *Opium poppy is a profitable crop produced with cheap labour (women, children and refugees);*
- *Inputs for opium poppy are abundant, including suitable land, water and know-how from itinerant labor;*
- *Opium became a form of saving, a source of liquidity and a collateral for credit;*
- *Opium is an insurance against poverty and hunger: farmers sell future crops to narco-usurers for subsistence;*
- *Opium requires no marketing or storage, as it can be sold easily on spot markets.*

Over the last two decades in many Afghan provinces, opium cultivation became part of the livelihood of rural households. The principal reason for farmers' deciding to grow opium poppy was that it was more profitable and, until 2000, it was *de-facto* legal to do so. Even after the Taliban ban on cultivation, opium trading remained *de-facto* legal until January 2002, when the Karzai Government banned it.

The lack of legal obstacles complemented opium's high profitability relative to other crops. Poppy cultivation's comparative cost disadvantage (its labor intensity is high, about 10 times more than that of cereals) was remedied by cheap labour provided by women, children and returning refugees.

Farmers' decisions in favor of opium crops were facilitated by easy access to other inputs for opium cultivation, including planting, weeding and harvesting techniques. The know-how was disseminated countrywide by a large pool of itinerant labourers.

The role of opium as a source of credit in a country where a formal financial system had virtually ceased to exist, was also crucial to farmers' decisions. Indeed, some of the expansion of opium cultivation in 1999 (the highest ever production year: 90,000 ha, 4,500 tons), can be linked directly to the need to repay earlier loans in kind (opium). Since loans could not be repaid in 1998 because of drought and poor yields, financial obligations to narco-usurers doubled or even tripled in value. In order to meet these obligations, many farmers were forced to increase their opium production substantially in 1999.

In 2002, by contrast, the main reason for the expansion in poppy cultivation was the high profitability of opium production due to much higher opium prices (\$350/kg), which were the result of shortages created by the Taliban cultivation ban (when prices were only \$35/kg). The average annual gross income of farmers in 1994-1999 was close to \$1500 per hectare. It fell to about \$1100 per hectare in 2000 (close to the revenue from the cultivation of legal crops – around \$900/ha), but it rose to about \$16,000 per hectare in 2002 (because of higher prices). The average size of a plot in the opium growing areas is less than one-third of a hectare, generating a substantial income of about \$4000, compared to the \$500 per year that a worker would have earned from legal crops.




Figure 6

Source: UNDCP/ICMP, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002* and previous years.

Chapter 4. Bazaars, finance and narco-usurers

Opium has become an "economic narcotic" for whole segments of Afghan society:

- *As a commodity, it is an income generator;*
- *As a source of liquidity, it is a means of exchange;*
- *As a payment mechanism, it is a way to store value and fund transactions.*

Opium traders frequently act as narco-usurers (money lenders) because:

- *Opium serves as a means of salaam (informal advance payments);*
- *They have capital to assist farmers. They regenerate cash flows via rapid turnover trade (low profit); or via shipments to border regions (medium profit); or by smuggling opiates across borders (high profit). Risks vary accordingly.*

It has been said that the Taliban succeeded in securing the transition from a first phase (up to 1996) of localized predatory warlordism, to a second phase (1996-2001) of a rentier state structure based on a criminalized semi-open economy. Ongoing efforts to curtail drug cultivation and trade are intended to prevent a third phase (from 2002 onward), namely the perpetuation of a large-scale criminal opium economy nourishing domestic instability and international terrorism.

Money lenders have been part of the deepening and widening opium economy. Their enhanced role as a *de-facto* institutional power and as key economic agents is due to the deterioration of the country's financial system as a consequence of the war and the complete breakdown of the banking system under the Taliban regime. Money lenders thus played a useful role, as there was a need for alternative payment mechanisms that could provide the services usually provided by the banking sector. Opium-based lending became the medium to fulfill these needs.

Historically, opium has also been used as a means of savings and as a collateral for credit. Over time, traders have generated sufficient liquidity to supply opium farmers with credit before planting (September-December). Opium farmers could sell their harvest in advance (forward) at a fixed price (i.e. using their future crop as collateral) and receive cash immediately. The repayment of the loan was in kind. The real per annum interest that farmers had to pay for these loans was, however, extremely high. According to a United Nations study in the late 1990s, the annualized interest rate charged to poor Afghan farmers by these money lenders exceeded 500%, making it appropriate to refer to them as narco-usurers.

Chapter 5. Greed, warlords and the opium trade

- *Opium is an ideal commodity for marketing, trade and speculation:*
 - *It is compact to transport and durable to store, with high intrinsic value (\$350-400/kg). At present, only a few licit agricultural commodities, such as truffles (\$800/kg), are more expensive on international markets;*
 - *Given the high risk of interdiction at the borders with neighbouring countries, high profits (fivefold increases of price) are generated by trafficking;*
 - *It is a commodity suitable for trafficking, especially in the provinces controlled by warlords who levy a tax in exchange for protection.*
- *In some regions, traffickers gain respect from the local community when they recycle part of their income for the benefit of poor villages;*
- *There is a clear nexus between drug trafficking and warlordism;*
- *The re-emergence of drug cultivation and the recrudescence of violence in certain provinces are well-known phenomena.*

The opium trade evolved over the last two decades as a *de-facto* legal activity to become an integral part of Afghanistan's war economy, with opium going out of the country and arms coming in. The smuggling of licit goods became another illegal pursuit supporting the war economy, chiefly as a result of the earlier (1950s) Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) that enabled land-locked Afghanistan to import goods duty-free into the country via Pakistan. The same goods were then smuggled back to Pakistan to circumvent that

country's import duties. A World Bank study estimated that this contraband was worth \$2.5 billion in the late 1990s, equivalent to nearly half of Afghanistan's estimated GDP and significantly more than the overall trade in opiates (about \$1 billion) at the time.

The main reasons for traders to enter the opium economy was the large profit and, often, simply greed. Opium revenues enabled traders to pay for things that were beyond the reach of a majority of the population living by honest means: buying land or a vehicle, paying a bride-price (at times, for more than one wife) or affording the *haj* to Mecca. In addition, the opium trade enabled persons to gain respect from the local community for providing income to the village.

The progression from profit to greed is usually a function of the appetite for risk-taking. In the late 1990s, profit margins were relatively small in the local opium trade. They increased substantially (up to 10-fold) once the borders with neighbouring countries were crossed. They could become considerable (up to 100-fold) when the heroin was trafficked internationally. (For example, one gram of heroin, at about 60% purity, cost \$2-\$3 in Afghanistan and approximately \$70, at 20% purity, on the street in Western Europe in 2002).

The mark-up on the rapid turnover trade (opium purchased from farmers and sold quickly in the various bazaars) was 3% to 26%. Approximately two-thirds of the traders traded less than 100 kg per year; most of the rest traded up to 500 kg, and one was selling up to 20 tons a year. There were potentially about 15,000 opium traders in the country in the late 1990s, i.e. one trader per 13 opium farmers.

A quarter of the opium traders in southern Afghanistan were involved in shipping the opium to border areas, with cargoes up to several tons – an activity rendered possible by the tacit support of local warlords. These traders confirmed gaining, on average, about \$11–12.50/kg in the late 1990s. Taking into account transport costs, their net profits amounted to more than 12% of the value of the merchandise and more than twice the rate they could reckon with from the local rapid turnover trade. Up until 2000 (when opium prices were \$35–40/kg), a bulk trader could make over \$200,000/year. At today's prices (10 times higher), these profits can reach extraordinary levels.

The largest profits are made by smuggling opium across the border. Taking into account all costs (raw materials, intermediaries and transportation), cross-border traders could reckon with profits several times the value of the merchandise at origin. Crossing the border was, and is, a risky endeavour, and many Pashtun traders confirm leaving the task to specialized Baluchi traffickers with Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani passports. (In Iran, for instance, drug dealing carries the death penalty.)

Profits could increase enormously, along with the risks, once opiates were smuggled beyond the border and moved further. The price of opium smuggled within Pakistan from Quetta (close to southern Afghanistan) to the seaport of Karachi would rise by some 30%. Throughout the 1990s – and current seizure levels indicate that the trend continues – there were well armed caravans crossing Pakistan and then Iran, because opiate prices were still significantly higher there. Opium prices in the Tehran wholesale market amounted to a more than sixfold increase from the prices in Pakistan's border region with Afghanistan or a 10-fold increase with respect to the opium prices in southern Afghanistan in the late 1990s. Since the Taliban ban, profit margins declined, falling from a 10-fold increase to a threefold increase by mid-2002. At the same time, however, gross profits per unit trafficked more than tripled, from \$360 per kg in 2000 to \$1260 per kg in mid-2002.

Profit margins also used to be rather high for the manufacture of heroin (around 100%) but fell significantly in recent years as local heroin processing capacity increased in Afghanistan. Following the Taliban ban, opium prices increased more strongly than heroin prices. In order to remain profitable, illicit laboratories had to have opium stocks, gain direct access to heroin markets abroad or simply improve laboratory efficiency. In such circumstances, profit ratios in the manufacture of heroin of up to 65% were still possible. Trafficking heroin across the border to Pakistan or Tajikistan earned around 100% profit in 2001. Trafficking it to less accessible locations in neighbouring countries could offer five- to 10-fold profits.

PART 3: REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES

Chapter 6. Devastation in neighboring countries

Trafficking

- More than 60% of global opiate seizures take place in the few countries neighbouring Afghanistan;
- Most seizures are made by Iran, followed by Pakistan and Tajikistan.

The impact of Afghanistan's opium economy on neighbouring countries (Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian states) can be measured in terms of trafficking, abuse and the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2000 61% of worldwide seizures of opiates (opium and heroin) took place in Afghanistan's neighbouring countries. The area that constitutes the market for most of Afghanistan's opium production (i.e. Afghanistan's neighbours, the Near & Middle East and Europe) accounted for more than 70% of global opiate seizures.

In 2001 56% of total opiate seizures in Afghanistan's neighbouring countries were made by Iran, followed by Pakistan (28%). In recent years the Central Asian countries, in particular Tajikistan where the United Nations *Office on Drugs and Crime* has developed a special purpose project, reported the biggest increase in seizures. There is also evidence of increased heroin manufacture within Afghanistan, reflected in heroin seizures in neighbouring countries.




Figure 7
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.




Figure 8
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.

Mega-incomes and economic vulnerability

- *Opiate trafficking profits in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan amounted to some \$4 billion in 2002, equivalent to 2% of GDP;*
- *Most profits are made in Central Asia, followed by Iran and Pakistan;*
- *Economic growth in countries neighbouring Afghanistan was below the global average.*

In 2002 the largest gross profits from trafficking were made by criminal groups from Central Asia (\$2.2 billion, equivalent to 7% of the area's GDP). Gross trafficking profits in Iran were estimated at \$1 to \$1.3 billion, equivalent to 1% to 1.3% of GDP. For Pakistan, they were estimated at \$400 to \$800 million, equivalent to 0.7% to 1.3% of GDP.

Contrary to the popular perception that an inflow of funds, whatever its origin, is positive for an economy, there is evidence that huge funds in the hands of criminal organizations destabilize a country's political system and civil society, as well as its economy. The smaller countries of Central Asia are particularly vulnerable: corruption, violence and dirty money, which includes financial support for terrorist organizations, have negative repercussions for legitimate investment and thus compromise economic growth in the long run.

Abuse

- *Countries neighbouring Afghanistan suffer from rising levels of abuse;*
- *The strongest rise in recent years was in the countries of Central Asia, which were also affected by the strongest increases in drug trafficking.*

Parallel to rising levels of trafficking, Afghanistan's neighbouring countries are also affected by growing levels of abuse, resulting from a spillover of trafficking, often a consequence of remuneration in kind (opium, heroin). There are 800,000-1.2 million chronic opiate abusers in Iran, 700,000 in Pakistan (including 500,000 addicted to heroin) and more than 300,000 in Central Asia; together far more than in Western Europe (1.2 million). Expressed as a percentage of the population age 15 and above, 0.9% in Pakistan and Central Asia and up to 2.8% of the people in Iran consume opiates, a far higher percentage than in Western Europe (0.3%).

The highest levels of opiate abuse in Central Asia have been reported from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The strongest growth in the 1990s was reported from Tajikistan.




Figure 9

Sources: Annual Report of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Drug and Drug Business Prevention, 2000; Agency for Drug Control under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan; State Commission on Drug Control under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic; Government of Uzbekistan, National Information and Analytical Centre on Drug Control.

The spread of HIV/AIDS

- *HIV/AIDS is increasing in all countries neighbouring Afghanistan, notably in the countries of Central Asia;*
- *Central Asia has one of the highest rates of IDU-related HIV/AIDS infections in the world.*

A particularly serious side effect of opiate abuse has been the trend towards injecting drug use (IDU) and the related spread of HIV/AIDS. The highest levels of IDU are reported from Central Asia (66% of all problem drug users). Central Asia is also faced with the strongest increases in HIV infections (a more than 600-fold increase between 1994 and 2001), of which 88% were IDU-related in 2001. AIDS cases are still relatively small but, unless drastic measures are taken, it is only a matter of time before they increase and affect the general population. This is bound to put a heavy burden on both the productivity and the health budgets of these countries.




Figure 10
Source: UNODC, calculations based on Euro-HIV data.

There is still a small window of opportunity to confine HIV infection to the community of drug users. Should other segments of society be exposed to this virus, it would become much more difficult (and costly) to contain the problem.

CONCLUSION: The way forward

For more than two hundred years, the international geopolitical situation has worked against the consolidation of an effective central government in Kabul because it has exacerbated Afghanistan's endemic problems of regional warlordism and particularistic nationalism. Over the past quarter century, the opium economy grew because of the failure of the state. Today, there is a window of opportunity for the state to consolidate because democracy is taking root and the collective force of the international community has superseded the geopolitical interests of foreign powers and of Afghanistan's neighbours. That window must be kept open by means of continuous international support for Afghanistan's Transitional Government.

Apart from supporting the central institutions of the state, the international support has to be targeted at solving the problems, documented in this book, which created the opium economy in the first place. The problems can be solved by:

- (i) alternative crops, seeds, fertilizers and equipment for opium farmers;
- (ii) alternative sources of income for landless labour and returning refugees;
- (iii) jobs for women and schooling for children, especially girls;

- (iv) macroeconomic structures within which commodity markets (including presently unregulated bazaars) can grow free from the perverse incentives provided by opium and other forms of contraband;
- (v) informal financial structures able to extend harvest-based collateralized loans (even micro-credits) to farmers and returning refugees, so as to bankrupt the narco-usurers at their game;
- (vi) effective law enforcement against opium markets within the country to combat the perverse economic and political impact of warlordism and against the international trafficking of opiates.

These measures coincide with what the United Nations *Office on Drugs and Crime* advocates as part of a balanced approach: balancing measures to reduce the supply of illicit drugs with those to reduce the demand for them. Since, all considered, the problems faced by Afghanistan are more serious than those created by the opium economy, drug control will have to be linked into the mainstream of other development efforts to rebuild the country. It is equally clear, and documented in this book, that unless the drug problem is solved, there will be no sustainable development for Afghanistan.

United Nations *Office on Drugs and Crime*
Vienna, January 2003



PROGRAMME IN AFGHANISTAN


I. STRATEGY ON DRUGS AND CRIME

Following the swearing in of the Afghan Administration Authority on 22 December 2001, the **United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime** (UNODC) has developed a strategy on drugs and crime as part of the overall political and economic support process to Afghanistan. This strategy is aimed at sustaining efforts carried out by the international community to ensure security and stability in the country, and at promoting alternative livelihoods as part of the economic recovery, particularly in rural areas affected by illicit opium poppy cultivation. UNODC is working in partnership with government officials, UN agencies and donors in implementing this strategy and has been expanding its secretarial role with the Government of Afghanistan through co-ordination with relevant Afghan ministries (Interior, Justice, Rural Rehabilitation and Development and Health). Close collaboration is maintained with the UK, the leading country in drug control assistance to Afghanistan, Italy in the reform of the judiciary and Germany for police reform.

UNODC delivers its assistance in the five strategic sectors:

- 1) Policy support, legislation and advocacy;
- 2) Drug law enforcement;
- 3) Mainstreaming drug control in development assistance;
- 4) Drug demand reduction;
- 5) Monitoring and assessment.

In May 2003, the UNODC programme portfolio in Afghanistan had the below status as regards ongoing and pipeline projects. The second pie-chart reflects the distribution of programmatic action by sector.



II. ONGOING AND PLANNED ASSISTANCE

This presentation contains a brief overview of current and planned projects, by strategic sector.

1. *Policy support, legislation and advocacy*

The four projects below support the:

- Formulation of a state drug and crime control policy and support to the building up of national drug control institutions;
- Development of adequate national legislation on illicit drugs, organised crime and related serious crime and on international judicial co-operation.
- Ministry of Justice in legislative coordination and planning and its juvenile justice reform.

◆ **AFG/G24 “Capacity Building for Drug Control” (*ongoing and fully funded*)**

This project assists the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) in its commitment to comprehensively address the drugs and crime problems in Afghanistan. Capacity building is required to facilitate the functioning of the new drug control and law enforcement entities that have been recently established within the AIA. This project provides assistance to the establishment of legal and judicial frameworks and to the State High Commission for Drug Control in Kabul and six provincial offices (Nangarhar, Qandahar, Helmand, Herat, Balkh and Badakhshan) in terms of drug and crime policy formulation, organizational arrangements and operational support (training, equipment, vehicles, communications).

Budget	2,515,200
Duration/Start	2 years, April 2002 to April 2004
Funding status	Partially funded

◆ **AFG/G29 “Technical Support for the Implementation of the UNODC Strategy for Capacity Building for Drug Control” (*ongoing and fully funded*)**

This project provides the capacities and resources required for UNODC to respond in a timely manner to the constantly changing situation in Afghanistan and react to both the Afghan Interim Administration and aid agencies' needs for designing UNODC interventions. The project contributes to UNODC's and Afghanistan's ability to design feasible and technically sound projects in drug and crime control, legal and judicial frameworks, alternative development, drug demand reduction, etc.). It facilitates UNODC representation at major meetings and conferences regarding Afghanistan, and supports the work of advisers on drug and crime matters.

Budget	310,185
Duration/Start	2 years, December 2002 to December 2004
Funding status	Fully funded

♦ **AFG/G71** "Coordination Mechanism for Assistance Programmes to Afghanistan" (*ongoing and fully funded*)

This project is to introduce a coordination mechanism to monitor and report on the delivery of international drug and crime control assistance in Afghanistan. It will support the more targeted delivery of assistance by individual donors. The project will produce comprehensive information on the situation in Afghanistan regarding major aspects of illicit drugs and organized crime, including national measures, bilateral and multilateral assistance provided and needs of Afghanistan still to be addressed.

Budget	108,000
Duration/Start	2 years, April 2003 to April 2005
Funding status	Fully funded

♦ **AFG/R40** "Reform of the Juvenile Justice System" (*ongoing and partially funded*)

The aim of this project is to strengthen the role of the Juvenile Justice Administration of the Ministry of Justice. This Administration is intended to become the focal point for matters pertaining to children in conflict with the law, the conduct of consultation and research, and for the process of legislative and institutional reform related to juvenile justice. The project will support the set up of new premises for the Youth Court of Kabul, which will enable juvenile judges and staff to prepare and hold youth court sessions, as well as the establishment of a youth residential institution for offenders aged 15-18 in Kabul. Training programs (magistrates, lawyers, judicial police officers and prison personnel) will enable this officials to deliver their professional qualifications and skills.

Budget	1,026,000
Duration/Start	2 years, 2003 to 2005
Funding status	Not funded

♦ **AFG/R41** "Reform of the Penitentiary System" (*ongoing and partially funded*)

This project will support law reform to harmonize national provisions and measures with minimum international standards and norms for the treatment of prisoners. The project will assist in establishing a Prison Administration Department within the Ministry of Justice and elaborate a national policy for detained women. The conditions within correctional institutions will be improved by the rehabilitation of prisons in Kabul, the refurbishment of the Kabul detention centre and the establishment of a new detention facility for women, especially those with small children. The training of prison officers on the Standard Minimum Rules as well as on management issues, and the development of prison officer selection, screening, monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, will be a cornerstone of the reform efforts.

Budget	1,979,000
Duration/Start	2 years, 2003 to 2005
Funding status	Partially funded

♦ **AFG/R42** "Criminal law and criminal justice capacity building in Afghanistan" *(ongoing and not funded)*

This project is designed to strengthen the overall criminal law and criminal justice capacity of Afghanistan within the framework of the larger Criminal Justice Reform Program in Afghanistan. In close consultation with relevant national and international counterparts, the project will aim to strengthen the operational capacity of the Ministry of Justice to establish multipurpose Centres of Justice in selected pilot provinces and to develop a web-based communication system for the Ministry of Justice and selected provincial Centres of Justice. The project will also assist in the revision of national criminal law and procedure, strengthening of the operational capacity of the Judiciary in Kabul and the development legal aid programme and services including a pilot office comprised of legal professionals in Kabul.

Budget	3,137,106
Duration/Start	2 years, 2003 to 2005
Funding status	Not funded

2. **Drug Law Enforcement**

In the area of drug law enforcement, assistance is aimed at building up a working police capacity for drug control on the one hand, and at laying foundation upon which a modern policing drug control structure can be built over time. Due to its international dimension, drug trafficking is addressed at national and sub-regional levels in close coordination with law enforcement efforts initiated in neighboring countries.

The five projects below support the:

- Provision of advice, training and relevant equipment to aid the development and improve the effectiveness of the existing drug law enforcement unit in Kabul;
- Provision of advice, training and relevant equipment to aid the development and improve the effectiveness of key satellite offices, and assessment of potential further key locations;
- Provision of advice and assistance to strengthen regional coordination and cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours;
- Provision of basic drug and precursor analysis capacity in Kabul and satellite offices based on needs' assessment.

a) **For Afghanistan**

♦ **AFG/G38** "Strengthening of Counter Narcotics Law Enforcement Capacities in Afghanistan" (Phase 1) *(ongoing and fully funded)*

This project supports the drug law enforcement unit in Kabul with organisational advice and equipment. This unit forms part of the Crime Branch of the National Police Force under the Interior Ministry. Similar support will be provided to a number of key strategic provincial centres. In addition, measures will be taken to strengthen cross-border cooperation. This includes enabling senior Afghan officials of the drug law enforcement department to participate in sub-regional, regional and global policy making meetings (such as the CND, HONLEA, etc.). Programming missions will be carried out to identify requirements for widening assistance in combating organized crime to provinces. An assessment is also to

be conducted for the potential launch of a forensic laboratory in Kabul and key provinces.

Budget	2,093,900*
Duration/Start	2 years, July 2002 to July 2004
Funding status	Partially funded

* As revised to accommodate an additional funding pledge of 1,850,000 by US.

♦ **AFG/H10** "Creation of a Drug Interdiction Unit" (*ongoing and fully funded*)

The objective of this project is to establish the operational pilot for an Afghan Drug Law Enforcement Interdiction Unit that is trained, equipped and ready to support other organs within the Afghan Counter Narcotic Directorate. The Unit will be the sole resource of the Drug Law Enforcement Directorate and will be under the command of the Investigation and/or Intelligence Units, helping them in potentially hostile areas of arrest, search and seizure. The Unit will start with a compliment of 30 men and sub-divide into three operational groups. There is currently an urgent need for transport and communications technology as well as specialist equipment for conducting searches and basic entry to secured premises. The operations will start in Kabul and will be extended to all other targets as soon as sufficient experience and expertise are gained.

Budget	2,531,200
Duration/Start	2 years, January 2003 to January 2005
Funding status	Fully funded

b) For Iran and Pakistan

♦ **AFG/H16** "Cross-border co-operation between Iranian and Afghan drug law enforcement agencies" (*ongoing and fully funded*)

This project is aimed at reducing the flow of narcotic drugs from Afghanistan to Iran. The objective will be achieved through strengthening the operational and intelligence capabilities of the Afghan law enforcement authorities and its posts on the Iran-Afghanistan common borders in Herat, Nimruz and Farah provinces. Technical assistance inputs will include equipment, training and the establishment of intelligence systems, as well as the creation of communication channels for operational cooperation between Iranian and Afghan drug supply reduction agencies operating on the common border.

Budget	3,066,100
Duration/Start	2 years, planned 3 rd quarter 2003
Funding status	Not funded

♦ **AFG/XXX (L3)** "Establishment of intelligence units within Pakistan's Law Enforcement Agencies and Promotion of Cross-border Cooperation with Afghanistan" (*pipeline and not funded*)

This project focuses on the creation of a number of dedicated intelligence cells within key law enforcement agencies. It will facilitate the development of an effective system for the collection of information at the grass roots level and the transfer of this information to a regional or national organ where it can be collated, analyzed and disseminated to operational forces. It is planned to extend cross-

border cooperation and the sharing of strategic intelligence between Pakistan and Iran to include Afghanistan. The focus will be on those agencies with responsibility for areas bordering the three participating countries. The ultimate goal of the project will be to ensure that there are open channels of communication between Pakistan's Anti Narcotics Force, Frontier Corps, Iran's Drug Control Forces and their Afghan counterparts.

Budget	800,000
Duration/Start	2 years, January 2003 to January 2005
Funding status	Not funded

- ◆ **GLO/G80** "Container Control Pilot Programme – Creation of port and container control capacities in Pakistan: Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore" **(pipeline and not funded)**

This pilot programme is to establish dedicated port and container control units in some pilot countries, including Pakistan, with local sites at the Karachi sea port and dry ports in the Lahore and Rawalpindi regions. The local pilot site component will be linked through the global programme management and coordination functions so as to facilitate inter-regional cooperation between Pakistan and West African pilot sites. The global programme will also create new analytical tools on global and regional container trafficking issues.

Budget	2,900,000
Duration	30 months
Funding status	Not funded

3. **Mainstreaming drug control in development assistance**

The four projects below support the:

- Advocacy of the importance of addressing drug control in Afghanistan;
 - Contribution to the establishment by the Afghan Coordinating Authority (ACA) and the UN of a management information unit to ensure the coordination and impact of development activities, including in opium poppy areas;
 - Provision of expert advice to, and participation in, programming missions of other agencies;
 - Studies on specific drug related subjects to be used by other agencies to design and target their interventions, notably on farmers' intentions to cultivate opium poppy;
 - Pilot project in Qandahar and Badakhshan to support farmers who formerly grew opium poppy with alternative sources of cash income;
- ◆ **AFG/G24** "Capacity Building for Drug Control" **(ongoing and partially funded)**

Please refer to the summary provided on page 3.

- ◆ **AFG/G37** "Rehabilitation of Roads and Irrigation Schemes in Rodat and Chaparhar Districts, Nangarhar Province" **(ongoing and fully funded)**

This project will assist the Afghan Interim Administration in its commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The project will provide targeted assistance to two poppy growing districts, Chaparhar and Rodat, in Nangarhar province. Small farmers and labourers affected by the ban on poppy cultivation will be provided with alternative income opportunities through labour-intensive activities, such as the rehabilitation of roads and traditional irrigation systems (karezes). The rehabilitation of roads will improve the transportation of agricultural products from the districts' villages to the main markets in Jalalabad City, which will have a positive impact on the local economy. Through the rehabilitation of karezes, communities in the target districts will get sufficient irrigation water for the cultivation of licit crops and have better access to safe drinking water.

Budget	363,400
Duration/Start	5 months, December 2002 to April 2003
Funding status	Fully funded

◆ **AFG/G76** "Alternative Development Capacity Building at National and Regional Level" (*pipeline and partially funded*)

This project will build up alternative livelihood capacities in Kabul and the provinces. The objective of the project is to establish a national capacity in alternative livelihoods within the Counter Narcotics Department of the NSC at its central and regional levels. Moreover, the project will ensure that institution building, law enforcement and demand reduction interventions are timed and targeted so as to complement and support alternative livelihood goals. By the end of the project, it is expected that the resources will have been developed to support the further development of a policy and regulatory environment to facilitate alternative livelihood opportunities and discourage poppy production and trafficking.

Budget	1,160,500
Duration/Start	2 years, September 2003 to September 2005
Funding status	Partially funded

◆ **AFG/G51** "Social Compact with Farmers in Qandahar and Badakhshan Provinces" (*pipeline and not funded*)

This preparatory project is designed as a first intervention to fill the gap between eradication and long-term sustainable development by offering access to credit to farmers in two opium poppy growing districts of Qandahar and Badakhshan provinces. This social compact will be complemented by appropriate technical assistance, mainly to improve market access and diversify income opportunities. The project will target agricultural micro-enterprises, in particular, small-scale farmers who produce licit crops. Mobilisation work will be carried out in order to give the recipients a measure of confidence in their abilities to change their living conditions before they begin to use credit effectively. In implementing this project, close co-operation will be sought with the relevant Afghan authorities.

Budget	10,055,800
Duration/Start	5 years, September 2002 to September 2007
Funding status	Not funded

4. **Drug Demand Reduction**

Afghanistan has an apparently significant, but to date poorly documented, drug abuse problem. Of first priority for UNODC is to develop baseline information on the extent and nature of drug abuse in the country. This work will be supplemented by bringing drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation services to populations where drug abuse has already been identified as a major problem. Long-term efforts will be geared to mainstreaming demand reduction into the work of national institutions.

The three projects below support the:

- Conduct of a pilot assessment of drug abuse/misuse in Afghan communities to prepare targeted interventions in the area of drug abuse prevention and reduction.
- Provision of drug demand reduction services to Afghan women in refugee camps in Pakistan.
- ◆ **AFG/G26** "Drug Demand Reduction Information, Advice and Training Service for Afghanistan" - pilot scheme (*ongoing and partially funded*)

The aim of this project is to improve the capacity of relevant UN agencies, NGOs and Government counterparts in Afghanistan to address the abuse and misuse of drugs and healthcare and socio-economic issues and problems relating to drug abuse/misuse. The project will balance the long-term need for sustained capacity building in demand reduction for healthcare professionals, teachers, social workers and community development workers with the immediate need for a rapid assessment of drug abuse/misuse in the Kabul area and the provision of an outreach referral system and home based detoxification and treatment service for current drug addicts. The project will be supervised by an International Drug Demand Reduction Specialist who will be responsible for initiating the capacity-building START (Support: Training: Advice: Resources: Targeting) programme, aimed primarily at Government counterparts.

Budget	378,841
Duration/Start	1 year, May 2002 to April 2003
Funding status	Fully funded

- ◆ **AFG/F55** "Drug Demand Reduction Information, Advice and Training Service for Afghan Women in Refugee Camps in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakistan" (*ongoing and fully funded*)

The aim of this project is to improve the capacity of healthcare professionals, social workers, teachers, community development workers and community groups working with women in targeted Afghan refugee camps in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakistan, to address the use and abuse of drugs and drug-related healthcare issues. This will be achieved by setting up two specialist teams of female workers who will develop an information, advice and training service for selected workers, community groups and female problem drug users in the target camps. Specialist training will enable project partners to establish community-based drug treatment, rehabilitation, aftercare and social re-integration services for female refugee drug addicts and develop prevention programs and activities for female refugees who are at risk of becoming problem drug users.

Budget	444,600
Duration/Start	18 months, July 2001 to December 2003
Funding status	Fully funded

- ◆ **AFG/H09** "Capacity Building for Drug Demand Reduction in Afghanistan"
(**AFG/G68** "Capacity Building for Drug Demand Reduction in Badakshan, Nangarhar and Qandahar") (*ongoing and partially funded*)

The overall objective of this project is to develop a comprehensive drug demand reduction information, advice and training service for Afghanistan. The specific aims have been defined as follows:

- To complete a detailed rapid situation assessment of drug abuse/misuse and provision of drug abuse prevention services/facilities in selected provinces of Afghanistan;
- To develop specialist Community Drug Action Teams (CDATs) in Faisabad, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Qandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif;
- To develop a START (Support: Training: Advice: Resources: Targeting) programme for partner NGOs, Government counterparts, and UN agencies such as UNICEF and WHO engaged in the provision of education, healthcare and social services to Afghan communities;
- To enhance the capacity of Afghan communities to develop realistic and achievable drug abuse prevention programmes and strategies, including treatment, rehabilitation, aftercare and social reintegration.

Budget	2,441,000
Duration/Start	2 years, August 2002 to August 2004
Funding status	Partially funded

5. **Monitoring and Assessment**

The overarching goal of the strategy is to rid Afghanistan of its dependence on the opium economy. Assessing the impact – both in terms of levels of cultivation and sustainability – of national and international efforts provides key information for all partners.

The three projects below support the:

- Conduct of a comprehensive Opium Poppy Survey in 2002 and provision of an accurate assessment of the situation for the Afghan authorities and the international community;
- A study on the economics of opium dependence in Afghanistan and its impact on surrounding countries. This study has been finalized.

- ◆ **AFG/F98** "Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan" (*ongoing and partially funded*)

The primary objectives of this project are to obtain reliable data on the extent and location of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, to monitor the expansion of opium poppy cultivation into new areas, and to collect data on opium prices. These objectives will be achieved through a ground-based survey, requiring surveyors

and coordinators to visit all the areas in Afghanistan where opium poppy has been reported and record opium yields, farm-gate prices and the extent of cultivation. Information derived from this project assists UNODC and the donor community for Afghanistan in fine-tuning and adjusting drug control strategies, determining the type and quantity of development assistance required for opium producing areas and monitoring the effectiveness of drug control in these areas.

Budget	1,460,700
Duration/Start	2 years, January 2002 to December 2003
Funding status	Partially funded

- ◆ **AFG/XXX (M)** "Monitoring and Evaluating the Impact of Development and other Intervention on Livelihood Strategies of Farmers and Rural Communities in Afghanistan" (*pipeline and not funded*)

The objective of this project is to contribute to the sustainable elimination of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by providing objective means to assess the impact and sustainability of national and international efforts to eliminate opium poppy cultivation. The project will put in place a mechanism to monitor and evaluate the impact of development interventions on livelihood strategies of farmers and rural communities currently dependent on opium cultivation, production and trading. This mechanism will be an integral part of the overall strategy for the elimination of opium poppy being implemented by the Afghan Administration with the support of its development partners, and will aim to embed this capacity within national institutions over the medium term.

Budget	1,090,450
Duration/Start	2 years, March 2003 to March 2005
Funding status	Not funded

WORLD MUST HELP AFGHANISTAN ELIMINATE OPIUM PRODUCTION - UN DRUGS CHIEF

New York, Jun 17 2003 12:00PM

Warning that the old Silk Road has been turned into "an opium-paved road," the top United Nations anti-drug official today called on the international community to help Afghanistan eliminate cultivation of a narcotic that feeds terrorism and for which it will continue to be the world's largest producer in the coming years.

1. "The Afghan drug economy can be reconverted to peace and growth if the government is assisted to address the roots of the matter," Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), told the Security Council in an open session on the Central Asian country.

Noting the need to create opportunities for alternative, licit sources of income, Mr. Costa said: "The task to rid Afghanistan of the drug economy requires much greater political, security and financial capital than presently available, to assist the rural areas affected by opium production and, above all, to improve the central government's ability to implement the opium production ban."

In particular, he said, the international community could develop under UN auspices a comprehensive approach to help the government in its own drug control strategy, promote concerted measures in Afghanistan and its neighbours against drug trafficking, and foster alternative development in opium-growing areas in partnership with specialized UN agencies. Such measures could include replacing local narco-usurers with micro-lending and providing jobs and education to women and children.

He emphasized that Afghan drugs provided resources for crime and terrorism - with dealers, including remnants of the previous Taliban regime and the Al Qaida terrorist network, recycling huge profits "in violence and death," influencing politics, fomenting regional strife and feeding armed conflict to destabilize the government.

But perhaps the most serious threat came from the spreading of HIV/AIDS through drug injections and "unless the problem is brought under control, the risk of a pandemic in the region cannot be excluded," Mr. Costa added.

Neighbouring countries, through which drugs are exported, and Europe and Russia, where heroin use feeds opium cultivation and demand reduction efforts should be intensified, need to make convergent efforts, he said.

"UNODC will contribute to the largest possible extent, stretching our work beyond Afghanistan's borders," Mr. Costa declared.

2003-06-17 00:00:00.000

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. Mr. Goodson.

**STATEMENT OF LARRY P. GOODSON, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF
MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY
AND STRATEGY, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

Mr. GOODSON. Thank you. I wish to begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Lantos, for your excellent opening statements, which I largely echo; and for the invitation to discuss United States policy in Afghanistan.

I am obliged to note that my views are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Army War College, or any other agency of the U.S. Government, which will probably be quickly apparent.

In your invitation, I was asked to peer into my crystal ball and project where Afghanistan will be in a year or two if present trends continue. Basically, the picture is dismal, as we have already heard today.

If Afghanistan continues on its present course, the following will most likely occur. On the political front, a new constitution will be approved this fall by a Loya Jirga controlled by pro-government delegates. In an election scheduled for June, 2004, Hamid Karzai will be reelected as President, and a legislature will be elected that will have few powers. Once these processes, however artificial they may be, are completed, the U.S. will begin drawing down its forces in Afghanistan on the grounds that the Bonn Accord's process of political transition to a "democracy" will have been completed. The government we have now will not have changed much; however, with northern minority leaders still in control, and southern and eastern Pashtuns increasingly restive over their marginalization. Thus, the government in Kabul will be set up with strong presidential powers, but the reality on the ground will make that government extremely weak.

That weakness is exacerbated by growing security concerns. Neighboring countries continue to meddle in Afghan politics on multiple levels, thus bolstering the ability of Afghanistan's regional commanders and sub-commanders to behave autonomously in relation to Kabul. Warlord politics will contribute to a deteriorating security situation outside of Kabul, as they jockey for position, foster criminal activity, and marshal their forces against future challenges.

Security is also threatened by the frustrations of the Pashtuns, some of whom are turning to anti-regime elements, such as the neo-Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizbe-Islami, and quasi-independent commanders. A security gap exists and will worsen, because the Afghan National Army and security forces have too few men. Defense Minister Fahim Khan continues to behave like a warlord, the International Security Assistance Force remains limited to Kabul, and the U.S.-led coalition forces are largely confined to two bases. The U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are inadequate to fill this gap, even if all eight were deployed. Continued operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces further complicate the security situation, delaying any American attempt to transition fully to peace operations.

The future for Afghanistan where reconstruction is concerned will be, at best, partial success in reestablishing infrastructure, especially in the larger towns and cities and a portion of the ring road. Aid money for Afghanistan is already inadequate compared to other recent post-conflict reconstruction cases, when measured on a per-capita basis, and is also lagging well behind what is scheduled for Iraq, despite Afghanistan having a larger population and much more extensive needs than Iraq. Given the current focus on Iraq, it is probable that donor fatigue will set in very quickly in Afghanistan's case, such that the large and sustained commitment required of the United States and international community will not be maintained.

Thus, Afghanistan is not likely to recover from its state failure based on current trends. It will still be plagued by flawed government, poor security, a weak economy, and meddling neighbors. Afghanistan's state failure made possible the flourishing of militant Islam and al-Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001. As a failed state, Afghanistan continues to pose a serious security threat to the United States, and thus it is critical to not let Afghanistan continue on this path.

In order to change the course Afghanistan is on, in my statement I offer four sets of recommendations for changes to American policy. In the interest of time I will mention only one recommendation from each area now.

First, closing the security gap is critical, which requires the consideration of seven important measures. One of these, already discussed, is to deploy additional American troops to provide security on the roads, and allow road-building to go forward.

A second concern is the political process. I mention in my statement at least five changes that deserve consideration, one of which is to modify the broad-based centralized government concept, either through a consociational arrangement where power-sharing is governed by a clear formula, or through adoption of a Federal system of governance that acknowledges warlord dominance within fixed territory, but in return grants them responsibilities and imposes constraints on their actions—if you will, de-warlordization.

To elaborate momentarily on this point, there is a serious mismatch between the current goal of the Karzai government, the United States, and the international community, which desires strong central government and the commitment of the United States and international community to make that goal realizable. If effective central government is therefore impossible, we should consider modifications to this model, such as a Federal approach.

A third area of concern is reconstruction. Of four recommendations, one is to increase American aid to at least \$1 billion per year for the next 5 years, structure that aid flow through the Kabul government in order to strengthen it in relation to the power of Afghanistan's regional commanders, and focus the aid on critical major infrastructure, most importantly, the Kabul-Kandahar road rebuilding.

Finally, I would offer two recommendations that transcend Afghanistan to also include Iraq and other places where U.S. policy may push for regime change and societal transformation. Strategic victory in the war against terrorism can only be achieved through

the competent and coherent wielding of all elements of national power: Diplomatic, economic, informational, military, and political. Thus, U.S. policy-makers should develop a nation-building component within our Federal Government either as a separate institution or within the U.S. Army, which is the largest repository of existing nation-building skills such as engineering, medicine, civil affairs, and security within the Federal Government. If this is done within the U.S. Army, significant changes to doctrine, force structure, training, and procurement will need to occur within the framework of the existing transformation that is already underway.

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan must not be allowed to slip back into an age of perverted Islam, medieval misogyny, or become again an anarchic narco-terror-filled state. If this happens, the U.S. will have won the war there and lost the peace, and we will be no more secure than we were on September 11, 2001. The average person in Afghanistan wants good governance, reconstruction, and security, and they are looking to the United States to bring these things about. We can, if we only will.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goodson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LARRY P. GOODSON, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGY, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Lantos, members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today at this hearing to discuss United States policy in Afghanistan. In your invitation I was asked to give my best projection of Afghanistan's possible future, based on an assessment of its current political situation, including the deteriorating security situation and moribund reconstruction. I will do so and in addition offer four sets of policy recommendations.

If Afghanistan continues on its present course, the following will most likely occur. First, a new constitution derived from the 1964 Constitution will be approved by a Loya Jirga controlled by pro-government delegates. In subsequent elections scheduled for June 2004 Hamid Karzai will be reelected as President and a legislature will be elected that will have few powers. Once these processes, however artificial, are completed, the US will begin drawing down its forces in Afghanistan, on the grounds that the Bonn Accords process of political transition to a "democracy" will have been completed. The government will not have changed much, however, with *Shura-yi Nazar* and other northern minority leaders still in control, and southern and eastern Pushtuns increasingly restive over their marginalization. Thus, the government in Kabul will be set up with strong Presidential powers, but the reality on the ground will make that government extremely weak, leaving Karzai as little more than the "mayor of Kabul."

Regional actors in neighboring countries on multiple levels (state, sub-state, sub-sub-state, and non-state) will continue to meddle in Afghan politics in pursuit of their own narrow-minded and short-sighted interests, thus bolstering the ability of Afghanistan's regional commanders and sub-commanders (warlords) to behave autonomously in relation to Kabul. Warlord politics will contribute to a deteriorating security situation outside of Kabul as they jockey for position (Abdur Rashid Dostum v. Mohammed Atta in the north), foster criminal activity (including both highway robbery and the opium traffic), and marshal their forces against future challenges (Ismail Khan in Herat). Security is also threatened by the frustrations of the Pushtuns, some of whom are turning to anti-regime elements such as the Taliban and al-Qa'ida remnants, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *Hizb-i-Islami*, and quaa-independent commanders such as Padshah Khan and Hazrat Ali. A "security gap" exists and will worsen because the Afghan National Army (ANA) and security forces have too few men (only 5000 at the moment), Defense Minister Fahim Khan continues to behave like a warlord, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is limited to Kabul, and the US-led coalition forces are largely confined to two bases,

at Bagram and Kandahar. The US Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are inadequate to fill the task, even if all eight were deployed. Continued operations against al-Qa'ida and Taliban forces (Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and senior members of their organizations are still unaccounted for) further complicate the security situation, delaying any American attempt to transition fully to peace operations.

To the general public as well as the average Afghan, the slow pace of reconstruction is hard to understand. Explanations like limited Afghan capacity, inadequate security, an initial focus on refugee relief and resettlement, and funding cycle realities may all be valid, but they still reflect a failure of the international community to do the one thing that would most stabilize Afghanistan—rebuild it, rapidly, publicly, and generously. US uncertainties about what is commonly referred to as nation-building (although state-building may be a better term) are causing us to lose the peace in Afghanistan and may play out in a similar way in Iraq. Based on current trends, the future for Afghanistan where reconstruction is concerned will be at best partial success in reestablishing infrastructure, especially in the larger towns and cities and a portion of the Ring Road. Aid money for Afghanistan is already inadequate compared to other recent post-conflict reconstruction cases, when measured on a per capita basis, and is also lagging well behind what is scheduled for Iraq despite Afghanistan having a larger population and much more extensive needs than Iraq. Given the current focus on Iraq, it is probable that donor fatigue will set in very quickly in Afghanistan's case, such that the large and sustained commitment required of the US and international community will not be maintained. Numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in aid work in Afghanistan will continue on, but the kind of rebuilding that needs to occur can only happen with committed US leadership.

Thus, Afghanistan is not likely to recover from its state failure based on current trends. It will still be plagued by flawed government, poor security, a weak economy, and meddlesome neighbors. Afghanistan's state failure made possible the flourishing of militant Islam and al-Qa'ida's attacks of September 11, 2001. As a failed state, Afghanistan continues to pose a serious security threat to the United States, and thus it is critical to not let Afghanistan continue on this path. Moreover, stabilizing Afghanistan will have a positive effect on the surrounding countries and will demonstrate to the Islamic world that the US can be a force for good and that they can trust in American leadership. Only through successful nation-building can the US achieve strategic victory (as compared to temporary military victory) in the war against militant Islam.

In order to change the course Afghanistan is on, I offer the following recommendations for changes to American policy. First, closing the security gap is critical, which requires the rapid adoption of multiple measures:

- deploy the remaining PRTs by the end of the summer;
- deploy additional troops to provide security on the roads;
- maintain sufficient air assets to meet ground support and airlift needs;
- join ISAF and expand its size and mandate;
- support an aggressive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program aimed at the warlord-led militias;
- dramatically increase the pace of ANA mobilization and Ministry of Defense reform;
- maintain a military and intelligence focus on capturing key al-Qa'ida and Taliban leaders.

A second concern is the political process. The following changes deserve consideration, but will be difficult to bring about without significant American political will:

- delay the constitutional Loya Jirga until the country is secure enough to allow an open process of public consultation, at the earliest in 2004;
- also delay the planned June 2004 elections to allow time for a census, districting, training of an electoral staff, and the development of political parties;
- foster the development of moderate linkage institutions—a free press, political parties, interest groups, civil society organizations—that can begin training a post-war generation of political leaders;
- encourage the major regional actors—Iran, Pakistan, and Russia—to refrain from deleterious interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs;
- modify the broad-based centralized government concept, either through a Lebanese-Swiss type of arrangement where power-sharing is governed by a clear formula, or through adoption of a federal system of governance that acknowl-

edges warlord dominance within fixed territory but in return grants them responsibilities and imposes constraints on their actions (“dewarlordization”).

Allow me to elaborate a bit on this last point. There is a serious mismatch between the current goal of the Karzai government, United States, and international community—strong central governance—and the commitment of the United States and international community to make that goal realizable. Therefore, current conditions, if unaddressed, may make effective central government impossible, thus requiring us to consider modifications to the central government model, including a federal or confederal approach.

A third area of concern is reconstruction. The US priority in this area is simple and singular:

- provide at least \$1 billion per year to the Kabul government over the five years for reconstruction and capacity-building;
- push the international community and UN to make similar commitments to Afghanistan;
- structure the aid flow through the Kabul government, which will strengthen it in relation to the power of Afghanistan’s regional commanders;
- engage in critical major infrastructure tasks with alacrity, beginning with the Kabul-Kandahar road rebuilding, giving rapid completion of such projects top priority.

Finally, I would offer some recommendations that transcend Afghanistan to also include Iraq and other places where US policy may push for regime change and societal transformation. Strategic victory in the war against terrorism can only be achieved through the competent and coherent wielding of all elements of national power—diplomatic, economic, informational, military, and political. US policy toward Afghanistan was fundamentally flawed from the moment the Twin Towers were struck. We geared up a rapid military response, perhaps made necessary by intelligence data showing an impending second strike by al-Qa’ida, but we did not gear up similarly in the other areas of national power. Thus, the inevitable happened. Our extraordinarily professional military quickly toppled the Taliban and dispersed al-Qa’ida, while the other pillars of Afghanistan’s reconstruction struggled to get off the ground. As nature abhors a vacuum, local powers quickly moved in, creating the complex and problematic situation we face today. Two general recommendations thus close my statement today:

- US policymakers should be required to develop a strategy that shows what the end-state we wish to achieve in Afghanistan is, and that maps out how to get there, how much it will cost, and how long it will take;
- We should develop a nation-building component in our federal government, either as a separate institution or within the US Army, which is the largest repository of existing nation-building skills (engineering, medical, civil affairs, and security) within the federal government. If it is done within the US Army, significant changes to doctrine, force structure, training, and procurement will need to occur within the framework of the existing transformation that is already underway.

Afghanistan must not be allowed to slip back into an age of perverted Islam, medieval misogyny, or become again an anarchic narco-terror failed state. If this happens, the US will have won the war there and lost the peace, and we will be no more secure than we were on September 11, 2001. The average person in Afghanistan wants good governance, reconstruction, and security, and they are looking to the US to bring these things about. We must stay the course, be bold and big-hearted, and remember the words of a wise man: “By their fruits ye shall know them,” said Jesus (Matthew 7:20). Thank you.

AFGHANISTAN: ARE WE LOSING THE PEACE?

*Chairmen’s Report of an Independent Task Force
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society*

Frank G. Wisner II, Nicholas Platt, and Marshall Bouton, Co-Chairs
Dennis Kux and Mahnaz Ispahani, Project Executive Directors

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nineteen months after the defeat of the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies, Afghanistan remains a long way from achieving the U.S. goal of a stable self-governing

state that no longer serves as a haven for terrorists. Indeed, failure to stem deteriorating security conditions and to spur economic reconstruction could lead to a reversion to warlord-dominated anarchy and mark a major defeat for the U.S. war on terrorism. To prevent this from happening, the Task Force recommends that the United States strengthen the hand of President Hamid Karzai and intensify support for security, diplomatic, and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Although Karzai is trying to assert his authority outside Kabul, he lacks the means to compel compliance by recalcitrant warlords and regional leaders who control most of the countryside. Current policy for the 9,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan rules out support for Karzai against the regional warlords and also active participation in the planned effort to demobilize the 100,000-strong militias. In the Afghan setting, where the United States has the primary military power, this approach is mistaken and leaves a dangerous security void outside Kabul, where the 4,800-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) maintains the peace. (The United States has been unwilling until now to support deployment of ISAF elsewhere.) The U.S.-sponsored effort to develop the Afghan national army (ANA) is proceeding at a painfully slow pace and the projected strength of 9,000 men a year from now is grossly inadequate to provide the Afghan government a meaningful security capability. This is also true for the training of a national police force for which the Germans have taken lead responsibility.

The United States should be exerting greater pressure on neighboring countries to support Afghanistan's stability and not to undercut the Karzai government through backing of regional warlords or failure to curb pro-Taliban elements. Breaking the well-ingrained habit of external meddling in Afghanistan is difficult but should have a high U.S. policy priority. To create an additional barrier, the Task Force also believes that the United States should undertake a major diplomatic initiative to obtain a high-level international agreement against outside interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs.

Politically, Afghanistan faces major challenges in adhering to the schedule agreed upon during the December 2001 Bonn conference. A new constitution must be approved by the end of this year and national elections held by June 2004 to pave the way for a permanent Afghan government. Although adopting the constitution on schedule seems feasible, there are growing doubts whether the complex arrangements for presidential and parliamentary polls can be completed on time. To avoid elections that lack legitimacy, thought should be given to holding presidential elections on schedule but putting off parliamentary balloting in order to allow additional time for the administratively difficult and politically sensitive tasks of conducting a census and demarcating constituencies.

Inadequate security has also been a major factor in the painfully slow progress in reconstruction. Both the United States and others should be providing more tangible, effective, and timely assistance to allay rising discontent among Afghans about the lack of economic progress. The Karzai government has developed a realistic budget for 2003 (\$2.2 billion) as well as an overall development strategy. These have been blessed by the United States, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and other major donors, but verbal praise must be followed by actual financial contributions. Moreover, the United States has combined relief aid with funds for reconstruction in totaling its assistance. Afghanistan, the World Bank says, needs \$15 billion over the next five years for reconstruction alone in addition to relief assistance.

One of the major economic weaknesses of the Karzai government has been its lack of control over customs collection. This provides a major source of government revenues, but remains largely in the control of regional leaders and warlords who have been keeping most of the money. Corrective actions need to be taken as part of the process of strengthening the central government.

Unlike in Iraq, the United Nations has the lead in coordinating political and economic assistance in Afghanistan. The United States and others share common goals and objectives. Even though the international effort is not perfect, it has functioned reasonably well. Still, the world thinks of Afghanistan as America's war. To address current problems there, the Task Force urges the United States to take a number of security, diplomatic, and reconstruction measures, all of which are designed to bolster the Kabul government:

Security Measures

- Make peacekeeping part of the mandate of U.S. and coalition troops stationed in Afghanistan, permitting them to intervene if needed to support the Karzai government against defiant warlords. Alternatively, the United States should support an enlargement of ISAF and an expansion of its responsibilities to operate outside the city of Kabul.

- Have U.S. forces participate in implementing the plan to demobilize, demilitarize, and reintegrate the regional militias. Without active U.S. involvement, this program—a vital part of the process of strengthening the Karzai government—is likely to fail.
- Dramatically increase the pace of training the new Afghan national army. Instead of the woefully inadequate 9,000 man force currently envisaged for June 2004, the United States should be targeting a force of 27,000—including integrated militias—to provide a credible peacekeeping capability for the permanent government slated to take power a year from now. The pace of training the national police force should also be drastically increased.
- Support reform of the ministry of defense to make it a more nationally representative organization under full control of the central government.
- Promptly deploy the eight planned provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and if the concept proves successful, consider additional units. Although the stated purpose of the PRTs is to help in reconstruction, their presence has also improved security in areas where they are located.

Diplomatic Measures

- Press Iran, Russia, and Pakistan to bring their real policy toward Afghanistan fully into line with their stated policy of supporting the Karzai government. Iran and Russia should not undercut Karzai by providing support to regional and factional leaders. Pakistan should do a better job of preventing pro-Taliban elements from using its territory to mount attacks on Afghanistan.
- Undertake a major initiative to bolster the standing of the Afghan government and to buttress the December 2002 effort of the Karzai government against external interference. The initiative should seek formal international agreement by Afghanistan's neighbors and other concerned powers not to interfere there, to ban the supply of arms and equipment to warlords, to accept Afghanistan's frontiers, and to promote trade, transit, and customs collection arrangements. The signing of the agreement should ideally coincide with the coming to power of the permanent Afghan government.

Reconstruction Measures

- Provide at least \$1 billion assistance for reconstruction in each of the coming five years over and above humanitarian aid. This will represent one-third of the \$15 billion that is needed.
- Ensure that U.S. assistance priorities are consistent with those established by the Karzai government and that programs are implemented under the aegis of Afghanistan's central government. Karzai's ability to attract and distribute foreign assistance is a major political asset. The United States should be careful not to undercut him by setting its own aid priorities and bypassing Kabul in program implementation.
- Support actions that will give the central government greater control over collection of customs.
- Complete the rebuilding of the Kabul-Kandahar road by the end of 2003 as promised by President Bush and press other donors to finish their portions of the road project expeditiously. Rebuilding Afghanistan's main road arteries would provide visible proof of reconstruction and a major boost to the economy.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Goodson. Mr. Santos.

**STATEMENT OF CHARLES SANTOS, DIRECTOR AND FOUNDER,
FOUNDATION FOR CENTRAL ASIAN DEVELOPMENT**

Mr. SANTOS. Thank you, Chairman Hyde, for this opportunity to testify.

As a New Yorker who was present in the city as the Twin Towers were attacked and a witness to the enormous suffering it caused, and as a person who has great respect for the U.S. Armed Forces and having assisted them in their efforts during the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, I believe that we must not deny the reality of the reemergence of extremism in Afghanistan, par-

ticularly of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the southern and eastern parts of the country, and even in Kabul.

We must not accept that they are the same as the leaders who fought with us to defeat them. The battle against those who attacked America is not over. We cannot deny the threat of extremism in the southern and eastern areas of Afghanistan, where Americans and other foreigners are routinely attacked, while in the north, western, and central areas of Afghanistan, Americans and other foreigners are generally welcomed. This is not about Mr. Karzai or regional leaders or warlords; it is about extremism and its danger.

The way to challenge extremism in Afghanistan is to challenge its ideology of ethnic and religious domination and control. To do this, the U.S. must face the fact that its policy has been based on three basic denials that are enabling extremism. The first is the denial of diversity of the Afghan nation. Many U.S. and U.N. policymakers have accepted the view often expressed by particular leaders that Afghans see each other as brothers undivided by differences. Any talk of addressing issues of ethnicity or diversity are often characterized as a plot to divide the country. Consequently, the necessary dialogue among communities has been squelched. Yet the very diversity that is now denied was understood by the U.S. military, and that understanding enabled them to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda extremists.

Afghanistan is made up of many groups: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Imeks, Nuristanis, Kizalbash, Beluchis. Yet the Bonn Agreements of late 2001 sought to build a strong central authority, trusting the myth that he who controls Kabul controls Afghanistan. Those who have bought into the notion of a single happy family of Afghans are aggravating the situation in denying diverse groups constructive political expression. We must try harder to address the concerns of ethnic communities, not build massive armies to be used against the Afghan people.

Our policy in Afghanistan is in sharp contrast to our Iraq policy, which recognizes that country's diversity and the political rights of groups long oppressed there. The reality in Afghanistan is that from the perspective of many in the regions, Kabul is not so much a capital as another region. It seems that we have ignored our recent experience in the former Yugoslavia, which had similar levels of diversity.

This leads to the second denial, the denial of Afghan history. Though the Pashtuns may be the largest ethnic group in the country, and though they have historically ruled and dominated, they are not a majority. Afghanistan is a country of minorities. In the aftermath of a century of oppression of the non-Pashtun peoples, more than a decade of communist rule, a devastating civil war, and the excesses of the Taliban regime, there will be no permanent peace or security without recognizing this fact, and restoring confidence and trust of the different ethnic groups traumatized by the numerous campaigns to homogenize the country.

The Taliban were ethnic nationalists, as well as religious extremists. And though many Pashtuns benefitted from their rule, the non-Pashtuns were brutally oppressed. Yet the lexicon of domination continues, and insists that whenever a non-Pashtun leader be-

gins to talk of diversity or the rights of his community, he is often labeled a warlord, and his people or his community infidels or worse.

U.S. policy-makers need to understand that Afghanistan's failure to fully centralize in the past was not due to lack of nerve; it was not due to lack of force. It is that centralization has always amounted to essentially Pashtunizing the country, a near-impossible task given the scale of diversity. In previous times, Kabul usually required foreign intervention to sustain subjugation of non-Pashtun peoples, and even of some of the Pashtun tribes.

National unity and security does not come from a single person, no matter how well-intentioned, or building national institutions which are not rooted in the various ethnic communities. It does not come from more troops. It comes from building trust and good will among the different tribes and ethnic groups and regions. It comes from respecting the rights of different communities and allowing them to elect their own leaders, not imposing them. This is especially necessary after decades of war and a century of brutal ethnic and religious persecution.

A program that allows communities to choose their leaders and supports decentralization and local governance is the best means of building security, needed for the reconstruction that we all seek. Security, in the end, must rest on trust and good will between communities, not force or threats.

This leads to the third denial, and that is the denial of our own experience as Americans. Centralization cannot work in Afghanistan, and never has. But some have refused to acknowledge the implications of diversity, and have tried to shoehorn the country into something it never was and never will be. We have failed to use the best example we have of accepting diversity: Our own experience. The civil rights struggle is a perfect example. We learned that diversity must be accepted, and not demonized, and the rights of people respected. That national saga is something that strengthened America, not divided it. And we need to bring that experience with sensitivity to bear overseas.

I was with Congressman Rohrabacher this past April in Mizar-i-sharif when he held a seminar with intellectuals. And I saw personally how interested these people were in the political experience of the United States, even at its founding, and how America found the balance between its regions and centers, or its states and centers. The best way we can help the Afghans find their balance and establish a government that is reflective of its vast diversity is to affirm what is best in our own experience of governance, not deny that experience.

We need to be open to the idea of federalism and the powerful role of democratically-elected local and regional governments as a way of creating trust and good will among diverse regions and communities. We have learned it. The Swiss have learned it. The Germans have learned it. The Canadians have learned it. A decentralized system directly repudiates ethnic and religious extremism. A federalist approach challenges the dogma of domination with a more tolerant and moderate political order. It will not divide Afghanistan, it will save it.

This is why I believe the best Ambassadors to Afghanistan are, in fact, the individuals I am addressing today, for you have the experience of diversity and accommodation, a real appreciation of democratic governance. It is your life experience. It is experience that the Afghans need to draw on as they find their balance and build their country together.

Afghanistan is faced with a historic choice. It is not between chaos and order; it is between acceptance of diversity, or return to old formulas of domination.

I want to also acknowledge Congressman Rohrabacher for all his work. And I would like to express my appreciation for Congressman Royce's efforts with Radio Free Afghanistan, which was motivated by the idea that Afghan people must have the information that they need to take control of their own destiny.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Santos follows.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES SANTOS, DIRECTOR AND FOUNDER, FOUNDATION
FOR CENTRAL ASIAN DEVELOPMENT

**The Unfinished War in Afghanistan:
National Governance Dilemma and Geopolitical Imperatives**

April 2003

An occasional paper of the
Foundation for Central Asian Development
Charles Santos, Elizabeth Cabot, and Paul Behrends
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Charles Santos, an energy consultant and Director of Foundation for Central Asian Development, was previously a UN Political Advisor in Afghanistan, and Vice-President of CENTGAS Consortium.

Elizabeth Cabot, President of Foundation for Central Asian Development, was previously Executive Director of Minority Rights Group (USA).

Paul Behrends, Senior Vice President, Rhoads Weber Shandwick, and a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, was formerly a staff member in the U.S. House of Representatives.

The **Foundation for Central Asian Development** (previously the Afghan Development Foundation) is a 501(c)3 which facilitates inter-ethnic cooperation, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Central Asia since 1997.

Executive Summary

At the end of 2001, the Taliban and al-Qaeda were broken and in utter confusion. Today, they are stronger and more active than at any time since their defeat. They have re-emerged forcefully in their base in the south and eastern regions of Afghanistan, as well as in the capital city of Kabul. Popular support for the Afghan government is eroding as expectations for both a fully representative government and the rebuilding of the country remain unmet. How has it come to pass that the U.S. won the war but risks losing the peace?

U.S. objectives for ensuring a pro-American, anti-terrorist moderate Afghan government have been undermined by its policy supporting a strong, centralized Afghan state. The current system does not permit local or regional political leadership to be elected or local governmental structures to be formed. Rather, exclusive effort has been placed on forging and reinforcing national political structures. While this approach suits the desires of the Kabul administration, it has led in fact to the overall weakening of the Afghan state.

This has come about in two ways. Understanding Afghanistan's regional dynamics explains why Kabul has been pursuing a confrontational position with the non-Pashtun regions. In so doing, it has ignored the increasing challenges by the Pashtun southern and eastern regions, including the growing linkage between extremist Taliban remnants and increased narcotics production. This approach has not only given the Taliban an enormous opportunity to regroup and reorganize, but it has created further mistrust and alienation among the non-Pashtun communities.

Meanwhile, centralization has played directly into the religious and nationalist extremists' hands. Afghanistan is essentially a country of minorities, and while centralization has been attempted many times, it never succeeded without brutal oppression and outside intervention. Centralization has historically been a tool of repression, and in the wake of the Taliban regime, not to mention previous attempts at forging a single national ethnic, religious and cultural identity, any attempt to do so again will further antagonize the deeply polarized communities in Afghanistan.

A decentralized political structure would begin to repair the fractured minority relations and provide Afghans a viable democracy. Of equal importance, decentralization will counter the extremists by undermining their ambition – and ability – to control the country through the proxy center of Kabul. Specific policy recommendations include investigating alternative political structures such as federalism or a confederated system, and taking a more balanced approach to the regions.

“When it entered Afghanistan, the Soviet Union made a big mistake in supporting some centralist Marxists in a country of very different ethnic groups, with tribal systems of government. Such centralization was totally alien to Afghanistan. It was the best example of how no government can be imposed by force in a territory that has its own traditions, its own ways of life and relations.” Former President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, quoted at a meeting on Democratic Transition and Consolidation held in Madrid in October 2001. Translated from EL PAIS, October 21, 2001

Introduction

At the end of 2001, the Taliban and al-Qaeda were broken and in utter confusion. Today, they are stronger and more active than at any time since their defeat. They have re-emerged forcefully in their base in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, but equally worrying is their re-emergence in the capital city of Kabul, challenging the newly established, pro-American Afghan government. How has it come to pass that the U.S. won the war but risks losing the peace?

After all, U.S. policy has been formulated to help shape support for a democratic system in Afghanistan, and create another legitimate model for the Islamic world. And more than two decades of occupation and civil war on, most Afghans do crave democracy, and hunger to take control of their own destiny. Yet popular support for the Afghan government is eroding as expectations for both a fully representative government and the rebuilding of the country remain unmet.

By any measure, the Karzai administration is faced with a Herculean task in Afghanistan, and the prospect of leading the nation is a daunting challenge. But there are specific policies of that administration which the U.S. has embraced – and reinforced – that actually contribute to the instability. In the process of creating a highly centralized state, both Kabul and the U.S. seem to be ignoring political realities on the ground, and are – inadvertently or not – encouraging the ethnic and religious extremists.

The dramatic increase in attacks by Taliban remnants that have mutated into a guerilla movement using infiltration and hit-and-run tactics is symptomatic of a larger disease. Far from being discredited and destroyed by the U.S. military campaign, or the Karzai interim government, the extremists increasingly target U.S. and international military personnel, U.N. personnel and foreign aid workers. Particularly in the south and eastern parts of the country, terrorist activities are happening on a weekly – and sometimes daily – basis.

And for many non-Pashtuns there is a growing suspicion that radical Pashtuns have substituted neckties for turbans and have begun to make their presence felt in the

fledgling Afghan interim government. The policy alarm bells should be ringing loudly enough to revisit our original assumptions and objectives. The following paper outlines the background discussion and proposes policy recommendations that would reduce ethnic divisions and strengthen the Afghan state.

Specifically, this paper argues that a decentralized political structure would provide the most realistic solution to a durable peace, and provide Afghans a viable democracy. Of equal importance, decentralization will counter the extremists by undermining their ambition – and ability – to control the country through the proxy center of Kabul.

American Objectives and Early Support for a New Government

The United States and its anti-terror coalition partners have set several overlapping objectives for a post-Taliban Afghan government, which are to:

- Ensure that there is no return to an extremist terrorist state where terrorists could gather to train, plan, and coordinate terror activities;
- Establish political stability within a democratic system and restore civic order;
- Maintain the territorial integrity of the state through a broad-based government that enjoys the support of the Afghan people;
- Revitalize the economy and the educational system, and bolster civil society institutions;
- Highlight success in Afghanistan as a public diplomacy case study to other nations so that the benefits of supporting American goals and values are self-evident; and
- Diminish narcotics production and disrupt and destroy its linkages with ethnic extremists and narco-terrorists.

The U.S. provided considerable support – both political and financial – for the processes leading to a new Afghan national government. As the Taliban regime was collapsing, a U.N.-sponsored initiative with U.S. blessing brought some three dozen Afghans to Bonn, Germany to begin discussions about the new government. Along with the Northern Alliance, members of three Afghan mediation ‘processes’ were assembled, out of which Hamid Karzai was picked by the U.N. to lead the Afghan Interim Authority.¹ Under controversial circumstances, this election was ratified by a traditional

¹ These ‘processes’ included the ‘Peshawar’ process, the ‘Cyprus’ process, and the ‘Rome’ process (which included the former King of Afghanistan, as well as Hamid Karzai). The Northern Alliance was led by the Panshiri Tajiks who had inherited the mantle of the recently assassinated Ahmed Shah Massoud. Most of the Bonn delegates lived outside Afghanistan, and of all those present, only the former King, Zahir Shah, could claim to have something of the mandate of a broad cross-section of the Afghan people.

Afghan consultative *Loya Jirga* process held the following June 2002, and Karzai emerged President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. His administration has been charged with undertaking nation-wide elections in 2004.

If the U.N. established the political procedures and a specific administration for the Afghans, the U.S. reinforced these political initiatives in many smaller ways. America has provided significant logistical support for the Afghan administration, such as U.S. funded transport, technical advice and American security detail for President Karzai. The particular concern with Karzai's protection is pronounced and has led, according to one cabinet minister, to such anomalies as senior cabinet ministers having to undergo metal detector and dog-sniffing searches before meetings with the President, and the American security detail sitting in on cabinet meetings.

Even more important, perhaps, is the U.S. financial assistance. As the largest national donor, the U.S. has channeled, by Afghan estimates, almost U.S. \$700 million in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the country in the two years since March 2001.² Altogether, such assistance is intended not only to reinforce the authority of the Karzai government, but to begin the process of rebuilding critical infrastructure and returning Afghanistan to the community of nations.

U.S. Policy in Favor of a Centralized State

Until now, the U.S. has not encouraged any political development outside of Kabul and the Karzai administration, and the current system does not permit local or regional political leadership to be elected or local governmental structures to be formed. Instead, a policy focusing single-mindedly on building a strong center was developed in tandem with both Afghan central government desires and international nation-building experience. U.S. policy makers have reasoned that a strong center, with a pro-American leader, can resist the revival of an anti-Western, fundamentalist threat or its neighbors' tendency to meddle in her internal politics. The U.S. also believes that a centralized government is the preferred mechanism for managing the distribution of the billions pledged towards the country's reconstruction.³

Accordingly, Zahir Shah was given authority to suggest a Prime Minister, which he delegated to the members of his 'process' to elect. One of their members, Professor Sattar Sirat, emerged the choice of the group (11 out of 14 votes), but the U.N. mediator overruled them in favor of Karzai because, according to Professor Sirat, the latter was Pashtun while Sirat was not.

² The rest of the international community has contributed another U.S. \$1.2 billion. Source: *Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority DAD* online database.

³ A preliminary needs assessment in January 2002 in advance of the Tokyo donor summit by the World Bank, UNDP and the Asian Development Bank estimated reconstruction costs for Afghanistan at US \$15 billion. (See World Bank News Release 2002/178/SAR.) To date, most reconstruction money has gone through international non-governmental organizations or UN agencies because of the lack of basic governmental capacity. The US, which is the largest donor, has said that this practice is scheduled to be diminished in 2003, when it will go to Kabul directly (through an Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund). See *Pentagon briefing by Joe Collins, December 19, 2002*. Material on the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund can be found on World Bank online at www.worldbank.org/.

Centralization is one, albeit crucial, part of the larger U.S. and Kabul policy, which is to rebuild – and in some instances build from scratch – the entire state immediately. This must surely be one of the most ambitious programs of nation-building ever devised, and the time table was planned for just a few years. National institutions as diverse as the executive, the legislative, the judiciary, a banking system, a press and media, an army, a police force, a country-wide school system, and a health system are being largely formed anew out of the administrative vacuum left by the Taliban regime and prior civil war. A constitution is to be written, an economy revived, human rights abuses redressed, the historically appalling situation of women in Afghanistan rectified and millions of refugees repatriated. Meanwhile Afghanistan is still in the process of formulating the terms of a political legitimacy that could bind the wounds of twenty years of state failure, and a century of brutality and incomplete progress.

If this appears a monumental task, the U.S. does not appear overly concerned. There is no doubt an intellectual attraction to managing the complex process of national transformation through a trusted centralized government in Kabul. The simplicity inherent in a ‘one-stop-shop’ for managing the daunting complications of Afghan ethnic and tribal relations, not to mention the billions pledged towards the country’s reconstruction, are easily apparent. President Karzai’s appeal as a focus for a moderate, new Afghanistan is also apparent. But U.S. support for such a centralized political state should be a deliberate decision based on facts on the ground, and not the result of bureaucratic inertia. Such a policy posture hardly helped the outcome for the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, or current day Indonesia, no matter how much policy makers wished otherwise.

While all these goals of nation-building are absolutely worth pursuing in the long run, the time frames here are utterly unrealistic. Worse, the general expectation for immediate solutions have led to widespread disillusion with the Karzai government, and increasingly even with the U.S. and the international community. Short-order nation building may suit the desire to move beyond Afghanistan’s problems quickly, but twenty years or more of political context cannot be wished away so easily. Meanwhile, regional leaders have begun, without help from the central government, to tackle the daily problems faced by Afghans throughout the country. Without a better sense of what is happening on the ground and where the country is going, the U.S. policy of centralization is in real danger of seriously undermining U.S. objectives.

The Transitional Government: Worrying Clues and Trends

Despite the U.S. and coalition forces support, the current government is not effective beyond Kabul. Indeed, it is unable to prevent growing insecurity and instability *within* the capital - despite the assistance of some 5,000+ International Security Force for Afghanistan (ISAF) military personnel.⁴

⁴ See among many citations “Afghanistan. Concern over crime in Kabul” January 20, 2003 (IRIN) at www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=31798&SelectRegion=Central_Asia&SelectCountry=AFGHANISTAN

Rebuilding Afghanistan will be no easy task, and this commentary aims to focus on structures and institutions, rather than personalities and individuals. Nevertheless, at the same time that conditions are deteriorating at the center and in certain regions, concern about lack of reconstruction momentum is building. The hesitation to fulfill international pledges follows a circular logic: the apparent weakness of the Afghan government renders much of the country unstable and insecure – yet instability will only increase if the environment remains devoid of the means to rebuild an economic future.

And the Karzai administration knows that its survival is precarious if it cannot bring about the twin requirements of stability and economic revitalization. All the same, it has chosen to address the issue of instability in contradictory ways. Having declared the war with the Taliban for all intents and purposes over, Kabul has also attributed the current instability to its own weak grip on the country. The more independent the region, it is implied, the greater the insecurity and 'warlordism'. To rectify this position, Mr. Karzai has called for the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul to other cities. He belatedly acknowledged lack of support for this, and is now promoting the establishment of a national army of 60,000 within six years – by most estimates an impossible goal.

The Us versus Them Mentality

Yet even as ISAF protects just the security in Kabul, conditions in some of the most ostensibly independent regions are more stable than in the capital. In the north, one of the regional leaders, General Dostum, has initiated a disarmament process without the help of Kabul and has begun the reconstruction – again without any U.N. or central government backing – of roads, schools, and other infrastructure. In the west, the commonly touted 'warlord' Ismail Khan has managed to make the city of Herat much safer through a disarmament process as well, even though he has recently faced several challengers and challenges that will be discussed shortly.

The Karzai administration has failed not only to acknowledge the relatively improved conditions in the northern and western regions but has singled them out for confrontation. At the same time, it has been far less vocal about the instability in the south and east, as well as in Kabul until very recently. Similarly, it has been reluctant to tackle the increasing extremism within its own administration and within the other government branches. Recent judicial rulings, for example, from the highest Afghan court banning cable television and coeducation drew virtually no response by the Karzai administration until forced to by both popular and international outrage⁵.

⁵ Issued by Chief Justice Shinwari, a Karzai appointee and a well-known fundamentalist and Pashtun nationalist. Shinwari has been a strong proponent of centralization, and has also ruled in favor of Karzai's substantial power to rule by decree. These and similar incidents have prompted, among other responses, the establishment of a new political party this past March, the National Democratic Front, to address the attempts to crush liberal tendencies in the current administration.

The matter of the Taliban prisoners remaining in the north is another example of the sort of inconsistency which characterizes the Karzai administration. Following pressure from the capital, approximately 3,200 of the original 4,200 Taliban and al-Qaeda members captured after the fall of Mazar were released from prison in the north and returned home to the south and eastern provinces. The remaining 1,000 are still deemed too dangerous to free at this point. However, once home, some of the former prisoners mounted attacks on U.S. military and one attempted to assassinate Karzai in Kandahar. In an interview with one of the authors, remaining prisoners were perfectly frank about their desire to 'kill Americans'. Yet despite the threat that these fighters pose to the U.S., to the Karzai administration, and to the regions in which they were captured, Karzai has repeatedly insisted that they be released immediately.

While this account largely focuses on the different approach of Kabul in the north and west versus the south and east, a word must be included regarding Kabul's treatment of the Hazara population in the central highlands of Afghanistan. These Shia minority peoples were especially persecuted by the Taliban, who massacred them in their tens of thousands, destroyed their cultural monuments and attempted to starve the remaining population by blocking all road routes in. The Taliban also destroyed a number of villages claiming 'grazing rights' over these non-Pashtun lands for the Pashtun nomadic Kuchis.

Such was the decimation of the population and resistance that Kabul has made little of 'warlords' there, and the Hazara have been fairly subdued. But that should not be interpreted as trust in the government. Since Karzai attempted to reduce their proportional allotment of delegates to the *Loya Jirga*⁶, the Hazara have grown increasingly apprehensive. Recent concerns include claims by members of the Karzai cabinet reviving the 'grazing rights' of the Kuchis on Hazara lands, and Karzai's trip to Bamyan during which he failed to visit the well-documented and visible mass graves. This in contrast to his repeated calls for investigations into *alleged* massacres of Taliban fighters in Mazar (but seemingly not into the massacres of the civilian resistance in those areas). The contrast has not gone unnoticed.

These and other actions illustrate the fact that stability, much less an inclusive, even-handed approach, simply is not a priority of the Kabul administration. Instead the issue of stability is used as a tool for economically and politically isolating the non-Pashtun regions and de-legitimizing their leadership. What the government in Kabul is clearly promoting then, is not just a Kabul-centric policy, but a Pashtun-centric policy. And this is the root of all the political rivalry between the center and those regions.

This rivalry explains the recent instability outside Herat referred to above. Reported as being between rival 'warlords', the challenges to Ismail Khan in fact came from former Taliban commanders, and even appear to have been encouraged by some members of the Karzai administration. One instance occurred recently in Baghdis, following an order issued by the Minister of Frontier Affairs, Arif Noorzai, authorizing a local Pashtun and former Taliban commander to establish a military brigade to challenge

⁶ by claiming certain Hazara areas as Pashtun in Gardez, Uruzghan and Ghazni

Ismail Khan. Another occurred outside Shindand last December when another former Taliban commander succeeded in taking several villages.

Naturally, the attempt to undermine non-Pashtun regions is part of shoring up support in the Pashtun areas. This also explains why Kabul was reluctant to discuss instability in the south and east until it became too glaringly obvious.⁷ But there are many worrying signs that the Afghan government's approach has failed to win that support. Significantly, both attempts on President Karzai's life, as well as the assassinations of two of his ministers, and a recent assassination of a government envoy, occurred in Kabul or the southern and eastern parts of the country. In addition, narcotics production has significantly increased in Pashtun regions. Meanwhile, in other areas of Afghanistan, such as in certain areas of Northern Afghanistan, efforts are beginning to be made without U.S., UN or central government support, to eradicate narcotics.

Such confrontations with the non-Pashtun areas, while attempting to shore up support elsewhere, have given the Taliban significant new opportunities to reorganize. Not understanding these dynamics, the international community has continued to support Kabul's approach. For now, U.S. military provides a safety net in the south and the east in the event of an effective Taliban challenge.⁸ But over time, any administration in Kabul will be forced to turn to the non-Pashtun regions and their leaders to help if it is serious about containing the Taliban.

The Failure of Centralization

It is clear that the Karzai government is determined to suppress the non-Pashtun regions and their leaders. So how do they manage to be so strong?

One of the most crucial misunderstandings of the Afghan dilemma is rooted in the very language that describes typical nation-states. For if Afghanistan has regions, so it must have a center, and if there are 'minorities', so there must be some 'majority'.

Actually, neither is the case. From the perspective of many of the regions, Kabul looks not so much a capital as another region, and one that is increasingly disconnected. But while the Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in the country, and have historically

⁷ Another example of this unbalanced approach was when Kabul tacitly supported the USAID's withdrawal from northern Afghanistan after the rape of an aid worker last June. Yet USAID and Kabul supported a major road reconstruction project from Kabul to Kandahar proposed immediately after the assassination attempt on Karzai in Kandahar.

⁸ This military presence has been largely composed of 5000-7000+ US forces who appear to be reorganizing into "Provisional Reconstruction Teams" (PMTs). These teams will be composed also of non-military civilians, and installed in six areas to provide both security and an organizational unit for reconstruction projects. While this is controversial, at least with the NGO community who fear that both the security component is weakened while the humanitarian/reconstruction component is confused for the local populations, one PMT has already been established in the southern city of Gardez. For more, see www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=32083&SelectRegion=Central_Asia&SelectCountry=AFGHANISTAN

ruled, they are not a majority - and even as the largest group they have generally fractured into various sub-groups, tribes, clans and other primary affiliations.⁹

It is, in short, a country of minorities, the outcome of living at the intersection of the three regional historical powers of the last half millennium. In the aftermath of communist rule, a devastating civil war and the Taliban regime, there will be no peace without restoring the confidence of the communities who have been traumatized by the numerous campaigns to homogenize the Afghans. Another centralizing attempt will only compound the enormous distrust among the ethnic communities and further alienate them from the center and each other.

Historical Context

Therein lies a significant lesson for the United States today. Failure to fully centralize was not due to lack of nerve or force, as the historical record of the Afghan nation will attest. Centralizing essentially amounted to 'Pashtunizing' the country, a daunting task given the scale of the diversity, and it always required foreign intervention to sustain the subjugation of the non-Pashtun peoples. In the late 19th century the 'Iron Amir', Abdur Rahman, ceded significant aspects of Afghan sovereignty, including foreign policy and borders, to the British in return for weapons, money and a free hand to suppress the non-Pashtun peoples. He also ceded sizeable lands populated by Pashtuns to the British, rendering the group divided today between Afghanistan and Pakistan (which accounts for the porous border conditions)¹⁰. More recently, the Taliban's thrust into the northern areas beyond Pashtun lands increasingly relied on massive Pakistani help - and eventually al-Qaeda resources and military assistance as well.

Always there, the complexity of the Afghan nation and ethnic affiliation increased in the aftermath of the civil war in the early 1990s. Identity politics were already paramount, because the various 20th century campaigns by the Afghan government to create a modern Pashtun state out of Afghanistan had polarized the non-Pashtun peoples. These modernizing forces also viewed the rural, traditional Pashtun tribal leaders as impediments. Some of these leaders were undermined and then actively persecuted during the more severe campaigns to centralize and modernize, particularly under the worst abuses of the communist period.

That these events led eventually to the Taliban is well known, with their punitive regime based on Pashtun village and tribal norms. What is often obscured in the many descriptions of the Taliban as medieval or as a 'backlash,' however, is how the movement was in fact a sophisticated consolidation of prior attempts to centralize and homogenize

⁹Other main minority groups in Afghanistan include Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Nuristanis, etc.

¹⁰The discussion is incomplete without a brief reference to the efforts by Afghanistan to create an independent Pashtunistan out of the Pakistan Pashtun areas, promoted especially by Prime Minister Daoud in the 1950s. These efforts created enormous antagonism with Pakistan as it was perceived to be an opening play by Afghanistan to reclaim the area, and so contributed to Pakistan's eventual support of Taliban and their "Pashtunization" program in Afghanistan as a way to defuse the issue.

the country. Highly fluent in the language of political manipulation and symbols, the regime represented a significant effort to unite and integrate the Pashtun peoples within fundamentalist Sunni principles, traditional Pashtun values and deeply embedded nationalist notions¹¹. This explains the regime's widespread support even among many former Pashtun members of the Communist party (especially the *Khalqis*) and educated Pashtun exiles - including many exile Pashtun women.

And the fusion of a century-long nationalist program of ethnic domination with universalist Sunni fundamentalism eventually bound the Taliban loyally to al-Qaeda as well, who saw in the Afghan Taliban the purest form of fundamentalist Islam. The Taliban's brutal suppression of non-Pashtuns is amply recorded. It should be recalled, however, that the Taliban never identified themselves as a political party, but rather as a national movement, thus rendering all contestants to Taliban rule illegitimate. Communities resisting 'Pashtunization' were 'infidels', their leaders 'warlords' or worse.

While the Taliban enjoyed enormous public support in their Pashtun areas, their military push to the north and west drew large civilian resistance, leading to large civilian massacres. The greatest were undoubtedly borne by the Hazara peoples in Mazar-i Sharif and Bamyan city, but to this day there are still tens of thousands of missing Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmens.¹² The Taliban's mission in non-Pashtun regions resulted in even greater Pashtun popular support, because it restored authority over areas that historically that have been seen as the Pashtun "manifest destiny".

And so as the 'warlords' in the Pashtun areas ultimately were removed or joined the Taliban, the regional and ethnic leaders elsewhere remained the only hope of the non-Pashtuns peoples facing Taliban occupation and domination. In the aftermath of the Taliban and the civil war, these regions are extremely mistrustful of any campaign to centralize because it has always amounted to ethnic domination.

If the repressive measures of successive Afghan leaders, the Soviet occupation and the later Taliban regime were unable to create a viable strong central State and stamp out this diversity, it is highly unlikely that the Kabul administration, with the help of the international community, is going to succeed in doing so now.

This attempt is not just highly unrealistic: it aims at a morally problematic goal. Undermining the regions by weakening their self-defense, by attacking their legitimacy and by labeling their leaders 'warlords' has hardly endeared the populations outside Kabul to the current administration. Centralization has been an historical tool of repression. Asking regions to support a strong centralized state is tantamount to asking for the end of cultural, religious and ethnic autonomy with only a promise that rights will be respected.

¹¹ Even the notion of the Taliban as being 'simple' village mullahs was in fact something of a fabrication, for many of the leaders of the movement were largely raised in Pakistani refugee camps, and educated in radical Islamic *madrassas* quite out of tradition back in Afghanistan until the Taliban's arrival.

¹² Among other reports, see those published by Human Rights Watch, Vol. 10 No. 7 (c), 1998 and Vol. 13 No. 1 (c), 2001.

And given the historical context not just of the Taliban years, but the past century, it is no wonder that so many Afghans are unwilling to surrender their hard-won freedom.

The Afghan government's top priority should have been measures that build community trust and reduce the highly polarized issue of ethnicity. Perversely, the government's attempts to prohibit any mention of ethnicity and its insistence on exercising complete control over the regions has weakened its authority overall. The regions, for their part, are increasingly focused on the thinly disguised specter of yet another crudely-made, centralizing experiment.

The Persistence of Extremism and the Decentralized Solution

But centralization has another dimension in Afghanistan as well, for the strongest antagonism to a decentralized State comes from the Taliban extremists and their ethnic and religious supporters as well as other fundamentalists. Beyond a relatively small but internationally well-connected group of former exiles that benefited from Afghan central governments of yesteryear, it is the ethnic nationalists and religious extremists who argue vociferously for strong and dominant central authority. They firmly believe that diversity undermines the idea of Afghanistan as a Pashtun country or an extremist Islamic one. Diversity is a condition that for them is both dangerous and intolerable.

It should not be assumed, however, that the fusion of ethnic and religious fundamentalism is only to be found in Pashtun communities. Certain other ethnic groups have had equally strong ambitions to dominate the other communities through control of the center, and while less successful, were in practice no less destructive of the Afghan nation. For example, of the two Tajik run administrations, one fell within a year or so, and the other lasted effectively less than five years.¹³ No doubt there was strenuous contest by the Pashtuns, but what is remarkable is that the Tajik administrations managed to alienate the non-Tajiks so thoroughly as well.¹⁴

Rather, it is that the Pashtun regions produced the most successful political movement in the form of the Taliban, before tactically retreating under pressure of American airpower and significant local resistance. But what animates all such extremists is the notion that they have a right to dominate absolutely, that co-existence is a repudiation of their higher claims, and that their interests alone are fused with those of the Afghan State. And the fastest and most powerful method of domination over the country has been through the capital. In the zero-sum environment of Afghan minority relations, he who controls the center controls the country.

¹³ These were Bacha-i-Saqao in 1929, and Professor Rabbani, effectively President from mid 1992 until the Taliban takeover of Kabul in the fall of 1996.

¹⁴ And so today, each group continues to attempt control over the others through the means available. For example, General Fahim, the Tajik defense minister in Karzai's administration, initially appointed only Tajiks generals to the national army (and one Uzbek), although he subsequently broadened the appointments after sufficient pressure was applied.

This is the crux of the matter for the United States. Instead of diminishing the importance of Kabul, the U.S. and the Karzai administration has supported the very policy that motivates the extremists to regroup and to contest the current administration.

Hence the difficulty that the south and eastern areas present for the current Afghan administration. While Karzai's strategy of provoking non-Pashtun regions may be an attempt to shore up support in his Pashtun base, he has not only failed to diminish the Taliban but has strengthened them. These ethnic and religious extremists are particularly dangerous for President Karzai, who hails from a prominent Kandahari Pashtun family with deep roots in the area. If he is unable to maintain any authority whatsoever in the region, what other pro-American, moderate Pashtun will be able to?

Extremism persists in Afghanistan as a universalist and absolutist way of thinking, and it requires a centralized condition so that it can expand and enforce its vision. Rather than recognize this, the U.S. has been pulled into mythical and romantic notions of an Afghanistan whose ultimate goal is to perpetuate the politics of domination through the center.

What Works – What Doesn't

The U.S. military initially defeated al-Qaeda and the Taliban by using the regional dynamics that are anathema to the administration in Kabul as well as the fundamentalists. It was the defeat of the Taliban in Mazar-i Sharif in November 2001 that caused the rest of the country – including the south and east – to collapse rapidly, because the extremist regime was now denied non-Pashtun lands that had justified their brutal rule.

But the valuable lesson was lost on subsequent U.S. policy. Having undermined a Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan by its military campaign, it then minimized the importance of identity and rebuilt the very centralized condition that the extremists require. This policy of over-emphasizing the administration in Kabul has, ironically, weakened the Afghan state. Given the rampant ethnic mistrust, and the impatience with yet more social experiments, any attempt to push yet again for a centralized State is precisely what may cause the breakup of Afghanistan. No community has called for secession, but Afghanistan has lost more than one generation to this social and political experiment. There are few left who are willing to tolerate another round of such efforts.

The Way Ahead: Policy Prescriptions

The U.S. approach towards a strong centralized state should be abandoned in favor of a more decentralized approach. The Karzai administration in Kabul must remain a focus for the U.S. but there is an urgent need to establish a system that takes into consideration the needs and leadership of all the regions. If the U.S. persists in working only through Kabul, its objectives for a truly representative, moderate national

government will fail to materialize and the precarious state of ethnic relations will deteriorate further.

The fractured relations and history of violence between communities demands that a greater political space be created in Afghanistan. A two-track political development of both a national government in Kabul and regional power centers within a loosely federated system would create that space. While there is serious opposition to such a 'regional', 'cantonal' or 'zonal' approach by those charged with drawing up a new constitution, and indeed by many in Kabul who are threatened by the loss of absolute political power in such an arrangement, regional political organization has been a *de facto* reality for many years now. If regions reflect Afghanistan's cultural, ethnic and religious divisions in the country, regional organizations have provided local conflict mediation, economic activity and political resistance to some of the worst abuses of political misrule.¹⁵

In short, building on this existing regional approach would be more inclusive and reduce the insecurity associated with a 'winner take all' status quo. A decentralized system not only is more realistic, given facts on the ground, but would over time provide the only way to a functional, unified and independent Afghan nation because it would directly reduce the concerns underpinning inter-ethnic conflict. A policy to achieve this must work at varying speeds with the different regions. Some will move faster, while others will be more difficult, requiring greater military efforts. But ignoring the complexity of Afghanistan to pursue unrealistic goals about centralized state-building will do more damage not just to those communities, but to the Afghan nation.

Not least, a final argument in favor of a loosely federated system is that it is the only approach in which the ideas underpinning ethnic and religious extremism are directly repudiated. Decentralization challenges the dogma of domination with a more tolerant and moderate political order. The war on terrorism in Afghanistan is as much a battle over ideology as it is a battle over land. Cultural, ethnic and religious notions are interrelated in complex ways that sustain the extremist movements, so it is here – at the structure of domination – that the battle must be engaged.

Under this new U.S. policy, the international requirements of the state, and the minimum domestic obligations would continue to be controlled by Kabul. However, the remaining areas, including reconstruction and policing, would devolve to those regions directly. While this is the most effective and least divisive way to approach reconstruction and security, it will also help reduce the inflated expectations of some Afghans that a centralized, modern Afghanistan will somehow be spontaneously created through the reconstruction process.

¹⁵ The regions already have some basis in recognition from outside actors as well. For example, the United Nations have managed their programmes through 'regional' offices, and similarly, the U.S. military also organized the resistance to the Taliban through regional blocks. However Karzai has recently dismantled the regional military structures, particularly those in the north and the west that helped rout the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

In pursuing this balanced approach, the U.S. should focus on encouraging cooperation, trust and goodwill between the regions and the center in Kabul. Among other things, this means understanding the highly politicized claims and counter-claims of ethnic violence or abuses perpetrated by the “other side” and resisting the tendency to use these to promote one group over another. Given the scale of abuses that has been perpetrated by all sides, human rights education should be promoted as an effective way of going forward to improve community confidence and enhance regional stability.

The logjam of resources at the center must be broken. The administration in Kabul must be reminded that resources are two-way street, and the U.S. should provide direct assistance to those regions that make progress towards disarmament, reform and reconstruction.¹⁶

In the immediate term, the U.S. needs to:

- Slow down the constitutional process and make it provisional in order to allow a federalist or other decentralized process to be developed. The whole constitutional process is increasingly problematic because of the complete lack of public debate about either the constitution or the *Loya Jirga* delegate selection. Even so, there is much to be salvaged but it means working with the administrative infrastructure at the district level in order to create a more participatory local government.
- Instill a sense of realism about the time it will take to establish a functioning government in Afghanistan. This is a matter of decades, not a couple of years. All participants need to maintain a perspective on the ability to impose lasting and significant change through external or top-down procedures. To the extent that significant changes must be undertaken, as far as possible they should be incremental in speed and initiated at the grass roots.
- Work with regional administrations that support the U.S. anti-terrorist and anti-narcotics interests. These administrations are working well in certain parts of the country and therefore are the most efficient structures to build on.
- Not undermine regional problem solving in favor of some idealized central approach that will not work and will only contribute to stagnation and antagonism with the administration in Kabul.
- Establish U.S. consular offices in seven regions in addition to the embassy in Kabul. They would be given more authority and autonomy to initiate reconstruction projects,

¹⁶ While USAID, the UN, NGOs and the current Afghan administration have begun important reconstruction work in the field of education, health and the repair of some of the necessary infrastructure of the capital, the reconstruction of the regions has largely gone unaddressed. The majority of the funds allocated have gone to Kabul: of approximately 170 quick impact projects listed by USAID since January 2002, well over half have gone to building central government capacity or to Kabul directly. Another 10% has gone to other Pashtun provinces. However under-targeted these provinces are, certain others have seen almost no USAID benefits whatsoever. Material taken from *USAID Monthly Field Reports online*.

such as roads, schools, clinics and other relief efforts. USAID presence and assistance should be accelerated in the regions immediately. Among other goals, AID should focus on building inter- and intra- community trust, and not just high-profile state building projects.

- Expand U.S. military civil affairs teams in the regions, and provide them with more resources to work on reconstruction projects. Cultivate a strategic perspective on the security implications of road-building and other forms of assistance
- Re-establish recently dismantled cooperative Afghan regional or zonal structures, which were so successful at helping the U.S. campaign, and as a backstop against growing al-Qaeda and Taliban activities.
- Encourage the participation of the regional business communities in local decisions, and bring them into partnership in reconstruction projects. The U.S. is on the right track to move away from a sole concentration on NGO delivery, but should include using local Afghan business capacity where it exists. Take advantage of OPIC's willingness to build on its work in Afghanistan by being open to worthwhile projects outside Kabul.
- Promote capacity building for most local governments, including administration infrastructure, human rights training and other assistance. Encourage the institutes within the National Endowment for Democracy to become active in political development at the regional level.

Over the long-term, the U.S. should maintain support for:

- Reformation of the judiciary at the regional and district level to improve the quality of local courts, with the recognition that the reforms will require longer time frames than is generally realized.
- Training of the local police and military units at the district and regional levels. Training of the national army should take place not just in Kabul but also at the regional level with regional leader participation, and again, will take longer than currently anticipated. Historically, national armies have sometimes been taken for armies of occupation, so establishing secure limits on the function of a national army is critical.
- Cooperation between different communities at the regional level and the inter-regional level. More diverse authority at various levels is needed. A significantly longer time frame than that set out by the Bonn Accords is needed and will require improving regional security structures to support these efforts.

Finally, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have grown in an environment that provokes old chauvinisms and long-standing divisions. U.S. policy must adjust to a more complex situation than the authors of the Bonn agreement anticipated. The different regions of

Afghanistan are at different stages in and perspectives on their past and future. Some of these regions have been constructive and some not. Yet the differences have been ignored in order to preserve outmoded political notions. This does not necessarily portend the end of Afghanistan, but U.S. policy must be adjusted to help the country survive, and eventually thrive.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Santos. Now, we have two panels. This was the first panel; we have a second panel. I want to get to the second panel so everyone has a chance to be heard. And so I am going to ask for questions of the Members here in the order in which you have appeared. We have tried to keep an accurate database on that. But I am going to respectfully request that if you have a question, ask the question, cut to the chase, because an awful lot of time can be consumed in making statements, and the time for that would be after we have heard from the second panel if you have statements to make.

So I would deeply appreciate your cooperation. And the first person we will go to is Dana Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Although it was not necessarily reflected in testimony—and let me commend all of you, your testimony was terrific. And the American people need to know the information that you have presented us, and Congress needs to know.

But I am somewhat concerned at what appears to be, Mr. Chairman, an anemic effort in terms of reconstruction of Afghanistan. We abandoned the people of Afghanistan before, and that is what gave rise to this radical Islam and the woes of that country. And I do not think that we have proven to them, with the type of effort, with a substantial reconstruction effort that they need, that we really are going to fulfill the promise. And I just want to put that on the record.

We need to make sure that these men, and people talk about the warlords, the warlords are able to hire people to work for them and to carry guns for them because those people have no other alternative way of earning a living. Let us give the people of Afghanistan a chance to build roads and aqueducts and rebuild their country, and put down the AK-47s and pick up the shovels and build their country. They cannot do that on their own. They need a substantial investment from the United States. We owe it to them. And I just thought I would throw that thought out.

And as a question, Mr. Rubin, you mentioned the police going to Mazar-i-Sharif. I happen to agree with Mr. Santos in terms of, you know, having elections and a local system. Do you foresee a system in Afghanistan where the local police are being commanded by Kabul? And is that going to create unity in a society, or will that create tensions in a society? Just like we would never agree in the United States to have our local police controlled by Washington, DC.

Mr. RUBIN. In our research project we have conducted studies of this and have published several papers. We have conducted research in many parts of Afghanistan. And what we have found is that, at the moment, because of the current realities in Afghanistan, nearly everyone in the country, including members of ethnic minorities, say that they want a strong central government. That is because the current form of decentralized power consists of power by unaccountable armed men; namely, commanders. And therefore, when these police are sent from Kabul to other areas of the country, they are warmly welcomed as saviors by the people there. And the people are now looking to Kabul to save them from these unaccountable local commanders.

But—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, your research has determined that. And you were there yourself recently?

Mr. RUBIN. Yes, yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Santos, is that—

Mr. RUBIN. But that is not the whole story, if I may just briefly finish.

However, I agree that once a rule of law is basically established, there should be measures for decentralization, including, I believe, community policing, which has always been the norm in Afghanistan, though it was not part of the legal structure.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the first step would be to make sure that there are free and fair elections, not just in Kabul but throughout the country, so that if these warlords are, you know, they are in power because of their force and brute force, that the people can secretly vote on a secret ballot to eliminate their power, and set up a local government contrary to a local warlord. Would that be right?

Mr. RUBIN. It is not quite so simple. At the moment people all over the country say they want these people fired by the President. Because officially, they are governors or generals, and therefore they are serving legally speaking, though not in fact.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is always easier to determine what the will of the people is through an election, and especially if we are there to help make sure it is a free election, rather than quoting studies.

Mr. RUBIN. There should be elections to local and provincial councils. What powers these will have will be determined by the future constitution. I know this issue is being actively discussed by the Constitutional Commission.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Just to clarify, because I was apparently not articulate enough to express myself before. I was not attempting to protect the rights of the Chair, who can do so certainly very adequately, but merely the Members of the Committee on both sides of the aisle and the Subcommittee Chairs, in stating that if the Subcommittee is bypassed, that at least at the Full Committee hearing the Chair of the Subcommittee and also the Ranking Member be allowed to make an opening statement.

You might note that with the exception of Mr. Chabot, neither the Chairman or any other Member of the Subcommittee is here. And with the exception of myself, there is no Democratic Member. And Members would like to feel vested somehow in the process.

Chairman HYDE. Are we ignoring the Democrats that are here?

Mr. ACKERMAN. No, we are not, Mr. Chairman. But the usual rule of order that we follow is to allow the Ranking Members of the Committee to make opening statements. And I just suggested, for the sake of—

Chairman HYDE. Well, I appreciate—

Mr. ACKERMAN [continuing]. Investing people in the process, that if the Full Committee, because of the weighty nature of the matter before us be taken up by the Full Committee rather than the Sub-

committee, that at least a statement by the Chair, who is a very capable person in this particular case, be allowed to be made.

Chairman HYDE. Well, I appreciate what the gentleman is saying, and I have no wish to deny any opportunity to make a statement on behalf of the Subcommittee. But sometimes a chair must exercise its judgment on the time available. And I am interested in hearing from all of the witnesses. And so I apologize for not giving the gentleman an opportunity to make a statement, but will be generous in time on your question. So use it in good health.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was not myself that I was trying to protect, but just as a general rule, the other Members, because perhaps then we would get more participation at the Full Committee level, which we desperately need on a matter such as this, by Members of the Subcommittee who feel, I think, bypassed.

I, for one, have been very concerned from the very beginning, and have been very supportive of the Administration's efforts in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq. But from what we have seen, according to my own personal observation, the promises do not come to fruition from the Administration. It does not seem to be the case here. It does not seem to be the case in New York, where the phrase "rebuild with whatever it takes" has come to pass. And I fear that is going to happen in Iraq, as well, all different situations, of course.

But the lack of commitment by the Administration to what they called nation-building would seem to doom to failure anything that we would hope would happen in Afghanistan. I am not sure what the psychosis is, but people who do the same things over and over again and expect a different result have some kind of a problem. We have that problem, whatever that is. We are going to be looking at the same picture 2 years, 5 years, 10 years from now. If the only thing about our democracy that we are teaching people in Afghanistan is bureaucracy and red tape and over- or mismanagement, that would be a very, very sad thing.

It seems that we have, at least on the civilian side, three special envoys running the thing, I do not know how many on the military side, operating at cross-purposes at times, and the job really not getting done, certainly the job of reconstruction not getting done where the international community has pledged \$2.2 billion for this year, and only \$191 million of that, less than 9 percent, has actually been spent. We do a better job on the humanitarian side.

What do we do quickly to pull this together? I guess is the question. And we have heard some interesting answers from different perspectives. Can the Administration do this with the current structure that we have now? If you could keep it to a real brief answer, Ambassador Tomsen.

Mr. TOMSEN. In my opinion, it has to come from the top. It is like President Bush getting so frustrated with USAID's lethargy on building the Kabul-Kandahar road. It is the same old problem. A contract was let to a large American corporation, which must sublet to subcontractors. And they sublet to other contractors, and money gets ensnarled in the bureaucracy, and nothing has happened.

So President Bush issued an order that that road be finished by 2003. And it is not road construction, it is only road repair, because the United States built that road in the 1960s.

So the first principle is, it has to come from the top, because it is a big mess out there. There is no coordination. This outstanding Freedom Support Act that Congress passed spent a lot of time discussing the importance of policy coordination on the ground by American agencies inside Afghanistan. That is not happening.

So first of all, there has to be a policy.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Are these cost-plus contracts?

Mr. TOMSEN. I am not aware of the nature of the contracts, sir. But it has to start at the top. There has to be an overall umbrella policy, diplomatic and operational. And then you have to have inter-agency discipline to implement those policies.

In my statement I also discussed the importance of reforming USAID's approach, because a lot of money is wasted, a lot of money eventually does not get to projects, and it is always delayed. Then there is—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me ask a different question, because I want to get as much in as possible. Without a commitment to nation-building, can we be successful in Afghanistan? If you can give us a yes or no, and maybe start with Mr. Santos. Try a yes or no, if you could.

Mr. SANTOS. No. I have already said no.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Frahi?

Mr. FRAHI. No.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Rubin?

Mr. RUBIN. In those terms, no. It should be called something else.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. TOMSEN. No.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The Clerk will announce the vote as five nos, no yeses.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the Chair.

Chairman HYDE. You bet. Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Tomsen, I am going to ask you about the situation in Afghanistan. In your prepared testimony you mentioned that the officers in the field do not speak Pashtun or Farsi; they are not able to communicate. You know, that is in pretty marked contrast to Lieutenant-General John Abizaid just being appointed to replace General Tommy Franks. He is an Arabic speaker.

So clearly in Iraq we have this right. We have people in the field who can speak the language. But in Afghanistan, we never really have done that. We have relied—and I listened to your testimony earlier—we have relied a lot on Pakistani intelligence, on ISI, to give us our sense of what is really going on instead of developing a network of people, diplomats and CIA, that know the language.

I was going to ask you about that. And I was also going to ask you about the reports that a correspondent for Radio Free Afghanistan, which was a product of this Committee, was beaten in Herat by Governor Ismail Khan's security forces while he was attempting

to cover the opening of a human rights office there. Let me ask you that first, and get your response.

Mr. TOMSEN. Of course, I agree with your implication that this is directly contrary to American policy, everything we are trying to do in Afghanistan.

Mr. ROYCE. I think it has been the preference of many on this Committee to expand the ISAF beyond just Kabul. When I was in Afghanistan I had the opportunity to speak with members of our provisional reconstruction teams, who were then Special Forces. They very much enjoyed their work, and were given a degree of autonomy and authority that, in the early aftermath of the Iraqi war, our officers did not have. The British had it; they had authorization in their sector. I recently returned with Congressman Duncan Hunter from Iraq. The British in their sector had the authority to make decisions to draw on resources. If there was a water pump, they had Iraqi dinar to pay Iraqis to fix it. In our sector we still have a bureaucracy up and running where it is very difficult and time-consuming. It would take 3 weeks, for example, and by then the unit might have moved on—for our military to have that type of authority.

With the creation of provisional reconstruction teams, we see something that, if we can actually create it as a template, and convince the British and French to agree to assist us in Afghanistan in developing these teams, do you see a long-term possibility for not only figuring out how our military, that is so good at winning a war, can also be a part of winning the peace? But also establishing a way to empower them and to give them the resources necessary to build bridges with local communities, so that there is more understanding on the part of Afghans as to the intention of the U.S. on the ground.

Mr. TOMSEN. Absolutely. And I must say that we have done this before. I was a District Senior Advisor in the Mekong Delta during the Vietnam war, and I had over \$1 million to spend in my district, which I used for projects like you are talking about. In Bosnia, our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, a part of USAID, had officers who went around Bosnia giving contractors contracts at the village level for projects, moving money into the economy, increasing the velocity of the economy, creating jobs.

We are not doing that at all in Afghanistan today. OFDA has ossified, like much of USAID has done in the last 20 years. They had an OFDA team that was supposed to go in. It was deployed to Tashkent and to Islamabad, but then it was brought back to Washington.

So we have done this before. We did it in the Balkans, we did it in other places, we did it in East Timor. We can do it again. And the U.S. military also should be so equipped. Unfortunately, the entire budget for civic action for the PRTs this year is only \$12 million. I was out there last September, and a Colonel in the civic action program told me they could easily spend \$23 million.

So it is a good concept, it is a good framework for development of the PRTs, blending security and development. But they have to get more resources. They are under-resourced. And they also have to get more punch, militarily.

Mr. ROYCE. We only had three teams, and one British team. NATO is going to take that over in August. Is this an opportunity to expand NATO's role?

Mr. TOMSEN. I would increase the PRTs, I would double them, but position them in the towns and out in the countryside. The additional NATO contingent, as I mention in my remarks, I believe should be limited to two brigades: One to guard the Afghan/Pak border with Afghan military police and border police, and the other brigade to be assigned to protection of roads, dams, and bridges, infrastructure projects that are coming online. And that second brigade should work with local tribal elders and committees, the local power structure, to protect these assets which they very much want to see come online.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired. Parenthetically, the Chair would like to say that it is our expectation to have the Administration up. We have done this kind of in reverse. Instead of having the Administration first, we have you first. So we will know what questions to ask. And we intend to ask them, based on the information all of you have provided that has been very helpful.

Ms. McCollum is next, and she wishes not to avail herself of this opportunity.

Ms. Lee is not with us. So we will try Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity. And I want to commend the panelists, particularly Mr. Santos, with whom which I could not agree with more.

One of the problems I see in going into these countries in the Middle East, and in terms of trying to restructure, is the lack of sensitivity to the variety of religious beliefs and religious sectors. And the other problem is that we do not understand their language. And much gets lost in the translation.

I have lived in enough foreign countries and picked up enough of the languages in those countries to know that even with an interpreter there, you are not getting the full meaning of what they are trying to say to you.

And so my question to you, Mr. Santos, is, how do we structure, as we try to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq, what would be a viable government? And I think you have already answered most of it, because you said we are going to have to do it on the local level. And I think we all understand that politics is local.

I see Afghanistan and Iraq as theocracies, guided by their religious beliefs. How do we put that in a workable format so that we can sustain our input, but that at some point see them as sovereign nations and pull back? How do we do this?

Mr. SANTOS. Well, first I think you have to understand the complexity of the society. And it is a very complex society. It is one that has suffered enormously over the last 100 years. There have been efforts to dominate particular groups by other groups. And we have seen this in Iraq, we have seen this in Yugoslavia, we have seen this in Rwanda, we have seen this in so many places around the world.

So one must start from the position that these, all these groups have a right and a place at the table, so to speak. So power-shar-

ing, in the sense I think that the Bonn Accords created it, was very limited. And one needs to bring it back to communities, bring it back to the regions as well.

And I think part of the trouble we have is we get into the language of warlords and the center or regions in the center. And I think that there are absolutely issues with particular leaders who misbehave and should be held accountable. But I think it also hides the ethnic dimension, and this is my big concern, is that we have neglected that ethnic dimension, and basically defined this in a way that ignored that diversity. And I think we have to find a way of reconnecting to it.

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, one of the mistakes we make is putting a panel like this together, and not having a woman on it.

The issue that resinated real well with me prior to our going into Afghanistan is the fact that women were treated so badly, and women had no rights. And I certainly would like to hear—and I understand there is, within the new government, a woman. And I would certainly have liked to have had someone who represents her views sitting on the panel today. Because I really think that if this government is going to work for its people, it has to be sure that it liberates its women. And I would like to hear from them if they are being considered in this new reconstruction.

But I have to also support Mr. Santos when he says that we need to look at the various ethnic groups and have some understanding and sensitivity. I think that is the problem, the key problem, with the United States going in and talking about liberating, when we really do not understand the complexities. Men understood weapons of mass destruction. Women understand something else, and I have not heard that viewpoint yet.

But I thank you, Mr. Santos, because you were the only one that really pointed up the fact that we are dealing with a very complex society. And until we can put together an after-the-war strategy that takes into consideration—you know, this is a different world for us. And a democracy, as we understand it in America, is not going to be the democracy that we build in these countries. It just will not work. And I can tell you that from experience.

And to the Ambassador, he understands, he is on the ground there. We can come in with all of our programs, all of our money, and all of our intentions. But if we do not take into consideration the local organizations, the local groups, the local ethnic groups, their beliefs, their religions, and so on, and sit them at the table and say, look, we are here to assist you, you have got to work it out, then we are going to miss the point. We will have won the war, but we will not have won the peace.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I would like to suggest to the gentlelady that if we can get to the next panel, we have a representative of Human Rights Watch, and they will discuss, he will discuss, based on a study done by a woman and a man, the problems of women in Afghanistan.

I also would like you to know that the panel was selected by a woman on our staff. [Laughter.]

Ms. WATSON. Where is that woman to speak for women?

Chairman HYDE. She is right here.

Ms. WATSON. But where is the one on the panel? Maybe you can point that person out to me.

Chairman HYDE. No, there is not one on the panel.

Mr. ACKERMAN. We are not going to out anybody today.

Chairman HYDE. There is a man who worked with a woman, but he was senior to her, and so he will testify. We could have had the woman here, too, but that would have been redundant.

In any event, thank you for your contribution. And Mr. Chabot?

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The question I direct to the gentleman of the United Nations, Representative Mr. Frahi.

In the humanitarian and restructuring aid that we and others are introducing into Afghanistan through the IMF and the World Bank and Asia Development Bank and USAID, UNDP and the NGOs being linked by these providers to drug eradication in the opium—are they being linked to drug eradication in the opium production regions? In other words, are we linking assistance to drug eradication? And if not, how can we expect to see major opium eradication in the producing areas?

Mr. FRAHI. Thank you for this question. Indeed, the situation started last year without any particular linkage of definite programs to poppy elimination in opium poppy areas.

Standard projects have taken place in opium poppy areas. But as I said in my statement, unfortunately the impact of this project have not been linked initially to the elimination of poppy elimination. And that is something that we have started to redress. We have set up in Kabul, through our regional country office, a coordination group whereby we work directly with the Ministry for Rural Development, the donors, the NGOs, and the U.N. agencies in order to bring consistency into the programs which are being developed.

At the same time, I think that we have to be extremely careful in the funding of these projects. And we need to ensure that projects, when they provide certain assistance such as irrigation, renovation of carriers, provision of fertilizers, we have to be extremely careful that what we provide as an element to help the communities is not diverted from the purpose of the project and used by the communities to develop further opium poppy cultivation. There is a need to ensure that somewhere a conditional policy be set up with the communities in order to ensure that when we provide assistance, they eliminate poppy cultivation.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. And it is my understanding that originally the Taliban regime was directly involved in benefitting from opium production for some period of time. And then toward the end, or closer to their overthrow by the United States and our allies, they had switched positions and were attempting to eradicate it, keep the opium production down, and it did go down. But that it has again continued to be far too frequent. And I think that is one of the things that needs particular work. Because it is unfortunate that our effort goes in there to free the people and to do all the things that we did to benefit that country and to protect our own citizens, but then to have the opium production go up is something we need to do a much better job on.

And Mr. Santos, could you comment on the linkage in our aid and other organizations' aid, that we are involved to drug eradication? And what you think is being done, or ought to be done?

Mr. SANTOS. Yes. My experience, just coming back from the north, for example, Congressman Rohrabacher went to Kabul and then to Mazar, and had brought up the issue of drug eradication very, very substantially. And one of the results were that some of the leaders in the north began an effort to try to eradicate, and I think something like 12 hectares of opium was bulldozed.

But the problem was that there was no real support for the continuation of those efforts. And I think the programs that—

Mr. CHABOT. Support by whom?

Mr. SANTOS. By U.S. authorities or by the central government. And I think that we have to reward, as was said earlier, those who are really willing and active in the effort to eradicate these drugs, and who believe that they are a danger to the Afghan people. And not just see everything as whether the central authority agrees or not. I think we should encourage that at all levels.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has run out.

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. It has virtually expired. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me say I want to fully associate myself with the remarks of the gentlelady from California. And to the Chairman, let me just say I appreciate your response, but I would like to take this one step further.

I believe, and it may have been I guess in the Freedom Support Act, Congresswoman Juanita Millander McDonald authored a resolution which we presented, and that was passed by this Committee, requiring—and I do not believe the exact requirement, but basically it was the inclusion and the empowerment of women in all of the types of activities at all levels in Afghanistan. And the United States had some specific role in making sure that this would be complied with in terms of our support.

So I am wondering maybe, Ambassador Tomsen, maybe you can answer this for me. In terms of, how do you see, or what is going on with regard to the United States' position, responsibility, role, in ensuring that we are helping to promote in women's rights, the inclusion of women, human rights, women's empowerment, all of those kinds of efforts that we wrote into the legislation? How are we providing oversight, consulting, expertise, technical assistance toward that end?

Chairman HYDE. Would the gentlelady yield just for a second?

Ms. LEE. Yes.

Chairman HYDE. An addendum to that question, how are we doing changing the culture of that society? It is a rhetorical question.

Ms. LEE. And that is Mr. Chairman's question, right?

Mr. TOMSEN. Well, historically, as you might know, women occupied over 50 percent of the teaching positions in Afghanistan. Over 50 percent of the doctors in Afghanistan were women. This is before the Soviet invasion. When you walked the streets of Kabul, they looked pretty much like Ankara, Turkey, where women were out; they were not covered in a veil. This continued in the communist period, as well.

So what we are talking about is going back to a situation, at least in Kabul, that existed previously. It is more conservative in the rural areas, particularly in the Pashtun areas of the south. But what you are aiming at is not unattainable, because in many ways, especially in the cities, it was there before. How do you get back to it?

Our aid programs, I think you will have to get the Administration to address this in more detail, but we do have specific focuses on women. For instance, girls' schools and co-ed schools around the country is very much a part of the aid education effort.

Around the country, too, there are special projects to build meeting-houses for women. Now, this might not sound like much, but it is important where you have many widows in the country who have lost their husbands. And they want to meet with other women. And they want, through that conduit, these women organizations and women houses, to get into handicraft projects and other income-earning projects. And this is another area of focus of our assistance programs.

Let me also, if I may, defer to Dr. Rubin, who might also be able to address this. With your permission.

Ms. LEE. Thank you. And let me ask, if I may, included in your response, Dr. Rubin or any of you, could you also indicate, in terms of just democracy-building, once again what is the United States—and thank you, I appreciate your response, Ambassador Tomsen—what is the United States doing, and what is our role in that whole effort?

Mr. RUBIN. I think that in dealing with both of these issues, we have to understand the context of Afghanistan right now.

You will see in the audience people who I believe were brought here by the feminist majority, wearing stickers that say "Expand ISAF for Afghan Women." This is because the number-one demand of women in Afghanistan today is security. If they are not secure enough to go out of their houses and move around, if their family members—and family is the central institution of Afghan life—are not safe enough to go around and seek employment, go to school, then all of these other things we are talking about will have no effect. And the women who participated in the Loya Jirga did not talk primarily about so-called women's issues; they talked primarily and very vocally, more vocally than the men delegates, about the need for security and overcoming warlordism, and having a government that will protect their rights. That is the number-one women's issue in Afghanistan.

Second, Afghanistan is off the charts in maternal mortality. And I believe we do have a program to try to address that issue, but that is extremely important as well.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach.

Mr. Leach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing and for assembling an incredibly impressive panel on this subject.

I am just trying to put together all these thoughts in terms of broad principles, and I have one very small question. In terms of broad principles, it seems to me that there are five that come to bear. One, the communications principle; the world is obviously closer. The second is kind of an inverse principle: The smaller the

country, the more it may matter in the world. The third is a principle, the bigger the country the more vulnerable it is to some of the new expressions of dissent in the world. The fourth is a traditional principle, meaning that traditional armies are good at traditional warfare, but not always at every new national security challenge, and particularly not necessarily as good at peace-keeping. And the fifth is a responsibility principle that when we intervene, we become responsible.

And it strikes me when you put all of this together, we have to be in Afghanistan on a substantial, sustained basis. And I am left with how we, as a society, learn, because we are in a new world and we are just learning from it.

And I want to talk directly to Mr. Goodson, because I think his testimony was as thoughtful as could be, coming from a military perspective. And I want to suggest several things.

One, the Army War College is an extraordinary institution the American public knows very little about. But you are responsible for producing one of the most sophisticated military officer training classes in the history of the world, not just in military affairs, but in all of the things that surround military activity.

There has been one—and here is the small question—issue regarding the War College that has developed this spring, and that is the disbandment of the Peace-Keeping Institute. Is this kind of an academic rearrangement that does not matter? Is this a symbolic thing? What is your judgment about this circumstance? Is this the type of thing we ought to keep central to the War College, or was it correct to disband?

Mr. GOODSON. Well, just to address quickly your small question, I do not work in that section of the War College. And my understanding of it is that it is a reorganization, and that the tasks of the Peace-Keeping Institute would be a pick-up elsewhere.

I might add to that that today we get officers who come to us, Lieutenant-Colonels and Colonels, to go on hopefully and become Senior Colonels and Generals, who have a background in peace operations and what we were calling generally nation-building activities, that they did not have a few years ago. And we have people like myself on the staff who have a background, as well, in our professional lives. So in many ways we are incorporating what we are losing from PKI elsewhere on the staff.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Real quickly, Mr. Chairman, I know we have a vote coming up. But I just want to say thank you for holding the hearing, and for having the distinguished members of the panel give us their testimonies.

I happen to agree whole-heartedly with Dr. Rubin's assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, as we are currently experiencing the same thing in Iraq. Without security measures taken by the powers, especially by our nation, all that we are going to contribute and everything that we are trying to do is going to be in vain and irrelevant. And I believe that if we do not take measures to do this in Afghanistan, we are going to be spinning our wheels, as we are currently doing right now in Iraq itself. We cannot even find Osama bin Laden; we do not even know if Saddam Hussein is still alive. So we have got some very serious problems here.

I want to make more comments, but I will wait until the next panel, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for giving me the chance to speak.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. We have three votes pending. Two of them I think will be 15 minutes each, and one 5 minutes, so that will be quite a bit of time.

I am going to let this panel go. You have done marvelously well, made a great contribution. And this is not the end, this is the beginning of this issue.

But I will ask the next panel to be patient, and we will resume at 2 o'clock, in 1 hour. It might give you a chance to get some lunch, and give us a chance to vote and get back.

So my thanks to this panel. And if the next panel will indulge us, we will get to you around 2 o'clock. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. ROYCE [presiding]. This Committee hearing on Afghanistan will reconvene. We are going to introduce our next panel.

Mr. Norman Leatherwood serves as Executive Director of Shelter for Life, which is a non-profit organization that provides innovative solutions to shelter and infrastructure needs in situations where there is a refugee community. Shelter for Life is currently one of the non-governmental organizations that is very active in Afghanistan.

He holds a B.A. Degree in political science and accounting from Northern Illinois University. We welcome him.

Also we have Mr. John Sifton. He is the Afghanistan researcher at Human Rights Watch. He previously worked in Afghanistan and Pakistan as the advocacy coordinator for the International Rescue Committee. He also worked in Albania and Kosovo during the 1999 U.S.-led campaign to liberate Kosovo.

He holds a Law Degree from New York University School of Law, and a B.A. from St. John's College in Annapolis. He has published articles on Afghanistan in *The New York Times Magazine*, *New York Times Book Review*, and *The International Herald-Tribune*.

I would also be remiss if I did not offer my condolences to everyone at Human Rights Watch. I was saddened to hear of Mike Jendrzejczyk's sudden passing. He was a wealth of knowledge on Asia, from Afghanistan to victims in North Korea, and he will be sorely missed.

Our last witness is Mr. Hasan Nouri. He is Chairman of International Orphan Care's Afghanistan Project. He was a co-founder of the International Medical Corps. He is also President of River-Tech, a consulting engineering forum, and a former teacher at Kabul University in Afghanistan. He is an active member of the Afghan-American community, and he has been a sincere advocate for helping the people of Afghanistan.

He has previously testified before Congressional and Senate hearings on Afghanistan. And we welcome Mr. Nouri again to this Committee.

We also want to express our appreciation for our witnesses coming so far to testify today, and ask each of you if you will now just do a summation, because we have your statement already in the record. If we could start with Mr. Hasan Nouri.

**STATEMENT OF HASAN NOURI, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL
ORPHAN CARE**

Mr. NOURI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I want to express my sincere appreciation to you for your efforts for the past 10 years to establish peace in Afghanistan. Had Washington took your advice, Afghanistan would not have been in this disastrous shape for the past 10 years, sir.

I also want to go on record that this morning the witnesses that have testified, I am 100 percent in support of the testimony of Ambassador Peter Tomsen and Professor Rubin and Professor Goodson.

I am respectfully in disagreement with the testimony of Mr. Charles Santos about the local autonomy. Local autonomy is another word for warlordism. Local autonomy could mean disintegration of Afghanistan, and it could mean disintegration of Pakistan.

The British, very brilliantly, 60 years ago divided the Pashtuns into Pakistan and Afghanistan. When disintegration happens, disintegration will happen in the entire region, and that would pose the greatest risk for the United States of America.

Mr. ROYCE. Just a clarification. When you say "brilliantly," you mean brilliantly from the standpoint of the British, not in terms of the standpoint of the Pashtuns?

Mr. NOURI. In terms of the British. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is what I meant.

Soon after we liberated the people of Afghanistan from the barbaric rule of the Taliban and inhuman treatment by al-Qaeda, the United States repeatedly promised extensive support to the Afghan people in rebuilding their nation: A vision of the peaceful Afghanistan with a stable civil society and a growing economy was planted firmly in the mind's eye of the Afghan people, the American people, and people throughout the Middle East and the world.

However, this year's proposed USAID budget for Afghanistan has been limited, and international donors, led by the United States, have pledged insufficient amounts. And even those amounts are not materializing as actual allocations.

Now we are beginning to see the Afghan people protesting in the streets of Kabul. It is very sad that it has come to this, only 1 year after seeing them dance in the streets and welcome American liberation from the Taliban.

Lack of proper support by the United States, coupled with ineffective government in Afghanistan, has resulted in the loss of hope by the Afghan people. For a government to succeed in Afghanistan, it must have no allegiance or loyalty to any foreign power or nation.

During the proceedings of the formation of an Afghan transition government in December, 2001 in Bonn, Germany, and subsequent Loya Jirga in Kabul, Afghanistan in June 2002, we should have learned from the mistakes of previous experiences by the British and the former Soviet Union. During the period of 1842 through 1930 the British Empire did not succeed installing a government in Afghanistan. After 12 years of blatant interference and genocide, the former Soviet Union also did not succeed in installing a communist government in Afghanistan.

After 88 years of trials and tribulations, the British Empire finally succeeded in the establishment of a government that had no allegiance or loyalty to the British. The British were amenable to that government of Afghanistan, because it also had no loyalty or allegiance toward the former Soviet Union or Nazi Germany.

Mohammad Nadir Shah, the father of Mohammad Zahir Shah, the former King of Afghanistan who is now residing in Kabul, formed that government. We should have learned from the mistakes of the past, and promoted a government that had no allegiance to us, but would have been effective in preventing production of narcotics and continuation of terrorism.

At this point of my testimony I would like to attract your attention, Mr. Chairman, to the peace plan by Mohammad Zahir Shah, the former King of Afghanistan, which I presented before the House Committee on International Relations on May 9, 1996, and again on November 7, 2001. Please see figure one and note that the struggle against terrorism and narcotics was an integral part of that plan, and I have highlighted that on that chart.

Unfortunately, this plan by Mohammad Zahir Shah was not implemented, and he was sidelined by our direct inference. If we lift the process of Loya Jirga that had succeeded in Afghanistan for centuries alone, Mohammad Zahir Shah could have played a key role in the establishment of a legitimate national government.

Mr. ROYCE. We understand that argument, and we will put that statement in the record. You are unfortunately out of time, Mr. Nouri. So we are going to go to Mr. Leatherwood and then Mr. Sifton, and then when we come back for questions you can make some additional points at that time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nouri follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HASAN NOURI, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORPHAN CARE



Good Morning Mr. Chairman, Honorable Representatives, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation in being invited to state my opinion on the challenges facing the United States in its strategy to reconstruct and stabilize Afghanistan. Based on your invitation I also would like to mention the horrific conditions under which the children of Afghanistan live.

Soon after we liberated the people of Afghanistan from the barbaric rule of the Taliban and inhuman treatment by Al Qaeda, the United States repeatedly promised extensive support to the Afghan people in rebuilding their nation. A vision of a peaceful Afghanistan with a stable civil society and a growing economy was planted firmly in the mind's eye of the Afghan people, the American people, and people throughout the Middle East and the world. However, this year's proposed USAID budget for Afghanistan has been limited, and the international donors, led by the United States, have pledged insufficient amounts, and even those amounts are not materializing as actual allocations. Now, we are beginning to see the Afghan people protesting in the streets of Kabul. It is very sad that it has come to this, only one year after seeing them dance in the streets and welcome American liberation from the Taliban.

Lack of proper support by the United States coupled with an ineffective government in Afghanistan has resulted in the loss of hope by the Afghan people. For a government to succeed in Afghanistan it must have no allegiance or loyalty to any foreign power or nation. Unfortunately, the current government in Afghanistan carries the scar of being installed by the United States. During the proceedings of formation of an Afghan transition government in December 2001 in Bonn, Germany and the subsequent Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) in Kabul, Afghanistan in June of 2002 we should have learned from the mistakes of previous experiences by the British and the former Soviet Union. During the period of 1842 through 1930 the British Empire did not succeed in installing a government in Afghanistan. After 12 years of blatant interference and genocide the former Soviet Union also did not succeed in installing a communist government in Afghanistan.

After 88 years of trials and tribulations the British Empire finally succeeded in the establishment of a government that had no allegiance or loyalty to the British. The British were amenable to that government of Afghanistan because it also had no loyalty or allegiance toward the former Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. Mohammad Nadir Shah, the father of Mohammad Zahir Shah, the former King of Afghanistan who is now residing in Kabul, formed that government. We should have learned from the mistakes of the past and promoted a government that had no allegiance to us but would have been effective in preventing production of narcotics and continuation of terrorism. According to recent reports by one of our Board Members who returned from Afghanistan last week production of narcotics in Afghanistan is rampant. He estimates the current production of narcotics in Afghanistan to be twice as much as it had existed during the Taliban rule.

At this point of my testimony I would like to attract your attention to the Peace Plan by Mohammad Zahir Shah, the former King of Afghanistan, which I presented before the House Committee on International Relations on May 9, 1996 and again on November 7, 2001. Please see Figure 1 and note that Struggle Against Terrorism and Narcotics was an integral part of that plan.



Unfortunately, this plan by Mohammad Zahir Shah was not implemented, and he was sidelined by our direct interference. If we left the process of Loya Jirga that had succeeded in Afghanistan for centuries alone, Mohammad Zahir Shah could have played a key role in the establishment of a legitimate national government.

Mr. Chairman: Now six years later I would like to present to you another plan which is summarized on the attached Figure 2. As this figure shows the reconstruction program of Afghanistan must be implemented parallel to the re-creation of State. It is important that the plan be implemented with assistance from the international community and not just the United States.


Consistent with the Bonn process of 2001 and the Emergency Loya Jirga of 2002, plans are under way for the final Loya Jirga to take place in Kabul in June of 2004. The 2004 Loya Jirga will provide the Afghan people with the opportunity to establish a legitimate constitutional government consistent with the Peace Plan by Mohammad Zahir Shah. We are hopeful that the proceedings of that Loya Jirga will be conducted under the supervision of the international community and not just the United States. An effective and legitimate government will succeed in reconstructing the infrastructure of Afghanistan as well as establishing the well-being of the children.


The children of Afghanistan continue to be the victims of 25 years of war. A 1997 survey sponsored by UNICEF revealed some shocking statistics explaining the emotional distress of Afghanistan's children. In a random, scientific sampling of 310 children in Kabul, 72 percent of respondents said someone in their family had died from fighting during the previous four years. Ninety-five percent had personally witnessed violence during fighting. Fifty-three percent had seen someone killed or injured by land mines or unexploded ordnance. Sixty-six percent had seen someone killed in a rocket attack. An equal percentage had seen dead bodies or body parts. Eighty-one percent had been uprooted from their homes by fighting. And 90 percent believed that they would eventually be killed in fighting.

Robin Pierson, a freelance reporter, who returned from Afghanistan last month and assists the International Orphan Care, provides the following report. "In visiting several school sites and observing thousands of children, it appears that the children of Afghanistan are very eager and ready to learn. However, they have no books or desks - or even a pencil - let alone proper school buildings to protect them from the blazing sun of summer or the cold winds of winter. Their teachers have virtually no teaching tools and several told us that they had not been paid for three months. Without proper schools and medical facilities, I fear that Afghanistan may once again descend into chaos. With this next generation, we have a chance to teach these children that there is more to life than violence, sickness and suffering". Finally, I must state that if violence in Afghanistan remains the norm of life, it can quickly spread and become routine in the region and the Middle East. That would pose enormous risks to the United States and our allies in the region.

INTERNATIONAL ORPHAN CARE
Maakid wese to the child the best it has to give – United Nations Declaration
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
 BY MOHAMMAD ZAHIR SHAH, THE FORMER KING OF AFGHANISTAN

Figure
1





Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Leatherwood, you have exactly 5 minutes. And I would urge you to watch the clock.

**STATEMENT OF NORMAN C. LEATHERWOOD, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, SHELTER FOR LIFE, INTERNATIONAL**

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for the opportunity to address this body. Thank you also for the leadership that is being provided, the innovative thinking. I support what President Bush is advocating in the context of a Marshall plan for Afghanistan. I think the level of commitment and sacrifice evidenced there will be equally fruitful if we can engage as a country and get behind this. I support the discussion, to date bipartisan discussion by people such as Mr. Kemp and Madeline Albright, and even the Chairman of this Committee, using this as a context for challenging ourselves to find solutions for problems like this.

I want to go in a little bit different direction, if you will allow me. My statement stands, as rough as it is. It is a draft essentially for the record.

I would like to come on behalf of the Afghan people, with whom I have seen and experienced great things with over the years, and make an appeal to you for exactly what has been asked for by Mr. Nouri. They need our support, they deserve our support. It is in our national interest to get fully behind them in a bigger way than we have. And I do feel that there are some serious ways in which our policies and practices have not delivered those kinds of services as quickly or as substantially as is needed.

The war against terrorism is a war that is going to be fought ultimately in the hearts and minds of people, and what the people of Afghanistan think in the long run is as important as the government of Afghanistan. If we are serious about building a civil society that is by the people, for the people, and of the people, then the people ought to be the focus of our attentions, our efforts, and we ought to evaluate our successes and failures, at least in part, on how their practical lives change as a result of our efforts and innovations.

Most Afghans know nothing about America. They do not realize that we have been their biggest benefactor for years. That is common knowledge here and in the international circles, but the face they see is the U.N. They probably think the U.N. or an NGO is their benefactor. And if we want to win this battle as a nation, that has to change somewhat. We need to address this problem and reach out to the common man.

In my written statement I have tried to make a case for following this initial victory in some practical ways, with programming that will actually pact people. In particular, housing. As the director of an agency that is primarily involved in providing housing, it is an item that is conspicuous in its absence in every case, except at the most basic and emergency levels, for many kind of development or emergency-response programming funded by the U.S. Government.

This is a serious problem, because people need more than just a plastic sheet over them if they are going to become contributing members and stakeholders of a civil society. A home is probably the most significant investment that many of the people in this room have made in their lives. It is the things that links us, and makes

us stakeholders in our communities. It is a vehicle that provides an anchor of personal wealth, and it is something that we ought to seriously consider when we underwrite and advocate programming for Afghans, as well.

If we do not, and if we do not address some of the lack of coordination and the ways in which aid is delivered, I concur with the opinions of the esteemed panel today, that we have probably a limited amount of time, and that the ultimate outcome might not be what we fought this war to achieve.

I do not agree with them, however, and say that there is nothing we can do about it. There is nothing we can do about it? We must do something about it. We have to rise to this challenge and do better than what we are doing and the attention of this particular body and others in government to the details of what is happening on the field, the evaluation of programming that is going on to make sure that the maximum benefits are actually percolating down to the common man is a vital component.

Security is an issue in Afghanistan, but security is more than just a military phenomena. It is a social phenomena, it is an economic phenomena. And it is something that needs to be addressed at the grassroots level.

It is interesting—and I am thankful that you have brought Mr. Nouri to speak—the level at which our policies and practices are guided by experts, but not Afghans. I would encourage you to continue in the direction that you are moving. The Marshall plan is a great concept.

There is an Afghan proverb that says when you meet a man one day, he is your friend; when you meet a man the next day, he is your brother. And I say if we are going to win the war on terrorism, we need brothers in Afghanistan, and not just friends.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leatherwood follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN C. LEATHERWOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
SHELTER FOR LIFE, INTERNATIONAL

Warm greetings to Chairman Hyde and other respected members of the Committee on International Relations, their staff, panelists and guests. It is an honor to be invited to bring testimony as spokesman for Shelter for Life, a Wisconsin based private voluntary organization serving the people of Afghanistan through relief, employment, and construction programs. Our history with Afghans dates back to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, when millions fled across the border into Pakistan. In recent years we have worked as a US government partner, initially in response to terrible earthquakes which devastated rural regions in the north, and to fighting between Taliban and Northern Alliance forces. In the months since US military intervention and the fall of the Taliban regime, more than 900,000 Afghans throughout the country have benefited from programs implemented by Shelter for Life, in partnership with USAID, the Department of State, and other bilateral and private donors. "Thank you", on behalf of those who were helped through these and other interventions authorized and underwritten by members of this Committee and the larger Body of Representatives to which it belongs. Thank you, also, for the opportunity to speak.

In a speech given on April 17 of this year, President George W. Bush referred to the post World War II Marshall Plan as both measure and model for ongoing US commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. First proposed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in June of 1947, the Marshall Plan in Europe and its corollary under General Douglas MacArthur in Japan have much to teach us about confronting the realities of massive economic devastation in far way places, and the residue of hostile ideology in the rebuilding of social and political institutions in cultural contexts foreign to our own. We can learn much as nation, as well, about the

long term rewards we might enjoy from sacrificial investment in others, and about the benefits of sustained collective action predicated upon the wisdom and best efforts of all stakeholders, both at home and abroad, whether giver or receiver. Two years earlier in a 1945 speech, President Harry S. Truman had stated that “if Europe is allowed to remain cold and hungry”, that “the foundation of order upon which the hoped-for world peace” rested might easily be undermined. The same could be said of Afghanistan today. President Bush has pledged an equally determined effort to provide the Afghan people resources and expertise “to achieve their aspirations”. “As George Marshall so clearly understood, it will not be enough to make the world safer. We must make the world better,” said President Bush, in reference to the war against terrorism.

Clearly, speeches and smart-bombs are not enough to win this war. It will never be won by a handful of professional warriors and bureaucrats, in spite of the abundance of wisdom, weapons or wealth at their disposal. In the end, it must be fought and won in the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, and wherever poverty, oppression, and ignorance prevail, and the fallacies of the terrorist worldview go unchallenged. As the events of 9–11 have taught us, this war threatens all freedom loving people and especially Americans, although the battlefields may be half a world away. Victory will cost every American, and will require sacrifice, commitment and time.

Mr. Chairman, you invited me to share my perspective on how the Afghan people view our governments’ efforts at rebuilding Afghanistan. You asked that I address both positive aspects of the United States effort, and any notable weaknesses in our strategy or its implementation. This I will try to do, although I do not claim to be an authority on Afghanistan, to have all of the facts, or even contend that all of my observations and conclusions are correct in every case. I am concerned, however, that we risk losing the war we claim to have won in Afghanistan, and not because people are not trying or that they do not mean well.

Security concerns are real, threatening both the delivery of humanitarian services, and the long term viability of the current Afghan government. The targeting of foreign humanitarian workers and the general lawlessness in some isolated areas are serious concerns, although it should be said that these have not become chronic and country-wide trends. In some of the areas of the north and west considered to be outside the transitional governments’ sphere of influence, the atmosphere is actually much better than in Kabul or in other areas of the country both for our work and for common Afghans trying to rebuild their lives. However, it is hard to imagine that a fair and comprehensive registration and voting process can possibly occur country-wide by next year without a larger measure of outside enablement and scrutiny. I join my voice with those of others who advocate an increased presence for peace-keepers in the outlying areas, especially if that presence takes on a more international appearance. Perhaps NATO is an appropriate option.

Security is not only a military issue, however. It is a social and economic issue, as well. More troops in the hinterland are not enough to ensure a democratic future for Afghanistan, or to correct some of the problems I see. I believe that gaps exist in US government interventions and strategies in Afghanistan, gaps that could undermine US credibility and interests in the region and diminish the prestige and viability of the current government. If ignored, these issues may hinder Afghanistan’s progression toward prosperity and democracy, and prolong the suffering of the Afghan people.

Furthermore, we have now committed ourselves as a nation to rebuilding civil societies in three major areas of the world-Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. Our experience in Afghanistan will serve as template or impediment to our success in other areas. Innovative thinking, extra effort, and greater investment in Afghanistan is needed now, coupled with careful examination of what is working and what isn’t working and why. These will also serve our interests elsewhere and into the future. I believe that post World War II programs and policies in Europe and Japan are a good place to begin. I commend the bipartisan efforts and discussion thus far, including that which has occurred before this Committee, and the leadership shown by President Bush in calling us as a people to squarely face and overcome the challenges we face as a nation in our world today.

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

You ask how Afghans view our governments’ efforts. The simple answer is that many had high and perhaps unrealistic expectations for a quick transition to a normal and better life. These expectations, for the most part, have gone unfulfilled. In early 2002, UNHCR estimated that about 800,000 refugees would return to Afghanistan by the end of the year, planning programs and appealing for funds accordingly.

The actual number returning was nearer to 2,000,000. The UN agencies, donors and providers were astonished and overwhelmed by the number and pace of Afghans coming home from abroad, to say nothing of the 400,000 or so who migrated back to their communities of origin from elsewhere within Afghanistan when the Taliban fell and fighting ceased. Both donors and providers gave superlative effort at responding to the needs of the 2.4 million people involved in this massive migration. The reality, however, is that only a fraction received the kind of support they needed or had adequate resources on their own to rebuild their homes and livelihoods in many communities damaged by years of drought or conflict.

Failure to enable conditions for sustainable reintegration into rural areas has led to movement towards cities in general and Kabul in particular. A study funded by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) described a population increase in Kabul from 1.7 million in 1999, to 3.3 million by early 2003. The result has been a severe housing shortage that threatens to intensify, dramatic increases in rent, overcrowding, and related impacts on sanitation and hygiene. Even large families live in one or two rooms, and many live in damaged houses, often squatting where owners have not yet returned. An additional 1.3 million people are projected to return in 2003, although preliminary indications are that rates of return are slower this year. This is due in large part to poor conditions for return, inadequate support from donors, or sufficient means on their own for sustaining life and livelihood.

Although the economy and opportunities in Kabul have grown significantly since 2000, housing has been cited as the single most urgent need by both UN and Afghan government sources, and the lack of it is creating "a number one health, sociological and psychological hazard". According to one study, widows and women-headed households are the most affected by the housing crisis. In a sample survey of twelve widows involved in a cash-for-work program in Kabul last winter, 100% identified housing as their greatest need, and said that with adequate housing their lives would improve and become more stable.

Currently, the only US government funded programs focusing on the housing needs in Kabul are targeting provision of a warm room necessary for winter survival. Many of the most vulnerable in Kabul city are not even eligible to receive this type of assistance, because of tenure issues related to living in informal settlements or in damaged houses which don't belong to them. The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH) estimates that 17% of the returnees moving into the city have no claim to land and no means to rent. This number does not take into account the very poor who are being displaced by the large migration into greater Kabul. Widows and others among the most vulnerable are included in this category, and many are settling in abandoned buildings, parks or in other spontaneous settlements all across the city.

New land must be made available immediately, as well as increased support for housing and livelihood in rural areas, in order to not to compound the already huge problem of informal, squatter settlements. MUDH has identified two locations on the outskirts of the Kabul, and SFL supports and wants to work to support this effort, but where are the funds?

How do Afghans see us? Very few have any idea that the US has been their largest supporter with food and funds for years. Most likely think the UN is their benefactor, or perhaps the NGOs, since these are the most visible foreign faces they see. Until recently, relatively few Americans were present in either community. For the most part, most Afghans are unaware of our ongoing pattern of good will towards them, and some may have heard much to the contrary from authoritative voices close to them. They don't read the Washington Post or watch CNN to listen to speeches, nor are they learning much elsewhere about our history, values and our own concepts of our role in the world. Of the 1.8 million Afghans assisted by UNHCR to return home last year, less than 300,000 were literate or had any level of education whatsoever. Certainly they connect us to the fall of the Taliban and perhaps to the earlier defeat of the Russians, and we are clearly linked to the current transitional government in Kabul. The power of air strikes sent an unmistakable message, and the faces that guard President Karzai are American faces. Apart from humanitarian workers, what they see of the US is very little apart from our soldiers, our fortress embassy in Kabul, and a handful of our citizens, usually from behind the glass of expensive vehicles or in establishments they would never enter or be able to afford. It should be said that our military has represented us well, however. Compared to the Russians who preceded us as outsiders with guns, the message has gotten through for the most part that our fight is with Al Qaida and Taliban, and that we are not hostile towards the common people of Afghanistan, their culture or their way of life.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS

What the majority of Afghans ultimately will think of the US government and our efforts on their behalf will be shaped by two things: the nature and scope of their personal contacts with American people, things, and ideas; and, the degree and extent to which their personal lives and prospects for the future are changing for the better in the unfolding scenario of US-supported political and social change in Afghanistan. My concern, Mr. Chairman, is that current US policies and programs in the region do not go far or fast enough on either count. Soldiers, diplomats, and professional government administrators, especially when they have little real grassroots contact with Afghans and rarely move outside Kabul other than in very controlled circumstances and settings, are not sufficient to convince the average Afghan that Americans are their friends. At the obvious risk of sounding self-serving, the point needs to be made that Americans in the NGO community have been our best and only option in this regard.

Housing and Home Ownership

Regarding housing, allow me to point out that private ownership of property directly links to a society of ordered liberty and individual rights based on the rule of law.

Mr. Chairman, there are gaps I see in the US government funding strategies world wide which impede our efforts to address the single most significant need identified by the residents of the most populous, most significant urban center of what we hope will become a democratic Afghanistan. If Mr. Karzai does not prevail in Kabul in the coming election, he will not prevail at all. The benefits of social change must trickle down to the common man in a one-man, one-vote democracy or leaders will be voted out. Although it is at least among the most critical felt needs, no agency of the US government currently responsible for administering our foreign aid budget in Afghanistan sees Kabul housing as their responsibility. Why is that?

Most fingers point to USAID as the most appropriate agency to address this need, but with the exception of disaster, displacement, or dire life-and-death circumstances in which shelter appears within the mandate of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID is reluctant to address housing on its own merits as an appropriate development activity in Afghanistan, or elsewhere for the most part.

In a most succinct and compelling document, USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios outlined four program elements in USAID's Afghanistan Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy: revitalizing agricultural and other livelihood options; enhancing educational opportunities; improving health; and strengthening Afghan institutions to assure stability. Although a case could perhaps be made for the funding of housing in support of the first objective, in this document, housing is conspicuous in its absence as it is in other USAID development phase program statements. While repairing clinics and building schools, roads and related infrastructure are specifically mentioned as fundable activities in support of USAID's recovery and reconstruction objectives, building homes for people to live in is not. This is most curious, since it is only within the composite clusters of houses in which people communally live, that any semblance of context or meaningful purpose for the construction of schools and clinics is created. In reality, people congregate and remain where they have permanent, secure homes. Housing dominates and energizes the scope and placement of other structures related to health, sanitation, education, transport, and so on, and not the other way around. Furthermore, it is in itself a critical factor in health and psycho-social well being. If we want to help Afghans recover and rebuild, we must help them rebuild their homes, as well as their livelihoods, infrastructure, and social institutions.

Permanent and adequate housing is a critical element to individual security, social stability, and to sustainable development. Building houses builds wealth through the creation of a capital asset which has value, and can be used to secure credit or other undertakings. Housing produces enormous economic impacts, both immediate and long term, as our own and other developed economies clearly show. Is it for America alone that the number of housing starts, building permits, and mortgage loans are key indicators of economic health and growth? When a house is built, construction materials are purchased, paid labor is utilized, and conditions are created for ongoing spending into a local economy as home is maintained and improved. Each point of activity generates positive ripple effects through the economy of a community and region, and contributes to economic growth and vitality as money is earned and spent. Experience in developing countries clearly shows that the facility itself often enables income generating activities when homes are provided or improved. In one OFDA funded project last year following a major earth-

quake in the mountains of northern Afghanistan, SFL helped 5000 families build earthquake resistant, two-room shelters within a five month period before winter snows began to fall. Not only can these shelters serve as “starter-homes” for expansion when families are economically able, 54% of the families were using them for some sort of home based enterprise. Homes are a building block in every healthy economy, and we need to start building them in Afghanistan, as fast and as many as possible.

Private ownership of property directly links to a society of ordered liberty and individual rights based on the rule of law, as stated earlier. Shelter creates a stimulus for political stability and democratization through giving owners a stake in their society and motivation to participate in their government. The development of the English and American systems of law can be directly traced to the development of property law as it progressed from feudalism, through the signing of the Magna Carta, into the framework of the US Constitution. Is it not in our interest to encourage and enable the same opportunities for the people of Afghanistan, if our goal is a stable and prosperous democracy in that land? Building houses is also directly linked to the generation of tax revenues which support and stabilize local governments, and contributes to a society’s sense of security and well-being. Homes and home ownership are building blocks of democracy. If we want to see a democratic and stable Afghanistan, we need to help Afghans rebuild their homes.

NGO Role and Participation

Empowering American NGO efforts and activities in Afghanistan is in our interest as a nation, and can serve to enhance US credibility and strengthen the reach and effectiveness of the central government through its constituent ministries in the outlying areas where the Karzai government is weakest. This is especially true when programs result in notable improvement in life and livelihood as measured by the common man. Remarkable impact was achieved in the months that followed the collapse of the Taliban through US government initiatives together with their implementing partners, in spite of adverse and trying circumstances. Unfortunately, however, the scale, range and commitment to partnership and support of American voluntary agencies is diminishing under the current program and administration of USAID development assistance in Afghanistan, as is becoming more common in certain settings with respect to USAID’s administration of development program portfolios. And although we all hope that US private sector presence and investment will increase in coming years, to date both have been pretty much confined to Kabul, and it is likely to remain that way for a while.

Furthermore, one must ask whether awarding one huge contract in the hundreds of millions to a private sector contractor is a better way to accomplish our national objectives in allocating and distributing foreign aid for Afghanistan, although the staff costs may be lower and the work of grant management less for USAID. The capacity to manage and spend more does not mean necessarily that more is being accomplished for less, or that the end user is better served by what is being provided. More needs to be said and careful cost/benefit analysis of this increasing trend is warranted. Both are beyond the scope of this testimony. It might be good to remember, however, that the Russians are said to have spent \$10–12 billion each year during their time in Afghanistan. The skeletons of tanks and vehicles which rust beside the road north from Kabul all the way to former Soviet border remind us that vast amounts of money and might will never alone prevail in Afghanistan, apart from the heartfelt support and participation of its’ people.

Opportunity now exists for Afghans to begin to close the door on war, hatred, ignorance and poverty, and to enter into a more prosperous and peaceful future. It is both right and good for America to support this process. Opportunity exists for America, as well. Will we succeed in rebutting the lies and lifestyles of terrorists, not just through words but through deeds, not just by fighting to protect democracy, but by making life better for every Afghan? May God help us to rise to the test, and to prevail in the real war in Afghanistan.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Leatherwood. Mr. Sifton.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN SIFTON, AFGHANISTAN RESEARCHER,
ASIA DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH**

Mr. SIFTON. Thank you. Thank you for allowing me to testify today. My statement is in the record, so I am not going to bore you with reading it over.

But I will say that what it does is suggest some of the things that can be brought up with the Administration witnesses who, at a later time, are going to be testifying before you.

Our latest research which we have conducted in Afghanistan shows a deteriorating human rights situation. We will issue a report in July, 2003 which will describe many of our findings. All I will do is summarize some of them right now.

As some of the people who have preceded me said, most of the country, most of Afghanistan now is in the hands of warlords and gunmen, fighters in Afghanistan's past wars, who are now terrorizing local populations under their authority. And robbing houses, stealing people's valuable possessions, killing people, raping young women and girls, raping boys, seizing land, extorting money, kidnapping, and holding people for ransom from their families.

I have interviewed numerous families myself who have been robbed in the night by Afghan military forces. And I have listened to witnesses describe being beaten by troops, and begging them for mercy. These are the types of abuses that need to be brought up with the government, the Administration's witnesses when they are called to come before you.

But sadly, these abuses are really not the ones that are the most serious for Afghanistan's future. I think in the end what the Administration really needs to be challenged on is the fact that these abuses are creating serious implications for a free society in Afghanistan.

Right now in many areas, Afghan civil society organizers, political organizers, women's rights activists, are now terrified of the warlord rule, and it makes it impossible for them to speak or organize openly. And many political organizations now operate in secret. Journalists in Kabul and elsewhere are censoring themselves.

As you know, Mr. Rubin said earlier, a journalist was arrested on Tuesday night. It is not an uncommon phenomenon. That is a very brave journalist. The reason he was arrested was he was challenging warlords. Most people are not that brave.

So the situation, to put it mildly, does not bode well for the upcoming elections. And this is another thing the Administration should be challenged for.

But really the worst consequence by far is the effect of the insecurity on the lives of women and girls. And this is something the Administration I feel really needs to be questioned on.

Here in the United States, Administration officials and even the President himself have repeatedly said that Afghanistan has been liberated, and noted that girls have gone back to school. The reality is more sobering. In many areas of Afghanistan today, insecurity is, in fact, forcing women and girls to stay indoors, and is depriving them of the opportunity to attend schools, go to work, or even seek health care in clinics and hospitals.

Mr. Rubin mentioned that the maternal mortality rate in Afghanistan is one of the highest in the world. It is true. We have talked to countless families who affirm that they are unable to get to hospitals because they are afraid to take to the roads in Afghanistan.

As for education, the U.N. is now estimating that 32 percent of school children in Afghanistan are girls. That sounds like good

news; however, population statistics in Afghanistan show that the majority of school-age girls in Afghanistan are not in school. The majority of school-age girls in Afghanistan are not in school. And UNICEF estimates that in some provinces the attendance rate is as low as 3 percent.

And the reasons, in many cases, are security-based. Some people think there is a cultural reason for these types of things; our research does not support that conclusion. In many provinces, Afghan families tell us they are not letting their daughters go to school because they fear they will be assaulted on the roads on the way to school, kidnapped or raped. Many say they want to send their daughters to school, but cannot.

But let me talk very briefly at the end about what we are talking about. We are talking here about human rights abuses, not about crime. And it is important to realize that the implicated parties, the perpetrators, are the gunmen who the United States Government armed to defeat the Taliban. This very much makes it the United States' responsibility to deal with the problem.

I also want to say, in my statement I have brought something up which is extremely important. These words we are using—warlords, warlordism—they are not mine, but these are the words of Afghans themselves. These are Persian and Pashtun words translated into English.

In Persian, *jang salar*, warlords. *Tufangdar*, gunmen. *Jang salari*, warlordism. These are the words Afghans themselves are using to describe those who terrorize them, and this is the vocabulary of Afghanistan today.

You have heard from other witnesses about the need for increased peace-keeping. All of that, it is in my statement. I completely support all of those, and urge you to bring those up with the Administration.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sifton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN SIFTON, AFGHANISTAN RESEARCHER, ASIA DIVISION,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Mr. Chairman,

My name is John Sifton, and I am the Afghanistan Researcher at Human Rights Watch.

Thank you for allowing me to testify today.

I want to take this opportunity to tell you about the latest research Human Rights Watch has conducted in Afghanistan, in the last six months, research in provinces across Afghanistan, based on hundreds of interviews with ordinary Afghans—farmers, teachers, laborers, doctors, aid workers, women and men. The results of this research will be published in a report to be released in July 2003, but I will describe many of our core findings here.

We don't have good news.

Human Rights Watch believes that human rights conditions in Afghanistan—which of course had improved dramatically with the collapse of the Taliban—are now in a state of deterioration.

Our most recent research shows that, in many districts and villages in Afghanistan today, families are now living in a constant state of fear. Most of the country is in the hands of warlords and gunmen—fighters in Afghanistan's past wars—who are now terrorizing local populations under their authority, robbing houses at night, stealing valuables, killing people, raping young women and girls, raping boys, seizing land from farmers, extorting money, and kidnapping young men and holding them until their families can pay a ransom. The situation is of course different in each district, but in almost every district Human Rights Watch has visited in the last six months, we have heard complaints about some or all of these types of abuses.

I have interviewed numerous families myself who have been robbed in the night by Afghan military troops or police, and listened to witnesses describe being beaten by troops, and begging for mercy.

But sadly there is more: our research has also uncovered cases of Afghan military commanders and officials—including high-level Afghan government officials—threatening and arresting journalists and political organizers, and beating or even torturing perceived opponents. I have interviewed myself several people who were tortured by Afghan government security forces, for organizing dissident political parties or groups. My colleagues have interviewed women who have been threatened with death for advocating women's rights.

Of course, these abuses are bad enough on their own, but their consequences for Afghanistan's future are even worse.

In many areas, Afghan civil society organizers, political organizers, and women's rights activists are now terrified of the warlord-rule, which makes it impossible for them to speak or organize openly. Many political organizers are now operating in secret. Journalists, in Kabul and elsewhere, are censoring themselves. The situation, to put it mildly, does not bode well for Afghanistan's upcoming constitutional *loya jirga* or elections in 2004.

The continuing instability is also keeping many refugees in Iran and Pakistan from returning home. We talked to many returned refugees, who were stuck in Kabul city, unable to return to the more dangerous rural areas. "We wish we had stayed in Pakistan," some of them said.

The worst consequence by far, however, has been the effect of the insecurity on the lives of women and girls.

Here in the United States, administration officials, and the President himself, have repeatedly said that Afghanistan has been liberated, and noted that girls have gone back in school.

The reality is more sobering. In many areas of Afghanistan today, insecurity is in fact forcing women and girls to stay indoors, and is depriving them of the opportunity to attend schools, go to work, or even seek health care at clinics and hospitals. We talked to countless families who affirmed this.

Today, the U.N. estimates that only thirty-two percent of school children in Afghanistan are girls. Population statistics in Afghanistan are always somewhat hit or miss, but under even the most conservative government estimates, it is clear that the majority of school-age girls in Afghanistan are not attending school. UNICEF estimates that in some provinces, the attendance rate for girls is as low as three percent.

Why are girls not in school? Some people think there is a "cultural" reason, having to do with entrenched Islamic conservatism. Our research does not support such a conclusion.

Instead, the reasons in many cases seem to be security-based. In many provinces, especially around Kabul, Afghan families tell us that they aren't letting their daughters go to school because they fear they will be assaulted by gunmen on the way, kidnapped or raped. Many say that they *want* to send their daughters to school, but cannot, because of insecurity.

Let me be clear about what we are talking about with all of these abuses: We are not talking about crime here, we're talking about human rights abuses by government forces: warlords and gunmen who ostensibly work for the Afghan government. We are talking about abuses by the leftover militias of the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces, the irregular military forces who work in some areas with the United State military, and the current police forces made up of former military personnel. These forces were the allies of the United States in its war against the Taliban regime, and were armed, assisted, and enabled by the U.S. government.

These words we use—"warlords" and "warlordism"—are not mine but those of Afghans themselves. They are Persian and Pashto words, translated into English: in Persian, the words *jang salar*, warlords; *tufangdar*, gunmen (*topakyan* in Pashto); *jang salari*, or *jang salarism*, warlordism, the rule of the gun. These are the words Afghans themselves are using to describe those who terrorize them.

And this the vocabulary of Afghanistan today. This is the result of the Taliban's totalitarianism being replaced by the violence and cruelty of unfettered warlordism.

RECOMMENDATIONS

You have heard from other witnesses today about the need for increased peacekeeping outside of Kabul, for more U.S. involvement in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former fighters (including a better vetting procedure, to sideline those with abusive pasts), and the need for funding for policing forces. Human Rights Watch seconds all of these recommendations. We also think that the

U.S. should insist that the United Nations increase its human rights monitoring efforts.

But we would add that there is also a need for the U.S., and all other nations involved in Afghanistan, to cut off support for the warlords themselves. We urge specifically the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency—all of whom are cooperating with local military leaders in Afghanistan—to take better steps to avoid strengthening local military leaders.

As it stands, the United States has a split strategy in Afghanistan—supporting Hamid Karzai on the one hand, but cooperating with local warlords to hunt former Taliban on the other. Indeed, U.S. officials have for the most part just stood by and allowed local military leaders to seize control of local governmental offices—not only military bases, but health departments, trash collection offices, transportation ministry officers, and so on. This is not a good policy. Oftentimes, it seems that U.S. military and intelligence officials have assumed that, because Afghan forces are helping them, these forces are good and honorable people. This is an untenable view.

One last point: At some time in the future, the situation in Afghanistan could very well explode. When that happens, it is more than likely that most people in the world will not blame the United Nations, or the people of Afghanistan. They will, however, blame the United States—which has been involved in Afghanistan's internal affairs for almost a quarter century.

It is vitally important for the U.S. administration to take action now to avoid such an outcome, and we strongly urge all of the members of this committee to urge them to do so. The U.S. must give more support to President Karzai in his efforts to bring warlords under control, and make better efforts to cut off the warlords themselves.

I will end with the words of a displaced Afghan man from a rural area who told us he was unable to return to his home district because of the security problems there. He told me:

The gunmen, who have guns in their hands, are irresponsible forces. The United States, in a way, brought them to power, and it is these gunmen who create problems now for our people. These people must be disarmed. This is the foremost, most important step to be taken, immediately. Guns must only be given to those who have been trained. You must raise our voice to the United States, to disarm these people.

I very much hope I have done so today.
Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, we really appreciate all of your testimonies here today. We are going to do that, Mr. Sifton.

In terms of the schools in Afghanistan, I did have the opportunity when I was in Afghanistan to visit a school in Kabul, one which is one of several supported by Mr. Nouri. Myself and others have served on the board of that school for the last 5 years. I thought I would share with you just the observations of the children in that school, as I asked the children what their intentions were in terms of their career.

One young man said, "I wanted to be an engineer. I want to go and study and become an engineer." And a young woman stood up. She said, "I want to be a doctor. I want to go to Kabul University and learn to be a doctor."

Now, most of the physicians in Afghanistan before the war were women. I asked her why, and she said, "Because I want to help my people."

Now, there is security in Kabul, but there is not outside of Kabul, where the warlords hold sway. And that is one of the reasons for this hearing.

I wanted to recognize Dr. Zieba Shorish-Shamley, who is with us today. I would like you to stand, if you would. She has appeared on my cable show. Would you stand up? And would the other women here in solidarity with you, with the Women's Alliance for

Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan, could I ask all the ladies here to stand for a minute and be recognized for your work?

[Applause.]

Mr. ROYCE. We want to recognize your efforts.

I think with respect to Radio Free Afghanistan, which is one of the avenues which women have right now to speak on a daily basis across Afghanistan, we have two women ministers that were elected as part of that government. Their voices are carried on those radio broadcasts.

There is an attempt here to offset what has been the consequences of the rule of the Taliban, and to reverse this process so that the historical role of women in Afghan society, in teaching, as physicians and so forth, is restored.

But Mr. Sifton is so right. A fundamental impediment of that is the security problem.

I was going to just bring up another way to engage for a moment, because Mr. Hasan Nouri has a strategy in terms of Afghan teams, soccer teams. The teams would play in the United States, and U.S. teams would play in Afghanistan, again to unite the country behind the concept of teamwork. We remember the days when Kabul Field was converted from a soccer stadium into a killing field, where women were brought on public display and executed under the Taliban for their violations of the decrees that were put down by the Taliban. Well, the goal is to return soccer as a national pastime, and I just thought I would give Mr. Nouri a chance to explain that concept.

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might at this point before we go on to the sports. You introduced the young lady there. Would you be kind enough to give her a moment to report on what she sees in the aftermath? I would so much like to hear from her.

Mr. ROYCE. I am glad to yield to the Congresswoman from California and give her an opportunity to do that.

So, Zieba, could I ask you, if you would just take the seat next to Mr. Nouri and speak for a moment? And then we can go to Mr. Nouri.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Zieba Shorish-Shamley.

STATEMENT OF ZIEBA SHORISH-SHAMLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WOMEN'S ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Ms. SHORISH-SHAMLEY. Thank you for the opportunity, thank you, Congressman Royce. You have been our friend from the beginning. The time that nobody listened about the Taliban, you did. I thank you for that.

The situation of Afghan women has not really improved. Yes, they have the right to go to school, they have the right to work, they have the right to see a doctor, they have the right to go outside without a male in tow.

However, it is all symbolic. And what we want is the full restoration of women's rights as equal to men. And we want women to be involved in every aspect of reconstruction of Afghanistan, the government of Afghanistan, as well as economic, political, and others.

What our concern is with the writing of the constitution. If the constitution is not based on the U.N. charters and international law, we are afraid—we are not against sharia, we support the Koran; however, it depends who interprets it. It is all the question of interpretation. In the Koran the women and men rights are equal.

But unfortunately, throughout history, the rights of women have been abused because the controller of the knowledge, the religious knowledge, has been men. Therefore, we want it to be based on U.N. charters, international law, and the context of Islam. So that is our concern. The way it seems, the constitution, really, nobody has seen it, and it is hush-hush. And we want the people and the women of Afghanistan to have the right to write their own constitution, and to write it based on all the laws that are accepted in the world.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. And we will ask if you would submit a statement, Zieba, for the record afterwards, as well.

Mr. Nouri, explain your concept for engagement on the soccer front.

Mr. NOURI. Yes. Mr. Chairman, soccer is the international language. We are working with your office, and we are working with the office of Congressman J. D. Hayworth from Arizona, to form a tournament for the youth—I want to underline the youth, not the professional teams—the youth from Iraq, Afghanistan, and United States to play a series of games across America. And I want to remind you, when we form the team, you can rest assured it will not be divided along the ethnic lines.

With that concept, we are progressing the American Association of Engineering Societies, having 700,000 membership in America; American Society of Civil Engineers, having 135,000 membership in America; World Federation of Engineering Societies, having 8 million membership around the world. And all of it under the Win the Peace Alliance, will be managing this soccer tournament, the Afghanistan/America Foundation, Win the Peace, an Iraqi charity organization which we have to determine, and of course the International Orphan Care, with support from Fund Flow, will be managing this soccer tournament. And we hope we get help from your office and Congressman Hayworth's office.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, it is a worthy endeavor. We are going to go to Mr. Sifton now.

You were on the ground along the Afghan/Pakistani border. And one of the issues that I would like to talk with you about is the influence of ISI, the Intelligence Service of Pakistan, on what is happening in terms of Taliban-type incursion over the border; whether or not you think that we are getting cooperation from the ISI and from Pakistan in terms of ending the incidents of groups that are in western Pakistan, that were once Taliban, returning to create unrest in Afghanistan.

Mr. SIFTON. Actually, I will take this opportunity to raise a point about something which is a little bit more worrisome, which is the fact that some of the government officials who work with the Afghan authority now are at the same time working with local leaders who are former Talibs themselves.

You know, many of the commanders in the southeast never shared the ideology of the Taliban, but joined them for survival reasons. And then, after September 11, switched back to the other side. Some of the Taliban officials are still in power.

There are a spate of attacks on girls' schools that are going on throughout the southeast right now. And in many cases, the people responsible are former Taliban and Hesby-Islami fighters who may or may not have the support of Pakistani ISI agents.

But more worrisome to me is the fact that in some provinces, the local military commanders who are cooperating ostensibly with the United States are, in fact, allowing some of these attacks to take place; are sort of giving some refuge to the former Talib and Hesby-Islamic people right in there.

If you go to Ghazni today, for instance, there are former Talib officers in the streets of Ghazni in plain clothes. And you can pretty much bet that they would not be there unless the local authorities were condoning their presence. That is a very worrisome—

Mr. ROYCE. Do you think this would be a strong argument for continuing the process of expanding an Afghan National Army, with training, to replace the regional forces—warlords, basically—that exist throughout Afghanistan today?

Mr. SIFTON. Yes. I think the biggest concern right now is that local security is being put into the hands of local militias, about whom the United States does not really understand. Some of those are getting assistance from the United States. I mean, we are worried about ISI, but you have to understand that some of these have received assistance, and are continuing to receive assistance, from the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is a very worrisome thing when you have these local commanders who can take money from Iranian Sipa Pasteran. They can take money from CIA, they can take money from other people. You have various actors who at the same time are buying allegiances. That is a very worrisome situation, because it is strengthening them. It is strengthening them.

Mr. ROYCE. Right. And looking at the long-term solution to this, it would seem the only long-term solution is an Afghan National Army properly trained and equipped by the international community.

Mr. SIFTON. The long-term solution is absolutely a central authority, whether it is the Army or whether it is more police. Professor Rubin brought up earlier today the notion of a central police force; that also should be explored.

We do not want an army policing the streets of the United States. I mean, in the long term you really want the police. But again, these are long-term goals. In the short term, I agree with all the other participants that the need is for an international peace-keeping force.

Mr. ROYCE. An international peace-keeping force and a constitution which guarantees the rights of everyone, including women. A constitution which is an international constitution, enforced by that national army, under a centralized government in Afghanistan.

Mr. SIFTON. In the long term, absolutely.

Mr. ROYCE. I mean, they can federalize the system, but you cannot have a successful system where you federalize the army. That is not going to succeed.

Mr. SIFTON. But you are not going to have any system if the elections cannot go forward in a free and fair manner.

Mr. ROYCE. Right.

Mr. SIFTON. And as the situation stands now that is not going to happen. And the only way it is going to happen is if the international monitoring, disarmament peace-keeping monitoring, all of that goes forward. That is the need in the short term, absolutely.

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Would it be helpful if we took a codel over to Afghanistan to find out just what is going into this constitution, that will guarantee all persons, as the Chairperson just said, their rights, and particularly women?

I am intrigued by what is going on in the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan, and what you say is happening, and how women themselves are feeling about their freedoms. So I think what would be—and I would like some comment from the Chair—potent, would be to go over there as an official delegation from the House of Representatives, to follow up on the development of the rights of all Afghan people, and the rights of women. And how those rights are going to be protected. And when those rights are violated, what the consequences might be.

And I think just hearing it from abroad like we are hearing today is not good enough for me. And as I understand you, Ms. Shorish-Shamley, but it is not good enough for you, either. You have not had input, is that correct?

Ms. SHORISH-SHAMLEY. There are some women on the committee or commission. But really, to be 100 percent honest with you, it is controlled by men, and it is written by men.

And the other thing that recently it was in the news, other problem is that some people, I do not know whether it was Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, one of them reported that the people are very angry—no, International Crisis Group—reported that people are unhappy because they are not consulted.

So the constitution of the people, by the people, for the people really does not exist. A few people are writing it, and a lot of people have not seen it.

Ms. WATSON. Well, let me conclude my part by saying that I would hope that the Chair and the Ranking Member would agree that we should follow up.

I think part of the problem we are facing in the Middle East with the countries where we have been involved is that the follow-up has declined. And if we want to see peace and stability and unity, whatever that is, we are going to have to be present.

And as you say, you need to have your input. And women need to have their say. We love our men, but we, as women, love ourselves, too. And we should be consulted. We should be part of the drafting, and part of the approval process. And if we are not involved all the way, then I do not think it will be legitimate, and it will not be authentic, and it will not be enforced.

So I am making a strong suggestion, Mr. Chair, that we do take a codel over there. I am volunteering to lead it, and I want you to come with me, too.

Thank you very much.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I could not be happier to accept your invitation. And Mr. Faleomavaega, would you like to proceed? Would you like to be recognized?

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are so recognized.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am sorry, my apologies for not being here earlier to listen to the statements of our witnesses. But I am sure they probably covered pretty much of the same ground that we had discussed earlier with the previous panel.

And initially also, Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with the comments made earlier by the gentlelady from California, Ms. Watson, regarding the whole problem involving our foreign policies toward not only to this specific nation of Afghanistan, but even to other regions of the world, as well. I readily admit, Mr. Chairman, and I want to give my personal commendation and accolade. Probably no other Member of Congress knows more about Afghanistan than you, Mr. Chairman, whom I have had the privilege of traveling with on a previous occasion on the borders of Afghanistan, even though we were in Basul. I did take a shower there, as well.

But Mr. Chairman, I think in giving our—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You might mention who you slept with that night.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes. With a 45-caliber pistol.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I got the shotgun.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You had the shotgun, I had the .45. But I think if we are ever to get a better perspective in terms of our country's interest with nations of the world, this is one situation that I think it is just the way things are, and it is so difficult. Not wanting to be boastful or trying to say that our country is so important, but the fact is that many countries of the world are constantly trying to get our country's attention to their interests.

So there is always that basis where countries are wanting to share with us their problems, and hopefully receive help to solve the problems that they are faced with.

But I think most Americans will associate Afghanistan with what had happened when the Soviet Union unilaterally sent a whole bunch of divisions in the military force to occupy Afghanistan. The Soviet Union's experience with Afghanistan came about in the same way that our experience was with Vietnam.

I think this speaks well to the character of the people of Afghanistan. These people are warriors. They love to fight, just like the Irish people and the Samoans. They love to fight. And to this day, my understanding of why we have different warlords and different clans, and are constantly at each other's throats, is the simple reason that they are very independent-minded people. And probably least of all, they do not like to be told by anybody in terms of how to run their affairs.

If we are to give some perspective on exactly what drew our country into Afghanistan, I would venture to say in my humble opinion, it was not for some real humanitarian purpose. It was be-

cause we were attacked on September 11, 2001, when some 3,000 innocent people were killed, or murdered, if you will, by acts of terrorists. And I think this is what opened the whole door in terms of our country's efforts as to say who did this.

The first name that came about was Osama bin Laden. And where was Osama bin Laden? He was stationed in Afghanistan. I think one thing led to another. This is what drew our country into war, not with Afghanistan but the Taliban, the al-Qaeda elements, and trying to find Osama bin Laden.

And next to establish some kind of a democratic government, knowing that these factions continued to exist, and these warlords are still fighting among themselves even after the Afghans kicked out the Soviet Union. And I cannot help but remind the Members of the Committee, probably one word that speaks quite well were the statements made earlier by Dr. Rubin, the situation that we find ourselves in right now in Afghanistan, and that word is security. As long as the situation exists where there is no real unanimity or consensus even among the warlords to have a democratic form of government, I think the current President or the Prime Minister is going to continue having problems.

It is obvious that our own intelligence community continues to have a very difficult time. We cannot even find Osama bin Laden, let alone we cannot even find Saddam Hussein. We seem to be going parallel in terms of what we are doing right now with Afghanistan, and what we are now experiencing with Iraq—again, the same problem of security.

I would be the last one to say, Mr. Chairman, with our soldiers continuing to be shot at like sitting ducks in Iraq, some 150,000 soldiers—and I do not know how many soldiers we now have in Afghanistan, if any—but the problem of security continues to be, in my humble opinion, the number one concern that I would have. I do not think it is going to be possible for the people of Afghanistan to be united to establish a democratic form of government. I am very curious about that.

I am sorry, I think I see the red light, Mr. Chairman. I did not mean to speak overtime.

One thing that I want to say is that I am really, really happy about the fact that the women of Afghanistan are given a much better status than what they were given under the extreme or orthodox views of the Taliban, where they were under the rule of whatever form of government they had established there in Afghanistan.

One question I would like to ask the members of the panel. Am I off in my assessment in saying that security is the number one problem right now in Afghanistan? You do not need to tell me about the heroin and the drug trafficking, because that is happening also in Asia. But I would like to ask the members of the panel, am I off in my assessment that security is a very serious problem right now in that society?

Ms. SHORISH-SHAMLEY. It is. And you are right. And we have been asking for the expansion of security forces beyond Kabul. That is the only way we can disarm the warlords and the armed militias.

But unfortunately, nobody is listening to the observation of the Afghan people. So unless there is expansion of security forces until the Afghan military is formed, and the police force is formed, we need that force in order to control the warlords.

As well, I want to also add that we also want the Congress to help us to push for an inclusion of women, Afghan women, in the armed forces and the police, as well as national army, and someday international force.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right, thank you very much.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. May I pose a quick answer?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You certainly may.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. Thank you very much. I just would like to offer one not opposing voice, but a contrasting voice. I think from the standpoint of Americans or outsiders, perhaps security is the number one issue; it is the most glaring and obvious thing that intrudes the pursuit of our goals in the country.

However, from the standpoint of the common Afghan, it is poverty and absolute deprivation. And many of these people have been absolutely victimized by war, devastated by drought. They have nothing. And they are not being given adequate support to go back and rehabilitate their lives.

If you were to ask the bulk of those, and if they were the ones voting, I doubt that security would be their primary concern.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And the Chair now, we have to be out of here at 3 o'clock, so the Chair will take the prerogative of having the time to ask questions. Maybe, I guess I am batting clean-up here, or whatever it is, to come at the very end.

I apologize for not being with you for the whole hearing. I was with you in the beginning. And I certainly agree with Mr. Leatherwood, that security is something that derives from other factors. It is not simply a goal that you achieve in and of itself. You can have security in a prison, you can have security in a concentration camp; what good is that? You can have security where everybody is so weak and hungry that they cannot stand up. What kind of security is that?

Security in Afghanistan, and I think in most places, there is a direct link between the security and stability of a given area, and the economic viability and the economic well-being of the people of that area.

People who are prosperous, even Afghans who like to fight as you say, will refrain from certain aggression if they feel comfortable with their lives. And they do not want to risk—Afghans, like anyone else, they do not want to risk their children. They do not like to fight if their children are going to be killed. They do not. And the agony of the Afghan people over these 20 years has been something that the American people did not understand. And millions of people lost their lives, and millions of others were maimed.

Children to this day step on land mines that we have the mujahudin to plant in order to defeat the Soviet Union. And when we walked away the first time, after the Soviets were defeated, it was a crime. We were not going to be secure, and we were not going to have our own safety, unless the Afghans had some sort of

modicum of justice and stability, and yes, economic well-being in their own lives.

A couple thoughts. And first and foremost about the economic well-being. And I understand your testimony has pretty well suggested that things are not going as well as they should. And from what I understand, I characterized it earlier in the hearing earlier today as anemic. And my understanding from those people who are there is that what we have got is a commitment from the United States, but an inability to break through the bureaucratic barriers of making it real.

Is that what you see? Or do you see a lack of fundamental commitment? Go right ahead.

Mr. SIFTON. I actually believe that the primary problem remains the need to lay a framework of human rights protections and security.

Solving problems with bureaucratic hold-ups, the constitution, the political machinations of the upcoming elections, may only be rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I was thinking more of the economic arena, where instead of having the huge amount of reconstruction that we envisioned, that I envisioned would take place after a year, it seems to be less than substantial.

Mr. SIFTON. But even if the money was there, it would be very difficult for most agencies, whether international agencies, U.S.-funded agencies, or anybody else, even private agencies, to actually implement reconstruction on the ground. Because it is literally impossible to travel safely, for both Afghans and international, to many places in Afghanistan.

On top of that, the beneficiaries of these programs are staying behind in urban areas, in many cases. I think you can say as well as I can that—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note this, that I was in Afghanistan 1 month ago. And I drove across the country myself, all right? Now, I do not know what that means. But if someone wants to help the people of Afghanistan, maybe they have to be willing to drive across the country. And maybe there is a reason to be afraid, but I will have to say, by my reading, more people were killed in Los Angeles County last month than were killed in Afghanistan.

Mr. SIFTON. There is no way of knowing, because the international community is not monitoring in many places adequately. I mean, it is like a tree falling in the forest.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will tell you, I drove across Afghanistan. I did not see this chaos. And certainly there are evil forces at play. If the NGOs do not want to take a risk, maybe they should stay home and decide to let other people who have a little bit more guts to go out there and start helping people.

The bottom line is helping people sometimes takes a risk. And I will have to say, having driven across the country, like sleeping in bed with a .45 automatic or a shotgun when we were there on the border.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, they were afraid of you. That is why nobody—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They were afraid of me. But let me, I would just suggest that I did not see this. And I think that it is disgrace-

ful that we have—if, indeed, we have permitted a few evil groups that are organized here and there to cower what should be a multi-billion-dollar effort to reconstruct that country, we should be ashamed of ourselves.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Just one sentence, Mr. Chairman. The biggest concern that I have right now on behalf of our country is that our commitment to Iraq now is so intense, at the expense of Afghanistan's needs, and this is where my fear lies. We are paying more attention to Iraq, and I do not think we are giving as much attention as we should to Afghanistan.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me suggest this. I am reclaiming my time. I do not think that is the reason why it is not happening in Afghanistan. The President has made it very clear that he is maintaining—in fact, his big speech on Iraq included a part on Afghanistan—do not worry, we are not going to forget you.

But it is not happening, for some reason. It is not happening because the President does not want it to happen? No, the President wants it to happen. And there is something, maybe it is the fear on the part of the NGOs, maybe it is the fear of the bureaucracy. Maybe it is just plain inertia for some reason. But we do not have a situation where money is being infused into the bottom level of Afghanistan.

If we come in with big construction projects, and hire people at \$10 a day, you will have an economy there, because someone will be able to pay for his family. If you do not have that job for that person, that wealth will not be in that society. And the only source of wealth that I have seen, by this hearing and others, is what? Drugs. Drugs. That is not a healthy way to build a society.

Let me go on. By the way, let me note this. All this talk about the warlords, and I do not know which warlords you are talking about, but I will say this. The non-warlords in the southern part of the country were sympathetic to the Taliban, and were our enemies, you know. And Dostan, Atta, even Fahim, who there are some questions about him and the way he is handling himself now—but these were people—and Ismail Khan—these were people that defeated the Taliban, who slaughtered thousands of American lives.

Just keep that in mind, if you are an American. They came to help us defeat people who slaughtered our own people. And I am grateful for that. And I am not about to label them in these pejorative terms, especially when the Taliban are still on the border being helped by the Pakistanis to kill Americans and other people. Taliban are right over the hill, and already we are going to label the guys who helped us get rid of them as the bad guys? I do not think so. And I would admonish, I would admonish the people who are involved in Afghanistan not to go so quickly in getting rid of people who helped us to defeat the Taliban, when there are so many people who were supportive of the Taliban who are still around.

And I think the best way to go, Mr. Rohrabacher's suggestion is let us make sure that we have elections that are internationally supervised, so that these supposed warlords are as unpopular, and if they are gangsters who are keeping control through fear in those local areas; if Ismail Khan really is not accepted by his people, if

Dostan really is a guy who is not accepted by his people; let us make sure those people have a right to vote in secret ballots. That is our job, with our troops outside and throughout the country, with the United Nations and the rest of the people there. Let us let those people vote and determine who their local leaders are going to be.

And if they do not vote for Ismail Khan, and they do not vote for Dostan, let us let them elect whomever they want. But at this time, I have heard a lot of negative posturing about people like these people, who happen to have been the guys who sided with the United States.

Sure, go right ahead. We have got a couple minutes. Let us have a little dialogue.

Mr. SIFTON. Two things I will just say very quickly. About the choice for elections. It is going to be extraordinarily difficult for people to vote freely, or even vote at all, when they are unable to even feel safe going outside of their homes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, come on, wait. Don't tell me that. I just got back from Afghanistan. That is baloney. That is absolute baloney. You know, I drove across that country. Don't tell me people are afraid to go out of their homes, they are not. They are not afraid to disagree with people either.

There is some level where people, of course, have to be cautious. But that is just utter baloney.

Mr. NOURI. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Mr. NOURI. A country that has been at war for 25 years, I can buy 100 votes for \$10. The warlords do have the money, and they can threaten to get votes, and they can buy votes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is almost as bad as some of the cities in our country, I have to admit that. That is why we should not have elections in Chicago, I guess.

Let me put it this way to you. It has never been pure in the United States, it has never been pure in any democracy. That is not a reason not to have elections. And for people who are suggesting that local people cannot elect their own leaders, they are setting up a scenario for continued violence and continued animosity.

If we end up having a police force that is being led by people who are appointed by some outsider, there is going to be a lot of problems in Afghanistan, just like there would be in any other country, including Iraq.

Mr. Leatherwood, you had something to say?

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. I did. Let me just say that there are many, many people, hundreds of thousands in Afghanistan who do not have homes to go out of. And that is a critical problem in Kabul. It has been repeatedly identified as the single most significant felt need.

The highest numbers and categories of vulnerable people are widow-headed or women-headed households who are in this condition. They are living in parks, in abandoned buildings, in destroyed houses that do not belong to them. And we cannot get a penny of support from the U.S. Government or any of their constituent agencies.

So there are enormous gaps in the funding strategies, in the way those strategies are being administered. And I am sorry, it is not just a security issue with soldiers. It is about—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As I say, I could not agree with you more. And on top of that, you do not have to wait until there is absolute security to initiate a massive reconstruction effort. I am sorry if the NGOs are afraid to come out of their buildings; I think it reflects the NGOs being afraid, not the Afghan people.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. It is regional. I mean, the things that he is saying about Ghazni and Kandahar are absolutely correct. But you probably drove up in the north.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is right.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. And we have had Americans, women, living there for years without ever having any incident or any sense of problem.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Correct, correct.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. There is lawlessness, but it is not—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Correct. And let me note that it is in the north where all these warlords are that they are going to eliminate, and it is in the south that supposedly they do not have the warlord problem like they do in the north.

Mr. SIFTON. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Wait 1 second, because we are going to be out of here in a couple minutes.

What about the drug problem? And I am sure people must have asked about this before. Can the United States go in and—there are ways we can eliminate those crops, but of course we have to make sure we give these people a source of income.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. Alternatives.

Mr. SIFTON. To be clear, I mean really, we can do anything. I mean, I am not advocating anybody stopping anything, stopping elections, not going out.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Mr. SIFTON. And the NGOs are going out, by the way, they really are.

What we are advocating is ways that the United States and the international community can improve the reconstruction effort, improve the elections, make them better. And I am saying why not? Why don't we improve them to be the best that they can be?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me know this. When I came in you were talking about how important—

Ms. SHORISH-SHAMLEY. Congressman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. One second. When I came in you were talking about how important centralization is. Now, I do not know if you have ever run for election, or you know the dynamics of how the electoral process works in various countries around the world. You may even know better than I do. I happen to have run for election and understand how some of these dynamics work, and I have participated in various parts of the world in setting up the democratic process.

Centralization, this idea that centralization causes stability is, I mean, it is exactly the opposite of what reality is. But it is really a cliché that everybody will accept.

Now, you may be an expert on how to build hospitals, or I am not sure what your specialty is. I know you have a human rights specialty. Certainly we cannot accept any society where someone feels that they are going to get beat up, or their wife is going to get murdered or raped, if they disagree with the tough guy who is in charge of the local community.

But centralization is not, does not create the dynamics where that tough guy disappears. Unfortunately, in Afghanistan we had great leaders, like Commander Massoud and Abdul Hawk, who were vibrant, and they cared about their people. And they were Pashtuns, and they were Tajiks, and they are wonderful people. We have been at war for 20 years, and so many of these wonderful people who would have provided good leadership are dead. Abdul Hawk is gone, Massoud is gone. These are guys I knew.

And just centralizing power in Kabul, and manipulating it so the majority clans will feel comfortable, you know, rather than having the Tajiks be able to have their own militia, or Dostan over there, or Ismail Khan. The centralizing power is not going to create a positive dynamic in that society. In the end it will have the opposite effect, and tear it apart.

Ms. SHORISH-SHAMLEY. Congressman, I agree with you 100 percent on the local autonomy of the people to make their own destiny. A centralized government has really not worked. I agree on that issue. History has proven that.

The security and the destabilization of the Afghan situation right now, you have got to keep in mind that Russia, India, and Iran have gone to one camp, trying to destabilize, supporting certain groups. And Pakistan and Taliban and al-Qaeda. So it is a reality. And that is why, again, we are asking for the expansion of security forces until our own army, that is the Afghan army is trained and the police force is trained.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, just to be clear, I am in favor of an Afghan army, independent. I am in favor of demobilizing the warlord armies and working into that. And I think that we have to be very careful about what is going on on the border now.

Look, we heard the testimony, 90 percent of the heroin is coming from the Pashtun areas, basically in the south. We know that up in the Panjsher Valley they have got some problems, as well. But 90 percent. And that is, a lot of that drug money is going into the same Taliban hands and al-Qaeda-type people that threaten the entire stability, threaten to undo everything that has been done. So we have got to be very cautious. Making sure we have a military presence throughout the country would be good, and phasing out these warlord armies by giving their men something to do with their time. You cannot just say we are going to eliminate the warlord armies; you have got to give those men a way to lay down that gun and pick up something to build their society.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. Very briefly, can I just give a quick anecdotal example?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure, go for it.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. We had two opposing warlords in one area that we were working near Kesham, where the earthquake was, and they were fighting each other. There was no contact that they had with one another. They belonged to different factions.

But we built a road through there, actually with cash-for-work money that was supposedly directed at poppy eradication. But in the context of building that road, there was a common objective that both of these men and the people that they were supported by could see.

In the context of coming together around the building of that road, these people learned to work together, and now they are not fighting. They are working together to build a better community.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. This is one other way, other than just outside force, for addressing the problem of warlordism.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As I drove across Afghanistan—my wife was with me, by the way, in this car—we saw something, a group of young people, kids, over here. And we said we have got to stop here; stop, stop. And it was sort of in a big, not a valley, but sort of a gorge area. And there was an old, just destroyed building there, and you know, these burned-out tanks—and I do not have to tell you that Russian burned-out tanks are all over the place. By the way, that might be a source of scrap metal that we can build some industry around; you know, melting down those tanks and selling that scrap metal.

So here we went over there, and there was a couple hundred kids in this ruin. And they had literally restacked the rocks so they could sit there, and they were teaching each other how to read. What a magnificent sight. What a magnificent tribute to the determination and the character of the Afghan people. Their children were there teaching themselves how to read, and how to do numbers.

Well, we need to help them build a school. We need to infuse some cash into that society so that they can make money building schools and hospitals. And that will help bring peace. And rather than just these schemes of how to reorganize the government by centralizing power in Kabul, and having somebody who we can manipulate being the head of the government, which is basically the plan—I mean, that is what that centralization talk is all about.

I would like to put in the record a letter that I have sent to the Administrator of USAID here and Andrew Natsios. And this is just, as we close this hearing, I am very concerned that United Nations humanitarian air service flights are excluding American military personnel who are not armed, our chaplains, our medical officers and people like that. Our civil engineers and civil groups that are going out, civil affairs groups that are going out in the country have been excluded from the United Nations humanitarian air service flights.

This is absolutely ridiculous. We are funding some of the NGOs that are opposing our own troops and our own people getting on this plane. We are not militarizing those flights. And I just, for the record, if I see NGOs who are trying to strike out and just slap America gratuitously like this, those NGOs are not going to get any funds out of this Committee, and I will make sure they do not get it out of AID.

You know, our people are there to try to help that country. And especially those who are in the civil affairs groups, who are going

out trying to locate projects to do and help people, let us get them out there. We want them out in the countryside.

One last thing. I was so inspired, as well, when I met with groups of women in Afghanistan. Let us not forget that the Taliban—and remember, the King had such a, he was trying to evolve this society out of this horrible discrimination that they have had against women in the past. Zahir Shah was going in the right direction, and then we had the communists come in, and then the Taliban, and you know, Hectmactiar Golbadin and the rest of those bad people.

The women now have a chance in Afghanistan. This is time for us to, more than anything else, show our solidarity with the women of Afghanistan. This is their moment. Because if we do not do it now, it is never going to work. I mean, if we lose now, it is back to the old dark ages.

I went there, and I was so proud that we had spent money making bakeries and giving them to the widows of Afghanistan, letting the widows own the bakeries and earn their own living. It is terrific. And this is important.

Let us never forget that what happened on 9/11 happened because our government decided that they were going to cut a devil's deal in the creation of the Taliban. Our government, with the Saudis and the Pakistanis, created the Taliban. And then we did not do anything to help the women, as they were being brutalized. We did not help any of the other people. Our government did not lift one finger to help when they should have realized that the Taliban were as evil as they were, and it came back to hurt us. When you do something immoral, it comes back to hurt you. And the United States, by not helping the people of Afghanistan by their inaction, were operating in an immoral way.

It is up to us to make sure that we set the right path, not only for Afghanistan, but for the United States of America.

Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon at 3:15 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]